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Abstract 
 
This is the first focused study of the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, the most 
influential and organised social and political movement in Kuwait, from its beginnings in 
1946up to2000. It focuses on the circumstances surrounding the emergence and 
development of the Muslim Brotherhood as part of a general Islamic revival in Kuwait. It 
argues that the Muslim Brotherhood was driven first and foremost by cultural 
considerations and that Kuwaiti secularists regarded it as a challenge to their growing 
influence in both the political domain (traditionally controlled by the ruling family) and the 
social domain (historically under the control of the religious establishment). The resulting 
conflict with secularists over the social domain posed a serious threat to the Muslim 
Brotherhood who considered themselves an extension of the traditional religious 
establishment. They also viewed the secularists’ attempts to reshape Kuwaiti identity as a 
threat to Kuwait’s Islamic identity. This prompted the Muslim Brotherhood to channel all 
their social, educational and political efforts towards reclaiming the social domain. 
This study focuses also on the mechanisms adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood, ones 
which combined Islamic values with modern mobilisation strategies producing a dynamic 
Islamist movement seeking to revive the golden age of Islam through modern means. The 
movement maintained a pyramid hierarchy and it refashioned modern economic theory to 
make it more compatible with Islamic teachings.  It also established a Muslim Boy Scouts 
movement and an Islamic press, while it reformed other organisations to make them 
compatible with Islamic values. All this was done in an effort to implement Hasan al-
Banna’s vision of fashioning a pious Muslim individual, a virtuous family and, finally, a 
true Muslim state. The Muslim Brotherhood’s comprehensive and sweeping agenda seeks 
the complete transformation of social conditions. The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait was 
not very different from its mother organisation in Egypt. It played a pioneering role in 
revising Islamic banking, developing charity work and challenging secularism. The 
Kuwaiti political system supported the Muslim Brotherhood in its struggle against 
secularists, but the Muslim Brotherhood nonetheless stayed out of politics, focusing on 
rehabilitating the social domain, in the interests of maintaining on good terms with the 
ruling family.  
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Notes on Transliteration 
 
The standard transliteration of the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 
(IJMES) has been adopted for transliterating Arabic words. Arabic words and titles quoted 
from different sources are written as in the original where they are printed in italics and 
followed by their English translation for explanatory purposes. Some words have been 
written in as they appeared in the word list of IJMES such as Shiʿa, shariʿa, and daʿwah. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview  
The modern Islamist movement in Kuwait today traces its roots back to the 1940s, when 
ʿAbdulʿazizal-Mutawwaʿ become a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1941 and later 
imported this ideology and the organisational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt to Kuwait in 1946. During the early years of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, al-
Mutawwaʿ applied the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s method of mobilizing the masses 
to promote an Islamic revival in Kuwait. Al-Mutawwaʿ called the new organisation 
Jamʿiyyatal-Irshadal-Islami [The Society of Islamic Guidance]. Its purpose was to spread 
the message of Islam to the wider Kuwaiti public. Al-Irshad, as the founders called it, 
succeeded in recruiting large numbers of young people and adults within few years. 
However, this success did not last for long because of internal disagreements between the 
founders as well as a negative public opinion towards the movement in Kuwait that 
resulted directly from Nasser’s attack on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Al-Irshad 
gradually diminished in size until it was eventually closed down in 1959, when all 
societies and clubs were ordered to close by an Emiri decree immediately after the UAR 
anniversary celebrations at Shuwaikh School in Kuwait City. From 1958 to 1968, the 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood splintered into small groups in the wake of pressure 
from the Nationalists and Nasserites, forcing them to go underground to practice their 
religious and organizational activities secretly. During this period, Islamists including 
former members of al-IrshadJamʿiyyatal-Islahal-Ijtimaʿi [Social Reform Society] which 
enabled members of the Muslim Brotherhood working in society. From 1958 to 1968 was 
a transitional period for the Muslim Brotherhood to rebuild its organization and reshape 
many of its ideas. Nasser’s defeat in the 1967 War by Israel provided the Muslim 
Brotherhood with a much-needed reprieve and reenergized their organization in the Arab 
World. In 1968, a small number of Kuwaiti members of the Muslim Brotherhood re-
established the organization on the same basis as before, but with different people and a 
new method. This new organization of Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait was influenced by 
the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational method, which was clandestine, cautious, 
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and entailed a long spiritual and organizational training for its members. This strict method 
and the lengthy training period built a cohesive generation of Muslim Brotherhood that 
was more numerous and better organized than its predecessor, a tradition that continues to 
the present day. 
The branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Palestine have been studied at 
length. Research on the Muslim Brotherhood in other countries, however, has received 
little or no attention. As a result, the experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood in other 
countries were greatly influenced and even dominated by the Egyptian experience, which 
greatly impacted the general perception of the Muslim Brotherhood and writings thereon. 
The Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf has received the least attention, with almost nothing 
written about its origins, development, ideology, organizational structure, mobilization, 
and influence on the society. The experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in this part of the 
world remains understudied and misunderstood.  
This study unearths the story of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, filling a very specific 
gap in the literature on Islamist movements. Special attention has been paid to the gradual 
development of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait and the different phases it went 
through from the late 1940s until the end of the twentieth century. Its focuses mainly on 
the quest to win back the control over the social domain after it was taken over by the 
seculars during the 1950s and 1960s. Historically, the study argues, traditional Muslim 
societies have been split into two main domains; political and social. Traditionally, the 
social domain was controlled by the religious establishment. The rise of the secular powers 
in Kuwait, however, that domain was gradually dominated by them which made the 
religious establishment, including Islamist Movements, feel threaten because of the loss of 
the domain it had controlled for a very long time. The study also applies Social Movement 
Theory to this case study to enhance our understanding of how Islamist movements in the 
Middle East progress on different levels (political, social, economic, etc.). It explains why 
and how different branches of the same movement act and react according to socio-
political circumstances. The case of the Kuwaiti branch of the Muslim Brotherhood shows 
important differences that differentiate it from the mother organization in Egypt where the 
former does not have a real problem with the existing political system while in Egypt the 
movement aims to change the whole system. 
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1.2 Literature Review 
In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attack on the USA, studies on Islamist 
movements increased dramatically. However, their main focus was on the relatively new 
and radical Islamist movements such as al-Qaeda and Hizbullah. Less interest was paid to 
the origins and history of old and non-violent Islamist movements such as Salafis and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the Gulf received the least 
consideration in terms of published works on the topic. Almost the only publications on 
the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait are Falah al-Mdaires’Jama’at al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimin fi al-Kuwait [The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait] (2010), Ali al-Zumai’s 
“The Intellectual and Historical Development of Islamist Movement in Kuwait 1950-
1981” (1988), Shafiq Ghabra’s “Balancing State and Society: The Islamist Movement in 
Kuwait” (1997), Sami ʿAwadh’s Al-Ahzab al-Islamiyya fi al-Kuwait: al-Shi’a, al-Ikhwan, 
al-Salaf [Islamic Political Parties in Kuwait: Shiʿa, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Salaf] 
(1999), Mustafa al-Tahhan’s Rihlat al-ʿUmr fi al-Kuwait [Life Journey in Kuwait] (No 
date), and Nathan Brown’s “Pushing toward Parties Politics? Kuwait’s Constitutional 
Islamist movement” (2007). There have been other studies but they either address the 
contemporary politics of the Muslim Brotherhood or other issues relating to the movement 
other than its history. Among the aforementioned authors, only al-Mdaires dedicated his 
whole pamphlet (around 80 pages) to the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, 
while the other studies were either chapters in a book (al-Zumai, ʿAwadh, and Lahoud-
Tatar) an article in a scholarly periodical (Ghabrah and Brown), or were mentioned in 
passing in some memoirs (al-Tahhan).
1
 
These studies include either: (i) a short overview of the history of the Muslim Brotherhood 
with a greater focus on the development of the official institutions of the movement (al-
Irshad and later al-Islah) rather than the movement itself, (ii) a discussion of the political 
actions of the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), the political wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, (iii) the history of the movement in social work and religious activities in 
                                                     
1
 There are other publications on Islamists in general. See Falah al-Mdaires, Jamaʿat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin 
fi al-Kuwait [Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait]. Kuwait: Dar Qurtas, 1999, Ali al-Zumai,“The Intellectual and 
Historical Development of Islamist movement in Kuwait 1950-1981”(PhD diss. University of Exeter, 1988), 
Shafiq Ghabra,”Balancing State and Society: The Islamist movement in Kuwait,”Middle East Policy, Vol. 5, 
No. 2(May 1997), Sami ʿAwadh, Al-Ahzab al-Islamiyya fi al-Kuwait: al-Shiʿa, al-Ikhwan, al-Salaf [Islamic 
Parties in Kuwait: Shia, Muslim Brotherhood, and Salaf], (Kuwait: Dar al-Naba’, 1999), Mustafa al-Tahhan, 
Rihlat al-Umor fi al-Kuwait [Life Journey in Kuwait].(Unpublished, no date), and Nathan Brown,“ Pushing 
toward Parties Politics? Kuwait’s Constitutional Islamist movement” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. No.79 (January 2007). 
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society and how the movement worked to spread the word of Islam, (iv) an analysis of a 
single issue (political, social … etc.) or periods such as the 1970s or the Iraqi occupation 
of 1990-91. None offers a comprehensive study and analysis of the history of the 
movement.  
When one studies the existing literature on the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, one is 
bound to encounter different interpretations of the history of the movement for various 
reasons. For instance, foreign researchers face a big challenge in gathering information and 
conducting interviews in the conservative society of Kuwait. The sensitivity of the topic 
and the type of people to be interviewed (Islamist activists) makes the task even more 
difficult. On the other hand, in the small yet politicized and ideologically charged society 
of Kuwait, it is not easy to write in a completely unbiased way if one is Kuwaiti himself. 
Al-Mdaires and Ghabra, secular liberals, thus adopt a negative position toward Islamists, 
especially the Muslim Brotherhood, a fact that is reflected in their narrative and analysis of 
the movement. For example, Ghabra argues that Islamists allied with Bedouins in order to 
get the latter’s support, and by doing so, Islamists had to merge Bedouin values with 
Islam. The result of this alliance was the “desertization” of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
values and practice in society. Ghabra argues that this alliance served to make society 
more backward and conservative. On the same issue, but in stark contrast, al-Tahhan 
explains how the movement played an important role in Islamic revival in Kuwait.  Al-
Tahhan asserts that the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait through charitable organizations 
and student unions played a significant role in spreading Islamic values in society. The 
grassroots method of changing the society the Muslim Brotherhood worked on during 
1970s and 1980s was reflected on the new generation of youth especially in Kuwait 
University where in 1960s the number of veiled female students did not exceed the number 
of hand fingers, yet after two decades the number of veiled female students were hundreds.  
Apart from these problems, three approaches underpin the literature of the history of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait: socio-cultural, political, and holistic. The socio-cultural 
approach stresses the social and cultural activities of the movement. In the case of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the goal of religious activities is to ensure that Islamic teachings are 
practiced in society. Both Ghabra and al-Tahhan examine the history of the movement 
within this framework. Ghabra argues that the political agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood 
is based on enforcing their interpretation of shariʿa, such as “severing thieves’ hands, 
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outlawing interest rates, segregating the sexes, and enforcing the dress code for women.”2 
Because of their limited socio-cultural goal, the Muslim Brotherhood did not have 
problems allying with the government
3
, which saw Islamists as the best way to establish a 
balance of power against the Nationalists.
4
 Similarly, al-Tahhan asserts that the biggest 
accomplishment of the Islamist movement in Kuwait has been the restoration of Islamic 
values in society through charity organizations, youth clubs, and other social activities.  
Al-Tahhan also stresses the role of student associations in impressing Islamic ideals upon 
the new generation of university students. Nevertheless, this socio-cultural approach does 
not exclude the political aspect of the movement but rather allocates it a smaller role in 
shaping its relationships, goals, and activities. 
The political approach naturally stresses political goals over others. In his letters, Hasan al-
Banna declared the political goal of restoring the Caliphate to be the highest goal of the 
movement.
5
 However, none of the authors believe that the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait 
supports this goal. The study by Brown on the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Kuwait, the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM),
6
 explains the role of the ICM in the 
political life in Kuwait. For Brown, the ICM, as its name indicates, aims to apply Islamic 
teachings to everyday life through constitutional means. Additionally, Brown argues that 
the ICM believes democracy is compatible with Islam; indeed, protecting democracy is an 
Islamic obligation. In this sense, the political framework of the Muslim Brotherhood is 
compatible with its ideology. Al-Mdaires, on the other hand, cites the ICM as being a mere 
opportunistic movement that utilizes religion for the benefit of its members. He also 
argues, like Ghabra, that during the mid-1950s and 1960s the Muslim Brotherhood was at 
its weakest while the Nationalists had reached the height of their success. This situation led 
to a coalition between the government and the Islamists to counter-balance the influence of 
Nationalists. 
In addition to al-Mdaires and Brown, Carine Lahoud-Tatar adds an interesting perspective 
about the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. The work of Lahoud-Tatar focuses on the 
                                                     
2
Ghabra, “Balancing,” 63. 
3
 The government in Kuwait is controlled by the Emir who appoints the prime minister.  
4
 The Nationalist movement was very active in late 1950s and during 1960s, and they were the dominant 
political force in Kuwait. In 1959 the Nationalists organized a huge event to celebrate the Egyptian-Syrian 
Union and al-Qatami gave a harsh speech attacking the tribal government in Kuwait which resulted in 
dissolving all clubs in Kuwait. See Ghabra, “Balancing”. 
5
 Al-Banna expressed this idea throughout his letters. Rasaelal-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna [Letter of 
the Myrter Imam Hasan al-Banna] (Cairo; Dar al-Wafa), 1986. 
6
Founded 31 March 1991. 
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politics of Sunni Islamists, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood and Salaf, in Kuwait. The 
author argues that within the relatively open political environment in Kuwait, Islamists 
entered the domain of politics gradually when they allied with the ruling family and then 
became an independent power. Islamists in Kuwait succeeded in indigenizing the imported 
ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt and the Salafi from Saudi where they 
became indigenous movements.
7
 
Lahoud-Tatar examines the importance of the political and intellectual life and its various 
internal social tensions on the development of political Islam in Kuwait. She also shows 
the complicated balances of political formula of Kuwait and sheds a light on Islamists in 
Kuwait in their diversity and their interaction with power. To do so, Lahoud-Tatar 
mobilizes a theoretical framework inspired by Social Movement Theory approach, where 
she describes the evolution, professionalization, and mobilization of Islamists. The work 
analyses the Muslim Brotherhood and Salaf, including the different groups, using Social 
Movements theory in order to examine their strategic dimension and to minimize their 
religious nature and identity. In fact, Islamists as movements are considered by Lahoud-
Tatar as political actors who face the same opportunities and constraints of actions as other 
political forces. This implies a reorganization of their mobilizing structures, a 
reformulation of their discourse that deals with political reforms rather than or more than 
social, cultural, and religious issues. Treating the Islamists as a political force without 
explaining ‘why’ Islamists entered this domain is what is lacking in this work. In fact, 
Islamism, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, is a socio-religious movement which used 
different methods, including politics, to reach their goal of gaining control over the social 
domain, not the opposite. Islamists in their mobilization process did not move beyond their 
social base even when they entered politics. Even though the Muslim Brotherhood is a 
dominant force within the political landscape, it is nevertheless constrained by the regime 
and forced to coexist with other political actors. The Muslim Brotherhood never 
constituted a real threat to the regime of al-Subah. On the contrary, it has been a strong ally 
when the legitimacy of the ruling family was challenged.  
Lahoud-Tatar, through the example of the Islamists, is interested in the politics of Islamist 
movements when they are not the direct target of repression rather than their ideology. As 
a result, she emphasizes the political variables more than the ideological ones:  
                                                     
7
Carine Lahoud-Tatar, Islam et Politique au Koweït. (Paris: Presses Universitaires France, 2011), 34-35. 
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Le passé des courants religieux sunnites au Koweït n’est pas marqué par une 
histoire traumatisante, contrairement à d’autres contextes arab… Leur action 
s’inscrit dans une logique d’autocontrole pour éviter la sanction. L’anyluse de la 
“structure des opportunités politiques” se révèle pertinente dans l’étude de 
l’émergence d’activités contestataires… La scène politique au Koweït, à l’inverse 
de celle de pays voisins, n’est pas atrophiée. Le degré d’accès y est relativement 
ouvert. La perspective d’une participation aux institutions et à la prise de décisions 
détermine non seulement l’étendue de la mobilisation mais la forme qu’elle prend 
et les stratégies sur lesquelles elle repose.
8
 
The use of Resource Mobilization Theory in explaining the politics of Islamists in Kuwait 
is useful especially in the relatively open political environment in Kuwait. It does not, 
however, adequately explain the phenomenon of the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamists as a 
social movement. 
The holistic approach avoids the reductionism of the former approaches whereby each 
shows only part of the reality of the movement. Arguments relying on a holistic approach 
reveal that a political agenda does not necessarily contradict with social or charitable goals 
especially in large movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The holistic approach 
stresses the social and cultural nature of the Muslim Brotherhood as a reformist project 
that uses various methods to approach this project including politics. In their two works, 
al-Zumai and ʿAwadh offer a useful overview of the main Islamist movements in Kuwait: 
IslamistShiʿa Movement, Salafi Movement, and the Muslim Brotherhood. For al-Zumai 
and ʿAwadh, Islamist movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait have a 
combination of multi-layered principles and methods:  political, economic, charitable, etc. 
However, the main principle that all principles and methods serve is the socio-cultural goal 
as al-Banna explains:  
Dear brothers, you are not a welfare organisation, nor a political party, nor a local 
association with strictly limited aims. Rather you are a new spirit making its way 
into the heart of this nation … If someone asks you: “To what are you calling?” 
Say: “We are calling you to Islam, which was brought by Muhammad (PBUH): 
Government is part of it, freedom is a religious obligation.” If someone should say 
to you: “This is politics!” Say: This is Islam, and we do not recognise such 
divisions.
9
 [Emphasis added] 
The “new spirit” is the main goal and drive of the reformist project of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Al-Zumai and ʿAwadh give a comprehensive overview of the various 
activities of Islamist Movements starting with al-Irshad, the first organized 
                                                     
8
 109-110. 
9
Hasan al-Banna, “Between Yesterday and Today.” Young Muslims Website.21 November 2010. 
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Islamistmovement in Kuwait, where it practiced all kinds of activities.
10
 They list all the 
other activities of the IslamistShiʿa, Salafi, and Muslim Brotherhood movements. 
However, the treatment of the history of these movements remained very general. For 
instance, the history of the Muslim Brotherhood did not have a deep discussion of the 
internal organizational ideology and structure nor the relationship between the Kuwaiti 
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and its mother organisation in Egypt. The authors did 
not offer an in-depth account of the cultural aspects that motivate the Muslim Brotherhood. 
1.3 Research Framework 
This thesis is an examination of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait as both a local and a 
regional movement with a special focus on the Kuwaiti context in which it developed. 
Understanding this phenomenon requires analysing its origins, objectives and the historical 
context in which it was born. In examining its origins, the research focuses on the 
emergence of the movement as a direct cultural and intellectual response to the Western 
colonial presence in Kuwait and the region. The thesis also addresses the reaction of 
various sectors of Kuwaiti society, especially the merchant class, to the shift from shura to 
dictatorship in Kuwait with the blessing of the British government, a state of affairs that 
also elicited a lot of animosity towards Western cultural influence represented by 
missionaries operating in Kuwait. The early reaction by Islamic figures such as 
Muhammad al-Shanqiti and Hafiz Wahba in early 20
th
 century marked the beginning of 
the reaction to Western cultural and political intervention. However, the repression by the 
ruling family at that time forced Islamist figures to work on protecting the identity of the 
society through establishing modern Islamic education as evident from the efforts of 
Yousif bin Isa and Abduaziz al-Rushaid. Yet, the Muslim Brotherhood members believed 
at the time that with the rise of secular forces in Kuwait, Islamists faced a new cultural 
challenge. Islamists represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and supported by a number of 
Islamist figures clashed with secularists who were very influential in some government 
institutions such as education and the media. The rise of nationalist and Nasserite socio-
political movements in the Arab world gave secularists in Kuwait a great boost in the 
1950s, 60s and 70s. Islamist movements struggled to emphasise society’s Islamic identity 
in the face of secularists, be they the liberals, the nationalists or left-wing parties.  
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The Islamist revivalist movement in the Muslim World, of which Kuwait is a part, was a 
reaction to the lack of progress of Muslim nations and the Western political and cultural 
superiority and hegemony over the Muslim World. Esposito explains that the reason 
behind Islamic revivalism is the “quest for identity, authenticity, and community, and a 
desire to establish meaning and order in both personal life and society”.  This quest starts 
by shaping a solid Muslim personality and ends with the Muslim Nation, or umma. This 
quest is a response triggered by the religio-cultural threat coming from the West, whether 
they are referred to as the new Crusades or atheist secularism.  Hrair Dekmejian also 
argues that Islamic revivalism occurred as a response to the faltering conditions of the 
Muslim world and called for the return to true Islamic teachings. The role model that 
revivalism aims to emulate is the golden age of Islam, the period of the first four Rightly 
Guided Caliphs (rashidun), on all levels: economic, social, and political.  Salwa Ismail 
argues that “subjugation is presented [by Islamists] as ‘intellectual’ (subjugation of Islamic 
concepts to Western concepts).”  After the Islamic golden age, the political domain was 
taken away from religious institutions, though the social and cultural domain remained 
under their control for centuries. With Western colonisation of the Muslim World, the 
authority of religious institutions over the social domain was challenged by westernized 
forces, particularly by the nationalists and secularists. As far as religious establishment 
was concerned, imperialism and colonialism introduced a new system of beliefs and way 
of life into the Muslim world.  
The context 
Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood are a continuation and an 
implementation of al-Afghani’s, ʿAbdu’s, and Rida’s Islamic revivalist project. The rise of 
Islamist movements in the Arab world in general, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 
particular has been the subject of many studies which seek to examine the reasons for this 
religious revivalism. Researchers usually describe this rise as a cultural response to the 
secularist westernisation of Muslim societies, especially those under foreign occupation. 
The reformist Islamist movement was the brainchild of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani(1938-93), 
Muhammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashīd Rida(1865-1935) who 
challenged the secularist literature’s contention that Islam was the reason Muslim societies 
remained backward and incapable of progress. Secularists compared Islam to the Catholic 
Church, usually blamed for Europe’s Dark Ages. The three thinkers defended Islam 
against these accusations and argued that Islam by its nature encourages the pursuit of 
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knowledge, thus leading to the creation of one of the greatest human civilisations. Their 
work provided the framework for the rise of many Islamist movements, including the 
Muslim Brotherhood who aspired to translate these thinkers’ vision into a reality that 
would combat the secularist efforts of the colonial project and, later, the indigenous 
secularists who carried these efforts forward during the post-independence era. This 
marked the beginning of a long struggle between reformist Islamist movements and 
secularists over all aspects of economic, political and cultural life. 
The twentieth century in the Arab world witnessed major changes on all political, 
economic, intellectual and cultural levels. Anti-colonial liberation movements gained 
increasing momentum with a considerable degree of success, especially in the aftermath of 
the Second World War which saw the decline of France and Britain in the Middle East, 
and their displacement by the new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The US epitomised the spirit of capitalism, a legacy of European colonial power, while the 
USSR promoted a communist ideology. With the British and French Empires declining, 
the two new superpowers rushed in to take their piece of the pie, with a particular interest 
in controlling traditional centres of power in Egypt and the Levant, in addition to the 
newly-emerging oil-rich centres of economic power in the Gulf and Iraq. 
According to Hourani, as a reaction to Western control over many parts of the Muslim 
World, Islamic Intellectuals and activists called for the unification of the Islamic world, a 
movement that was founded by al-Afghani who proposed the establishment of an Islamic 
League and vociferously defended the legitimacy of Ottoman rule. Fearful of the rising 
Pan-Arabist and Turanist sentiments in the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman 
government encouraged this approach, which was also adopted later by al-Afghani’s friend 
and student Muhammad ʿAbduh. ʿAbduh advocated a reconciliatory intellectual approach 
between Islamic traditions and Western modernity that would preserve aspects of Islamic 
identity in the Arab and Muslim world while incorporating Western elements of progress. 
Muhammad Rashīd Rida also adopted this reconciliatory approach and, through his 
widely-circulated journal, al-Manar, helped to disseminate its basic tenets which 
combined modernity with Islamic Salafi tradition.  
Albert Hourani argues that the spread of the reconciliatory approach was constrained by 
the rise of the Kemalists who turned their backs on the collapsing Ottoman Empire and 
who, through a plethora of legal, intellectual, and political writings calling for the 
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separation of state and religion, validated the establishment of a secular state. The First 
Wold War proponents of the reconciliatory approach were torn apart by internal conflicts 
which eventually divided them into Islamists and secularists, particularly since this 
approach had not fully matured, especially on a political level. Scholars and thinkers such 
as Shaikh Ali ʿAbdulraziq (1885-1966) and Taha Hussain (1889-1973) favoured a 
Kemalist approach, albeit in a less extreme form, but such secularist tendencies were 
challenged by Islamists like Shaikh Mustafa Sabri (1869-1954) and Rashīd Rida (1865-
1955). Political life in Egypt was greatly influenced by this intellectual conflict which saw 
the establishment of the Nationalist Wafd party in 1919 and the secularist Liberal 
Constitutionalist Party in 1922, both of which announced themselves as the true 
representatives of the school of Muhammad ʿAbduh.11 
Arab Nationalism may have spread rapidly from the time of the Great Arab Revolt (1916-
18) and liberation movements in Egypt, the Levant, Iraq and other Arab countries, yet its 
sources were varied. Some branches of nationalism were inspired by Islamic civilisation’s 
offering of a vision where Islam and Arab Nationalism were two faces of the same coin, 
while other liberal and secularist branches of Arab Nationalism were derived from 
European nationalism which had freed political life from church control and liberated the 
individual from the influence of priests. The success of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and 
calls for rebelling against the powers of capitalism and imperialism played a huge part in 
shifting Arab Nationalism, which found the notions of liberation from the colonial West 
and its control of Arab resources very appealing, to the far Left.   
Notwithstanding the wide right-left spectrum of Arab Nationalism, its several Islamist, 
Liberal and left-wing branches were able to co-exist peacefully for a while. A number of 
organisations, in the style of Turkish reformist parties such as the Young Turks (1902-18) 
and reflecting various ideologies, became increasingly active. Despite the plethora of 
parties and political organisations, the most prominent was the movement of the Muslim 
Brotherhood which was born in 1928 out of the Islamist nationalist school of thought. The 
movement which originated in Egypt rose to prominence there and spread to a number of 
Arab countries.
12
 Other left-wing organisations soon followed but did not gain a very 
strong foothold until Jamal ʿAbdulnasser seized power in Egypt in 1952. There was 
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naturally a battle between these organisations over the hearts and minds of the masses and 
to attract as many followers as possible, a fact which did not bode well for the newly-
independent Arab countries since it soon became evident that it would be impossible to 
apply all these conflicting thoughts, programmes and schemes to these countries once a 
certain party was in power. Former comrades on the battlefield became arch enemies 
fighting over political and intellectual power, keen to influence and direct public opinion. 
In Egypt, for example, a fierce confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser 
resulted in Nasser proclaiming the Muslim Brotherhood  traitors in 1954; very soon open 
war was being waged by Nasser and the leftists, against the Muslim Brotherhood in 
particular and the Islamists in general.
13
 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s reformist and revivalist project emphasised the superiority of 
Islam with its long history and rich heritage, especially its ability to lead the world. The 
Muslim Brotherhood devised their own unique discourse to respond to secularist 
ideologies which sought to undermine Islam as a leading social force. A number of slogans 
were born: ‘Islam as a way of life’, ‘Islam encourages the pursuit of knowledge’, and the 
most famous ‘Islam is the Solution.’ The Muslim Brotherhood used these slogans to 
emphasise their conviction that all of the modern Muslim world’s economic, religious, 
political and social problems can be solved with a return to true Islam as introduced by the 
Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs (the golden age of Islam which lasted only for half 
a century).  This emphasis on the superiority of Islam was aimed at increasing Muslims’ 
faith in the Muslim Brotherhood’s project which represented a true effort to challenge 
secularist and nationalist ideologies in the political, economic and social domains. The 
confrontation was not easy due to the strength of the secularist project which was 
supported by foreign colonial powers. A good portion of decision-makers in the Arab 
world were lured by secularist ideology and began to use their positions to spread its 
values. With help from political parties, armies fashioned after their Western counterparts, 
and government officials, these secularists succeeded in gaining full control over the 
political life of Muslim societies. They worked tirelessly to refashion social identities by 
exercising control over a number of institutions such as schools where Western-influenced 
curricula were introduced. Traditionally, schools had been the domain of influence of 
religious scholars and institutions. Natural sciences replaced religious studies, and 
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secularist approaches to human sciences replaced religious ones. The judiciary replaced 
shariʿa laws with civil codes, especially the French legal system. Secular judges replaced 
shariʿa ones. In addition to education and the judiciary, secularists controlled media 
outlets. In essence, religious institutions lost all control they had over cultural and social 
media.
14
 
As a part of the Muslim and Arab World, Kuwait witnessed the same cultural challenges 
and reacted to them in the same way. The early Western presence from the first two 
decades of the 20
th
 century was political (in the form of British Political Agents) and social 
(symbolised by the medical and educational missionary activities of the Arabian Mission 
of the Dutch Reformed Church of America), both of which were a direct threat to Kuwait’s 
Islamic-Arab identity.  Although they provoked the reformist movement (both Islamists 
and nationalists groups) in Kuwait, in reality neither of these Western institutions in 
Kuwait had a great influence on the conservative and generally closed Kuwaiti society. 
The reformist movement, which was comprised of Islamists and nationalists, focused on 
political and social reform. The early political reform reached its peak with the 1921 and 
1938 Majlis movements, whose main goal was reviving the principle of shura that had 
been practiced before Shaikh Mubarak seized power in 1896. However, the new demands 
were more modern with the call for the instatement of legislative councils in 1921 and 
1938 respectively. Yet when the political crisis reached its peak in 1938 between the 
reformist movement and the ruling family, the Islamists represented by Yusifal-Qinaʿi 
took a stance more supportive of the ruling family. This can be explained by the fact that 
the main objective of the Islamists was dominating and reforming the social domain as 
opposed to the political domain. This goal of dominating and reforming the social domain, 
in addition to the good relationship between the ruling family and the Islamists, continued 
with the student of al-Qinaʿi, ʿAbdulʿazizal-Mutawwaʿ, who later established the branch of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. The 1938 incident was the beginning of the split 
among the reformist movement between the two main groups, Islamists and nationalists, 
who both adopted the Islamic-nationalist ideas of Rida, the role model for both. However, 
the emergence of the more radical and secular nationalist activists such as Ahamad al-
Khatib, who shifted the movement to be secular, and the conflict between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Nasser totally ruined the relationship between the nationalist and Islamist 
groups. 
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The implications of these events spread to most of the Arab world, including Kuwait 
where both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Nationalists were very active. In the 
early 1950s, and immediately after Shaikh ʿAbdullah al-Salim al-Subah (1895-1965) had 
come to power – an era marked by democratic liberalisation – a number of Arab 
expatriates, heavily influenced by Arab Nationalist trends, mobilised to establish 
nationalist groups whose initial aim was to support the Palestinians and their cause. 
Ahmad al-Khatib (1927-…), a young doctor who had just graduated from the American 
University in Beirut (AUB), co-founded the Arab Nationalist movement in Kuwait with 
George Habash, and before long became its leader. Along with Jasem al-Qatami (1929-
2012) al-Khatib and other nationalist pioneers established a number of nationalist 
networks, clubs and societies, such as the Nationalist Cultural Club which served as the 
movement’s headquarters. The Nationalists’ demands centred on resisting colonial powers, 
supporting liberation movements and Arab unity in addition to the Palestinian cause. They 
also demanded the nationalisation of various government bodies, including the oil 
company. The movement utilised relatively new platforms, such as clubs and students’ 
unions like the National Union of Kuwaiti Students (NUKS) in Cairo. The National Union 
for Kuwaiti Students, established in 1964, served as a very influential platform for the 
movement from which they broadcast their ideas and messages to students and the wider 
society.  
The Arab Nationalist movement was also very active in the political domain through its 
demands for increased freedoms and democratic change. In the 1950s, the movement’s 
leaders had called upon the government of the Emir ʿAbdullah al-Salim to adopt a 
democratic system of government. On the first anniversary of the 1958 union between 
Egypt and Syria, Ahmad al-Khatib and Jasim al-Qatami delivered speeches before a large 
audience that included the Emir of Kuwait, in which they criticised the oppressive and 
backward system of rule embodied in the ruling al-Subah family. This inflammatory 
speech did not go down well and the ruling family responded by closing down the 
Nationalists’ clubs and societies in addition to al-Irshad. The movement remained banned 
by the government until Kuwait’s independence in 1961, at which time the ruling family 
became aware of the importance of the movement’s support for its regional and 
international legitimacy, especially in light of the movement’s far-reaching influence in a 
region dominated by nationalist governments, such as Egypt. 
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New ideas and trends spread in the 1950s and 1960s by a new class of educated Kuwaitis 
who had studied in Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq where they were exposed to new intellectual 
and social trends in these more advanced countries. They brought these ideas back with 
them and contributed to their dissemination in Kuwait. Each group was influenced by 
whichever ideology was prevalent in their country of study – Nasserism in Egypt, 
Nationalism in Lebanon and Baʿthism in Iraq – and established new societies accordingly, 
the most prominent of which was the Arab Nationalist movement.
15
 In fact, none of these 
organisations and movements with their secularist overtones would have entered the 
conservative Kuwaiti society without the oil money that helped fund students’ studies 
abroad.  Oil was destined to play a central role in the transformation of society as 
economic gains brought with them new social, cultural and political realities. 
Theory of Domains 
Equally important is a careful consideration of the historical context in which Islamist 
movements developed; the thesis adopts insights from the theory of domains to shed light 
on how a Muslim society is sometimes divided into a social and political domain, each of 
which is controlled by certain forces. Lacroix employs a theory of domains to describe the 
division of the social, the political and the religious in Saʿudi Arabia.16Lacroix argues that 
al-Saʿud ruling family controls the political domain while the cultural domain is dominated 
by liberal secularists, with the religious domain being the share of the al-Saʿud’s allies the 
Salafis, the most prominent of whom are the al-Shaikh, the descendants of Muhammad bin 
ʿAbdulwahab. The same approach will be applied to the Kuwaiti experience but with the 
religious and cultural domains merged into one since culture, religion, education and the 
judiciary existed under one domain of influence.  
The term “religious establishment” shall be used to refer to the convergence of different 
actors in the social domain such as religious scholars, judges, teachers, and Sufis. The 
religious establishment is mix of different religious actors who instil Islamic teachings in 
society were Islam is the dominant source of identity of the state and society. Lapidus 
argues that historically, the religious establishment controlled the social domain in addition 
to the political domain since the first Islamic state but with the rise to power of the 
Umayyads, the political and social domains parted ways. Ruling families from the 
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Umayyads through the Abbasids and subsequent dynasties controlled the political domain 
in various Muslim regions while the social domain remained in the hands of religious 
establishment, which gradually lost their ambitions to regain control of the political 
domain. Thus, two distinct domains emerged in Muslim societies, each controlled by an 
independent party. The situation persisted until colonial powers followed by dictatorial 
military secularists changed the division of power.
17
 Despite the fact that the political 
system in Gulf States remained the same with ruling families controlling the political 
domain, secularists succeeded in having a great impact on the social domain with the 
spread of nationalist anti-Muslim Brotherhood ideology inspired primarily by Nasserism. 
The religious establishment in the Sunni World during the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries 
was fluid and did not represent a solid institution except for some examples such as al-
Azhar in Egypt. What would be recognised as a religious establishment in the modern era 
is the same as previous eras where various religious actors such as Islamic figures, families 
(e.g. al-Shaikh in Saudi), judges (e.g. al-ʿAdsani family in Kuwait), teachers, Muftis, Sufis, 
preachers, and every cultural and religious producer whether it was a person or an 
institution make up the religious establishment. In his description of opinion makers in 
Egypt in the 1920s, al-Banna explains the source of opinion in society “(1) the ʿulama; (2) 
the shaikhs of the Sufi orders; (3) the ‘elders,’ by which he meant the leading families and 
groups in the broadest sense; and (4) the ‘clubs’ (social and religious societies).”18 
However, the new challenges posed by Western powers and the secular movement put the 
religious establishment in a difficult position. Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood 
came to fill the gap of the scattered and fluid religious establishment which was weakened 
by Western intervention and also the new socio-political non-Islamic forces and regimes. 
The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements emerged as new actors and part of 
the religious establishment. Soon they rose to become the leaders of the religious 
establishment because of their high level of organisation, strong leadership and clear goals. 
The boundaries between the political and social domains in Kuwait have been defined, yet, 
since the emergence of the seculars the boundaries became blurred because of the 
interposition of the seculars in both domains. However, the political domain is more 
defined than the social one because of the structured institution of the ruling family in 
contrast to the fluid structure of the social domain. As a result, it was easier for seculars to 
intervene in the social domain more than the political one. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood was secretly founded in Kuwait in the late 1940s and, a few 
years later, Jamʿiyyat al-Irshad al-Islami was launched as a front for the movement. Al-
Irshad, however, was banned in 1959 and, a few years later, Islamists launched Jamʿiyyat 
al-Islah al-Ijtimaʿi and carried on with the Islamist project of reforming society. The 
ideology, strategies, and tactics of the organisation were adopted from the mother 
organization in Egypt. However, political views on domestic issues differed from the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Kuwaiti context has always been  different from the 
Egyptian one because in Kuwait a good relationship between the religious establishment 
and the ruling family exists. Moreover, the religious establishment in Kuwait, including 
the Muslim Brotherhood, did not see any threat posed by the ruling family to the social 
domain they controlled. The real threat was posed by the secularists, be they communists, 
liberals, or nationalists, who called for a new moral code and way of life. The secularists 
competed with the religious establishment over control of the social domain. This conflict 
began in the 1950s and continues until this day. The competition manifested itself on many 
occasions such as the call for banning alcohol in Kuwait, gender segregation at Kuwait 
University, and the on-going battle since Kuwait’s independence in 1961 over the second 
article of the Constitution. Islamist movements in Kuwait, especially the Muslim 
Brotherhood, inherited the religious establishment’s authority over the social domain using 
new methods of control. These methods developed over time and the shift in the socio-
political context in Kuwait is a good example of employing the political opportunity 
theory. The Muslim Brotherhood profited from contextual shifts, raising the ceiling of 
their demands and increasing their control over the social domain. Major turning points 
such as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the 1990-91 
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait helped the Muslim Brotherhood gain more social influence in 
Kuwait. By time, Islamists movements became the leaders of the religious establishment 
where they succeeded in controlling Islamic discourse by producing religious scholars, 
founding Islamic schools and bookshops, establishing Islamic financial institutions, 
producing Islamic art, etc. 
Although the Kuwaiti branch of the Muslim Brotherhood traces its origins to the mother 
organization in Egypt and was heavily influenced by the Iraqi branch, the leaders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood state that the movement it has its own distinctive characteristics. 
While most branches of the Muslim Brotherhood have had to survive under authoritarian 
regimes and were under constant attack from seculars, the Kuwaiti branch of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood has operated in a more democratic political environment where people can 
express their opinions freely. The political system in Kuwait permits people to freely elect 
their representatives while most Arab countries have little or no parliamentary traditions. 
The Muslim Brotherhood allied with the ruling family against the seculars for a long time 
in contrast to Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and most Arab countries. As a result, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Kuwait never represented a challenge to the ruling family, and in return, 
the ruling family was very tolerant of the Muslim Brotherhood and allowed them to 
operate freely in the social domain.  The boundaries between the two domains were to 
some extent clear and allowed the ruling family and the religious establishment, 
particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, to enjoy a harmonious relationship. Yet, the 
religious establishment never quite won back the kind of control it used to exercise over 
the social domain before the intervention of seculars.  
 
1.4 Theoretical Framework and Outline of the Study 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait is part of the global Muslim Brotherhood movement, 
reflecting its ideology and structured along the same organizational lines.  Nonetheless, the 
movement in Kuwait has many unique characteristics and differs from the mother 
movement in Egypt. This study focuses on the complexity of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Kuwait, which is a combination of the external imported ideology and structure, and 
internal social and political factors.  The study also argues that the main objective of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait is maintaining the control over the social domain. 
Religious establishment, and its various actors, which used to dominate social and 
intellectual discourses and domains were over controlled by the new ideological Islamist 
movements (the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis) who were heir to the religious 
establishment along with other actors such as independent shaikhs and Islamists. The 
Muslim Brotherhood seized the political opportunity to spread its influence over the social 
space via different means, such as targeting youth by organizing social and cultural 
activities, distributing religious lectures and sermons on cassettes, establishing charitable 
organizations, involvement in professional syndicates, and participating in elections and 
the parliament. However, the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait does not have a clear 
political project similar to other Muslim Brotherhood branches such as Egypt or Iraq for 
several reasons. First, the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait as an extension of Islamic 
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institutions in Kuwait aims mainly to control the social and cultural domains. Second, the 
Muslim Brotherhood believes that the ruling family’s main objective is maintaining total 
control over the political domain and, as such,  has no interest in competing with the 
Muslim Brotherhood over control of the  social domain, while the secularists are the real 
competitors for the political and social domains. Third, the Muslim Brotherhood helped 
forge good relations between religious institutions and the ruling family. The study will 
analyse the history of the origins, structures and cultural spaces and the mixture of 
activities (socio-cultural, political, charitable, etc.) of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. 
The thesis adopts a theoretical framework of several interrelated themes:   
1. A holistic approach towards the complex phenomenon: The Muslim Brotherhood is 
a multidimensional phenomenon, not a simple socio-cultural or political reaction to 
social or political contingencies. The multifaceted activities of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (economic, cultural, social, and political) should be studied together. 
The Muslim Brotherhood as an ideology and a movement is a comprehensive 
reaction to the multidimensional challenges facing Muslim societies: political, 
social, cultural, economic, and so on. The ideal model of society, which the 
Muslim Brotherhood seeks to emulate, is what the group views as the golden age 
of Prophet Mohammad and his Companions in Islamic history. Therefore, by 
reviving the values of early pristine Islam, Muslims will regain the spiritual and 
material power they enjoyed during the golden age. Studying this holistic vision is 
crucial to understanding the ideology and reality of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Kuwait.  
2. Protecting the social domain: although the Muslim Brotherhood is a holistic 
phenomenon, the movement in Kuwait focuses on protecting the socio-cultural 
domain that had been traditionally controlled by the religious establishment. 
Religious scholars in different fields used to shape culture, intellectual discourse, 
and social norms in various ways: through fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence), which 
regulates the life of people by codifying the legal system; through tarbiyyah (the 
development process conforms to Islamic guidelines and standards) and tasawwuf 
(Islamic Mysticism), whichinstil in the Muslim individual self-improvement and 
spirituality with a focus on the relationship with God; and through ʿaqida, which 
determines the religious belief system. However, the secular dominance over 
culture supported by the West or by the Arab nationalist movement in other Arab 
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states threatens the domain of the religious establishment. The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Kuwait focuses mainly on controlling the socio-cultural domain. 
The political domain in Kuwait is traditionally controlled by the ruling family, 
which enjoys good relations with religious establishment. The absence of a 
political agenda by the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait and the control of the ruling 
family of the political domain have meant that the Muslim Brotherhood took a 
marginal interest in politics.  
3. By applying an empirical methodology, this thesis will examine what could be 
referred to as “the anthropology of the movement” by studying its agents. The 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood mobilized as social agents in the traditional 
society of Kuwait with its different local networks, sources of power, and interests. 
The agents of the movement were affected by micro-level elements such as kinship 
and social groups and the state. These, in turn, interact on a macro-level with 
regional and international events and the broad Islamic reaction to them. This 
interaction forms the discourse in which the agents comprehend the development 
and reality of the movement. This methodology fills the gaps in other social 
movement theories that lack to explain the process of mobilization and the 
incentives of it. 
 
Focusing on these themes, the thesis will seek to study the history and development of the 
origins, development, ideology, organizational structure, mobilization, and social influence 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. To do so, this study will rely on extensive 
interviews and primary sources in Kuwait, some of which will be examined for the first 
time.  
1.5 Primary Sources 
The covert nature of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait is the main reason for the scarce 
literature on the movement. However, the significant role of the movement during the Iraqi 
occupation of 1990-91 built trust between the movement, society, and the government. 
During the post-liberation period in 1991, the Muslim Brotherhood declared the 
establishment of its political wing, the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM). It also 
became more open about its aims and objectives. As a result, the movement’s literature 
became more accessible and the leaders more cooperative with researchers.  
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This study draws on six types of primary sources: 
1. Writings by members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. This includes the 
memoirs of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Abdullah al-Mutawwa, 
statements on political and social events, ideological and theological debate with 
nationalists and other Islamist groups, published and unpublished studies by 
members of the movement, the rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood figures, and 
fatwas issues by the movement’s ʿulama, such as Shaikh Jassim Muhalhal al-
Yassin, published in newspapers or otherwise circled among the members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and al-MujtamaʿJournal, the official publication of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. 
2. Writings by other Islamist groups and authors, such as studies of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere, and the writings and magazines of other 
Islamist groups in Kuwait, such as the magazines of Al-Furqan and Al-Bayan. 
3. Contemporary journalism and travellers accounts’ of Kuwait: Kuwaiti newspapers 
(i.e., Al-Qabas, Al-Watan, Al-Aan, etc.) and magazines (i.e. Al-Biʿtha, Al-Ra’id, 
etc.) campaign literature, periodicals, as well as the writings of outside observers. 
4. Interviews. With the relatively new open environment of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
interviews have been easy to obtain and have become a rich source of information. 
5. British and American government records: the records and correspondence of 
British and American diplomats in Kuwait provide insights into the history of the 
movement. However, British and American government records give very limited 
information about the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait due to the secret nature of 
the movement.  
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Chapter II 
The Beginnings of Reformist Movement in Kuwait and the Rise 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Before examining the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, it is important to 
provide an overview of the origins of Kuwait’s reformist movement which preceded the 
Muslim Brotherhood by almost four decades. It is equally important to examine the roots 
of the Muslim Brotherhood from its point of origin in Egypt before it spread to the rest of 
the Arab world.  From the time it was launched in the early years of the twentieth century 
and for the next 50 years, the reformist movement in Kuwait was characterised by its 
uniformity. The reformist ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, MuhammadʿAbduh and 
Muhammad Rashīd Rida were at the heart of all demands for reform in the Arab and 
Muslim world, especially in the struggle against colonisation. The Arab and Islamic 
components of identity were deemed essential in the struggle to protect Arab countries 
from westernisation and secularism.  
These calls for reforms were very positively received in various parts of the Arab world, 
and paved the way for a number of reform movements in various Muslim countries, 
including Kuwait. A number of young Kuwaiti intellectuals mobilised against British 
interests in the country and challenged the cultural and religious activities of missionaries, 
especially American ones. These movements continued to grow, and succeeded in 
changing the cultural landscape of Kuwait society in relation to a number of political and 
social issues. 
The reformist movement in Kuwait represented an Islamic national project where Arabism 
and Islam were perceived as two faces of the same coin. Nationalists did not contest the 
Islamic component of the Kuwaiti identity, while Islamists considered freedom from the 
West part of their religious creed. The two sides worked together very closely for a while, 
until signs of disagreement began to emerge over a number of political and social issues 
and how best to tackle matters related to the structure of the state and the old society. 
Political and social structures in Kuwait were a continuation of an old system that had 
persisted for centuries in various parts of the Islamic world, where the state was divided 
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into two domains controlled by two groups; the social and political domains. The realm of 
politics included the daily affairs of the state, foreign relations, taxes and other matters 
related to the monarchy, the army and the merchant class. The social domain included 
education, the judiciary, culture, and religious waqf and was usually the domain of 
religious institutions.  
The system in Kuwait was not much different except for the participation of the merchant 
class and its great influence on politics, especially during the period when merchants 
considered themselves more or less equal to the ruling family – whose main source of 
funding was these same merchants, most of whom, similar to al-Sabah ruling family, 
traced their origins to Najd. After Mubarak al-Sabah came to power, having killed his two 
brothers who had ruled Kuwait, he imposed his political will and vision on the country. 
The merchant class felt it had lost most of its political power but had no choice except, 
reluctantly, to embrace the new reality. 
19
 
The new reformist thinking spread rapidly among many merchants and religious scholars 
and the parties created a very strong and extremely influential reformist movement.  
Through its conflict with the rulers of Kuwait the merchant class planned to recover some 
of its traditional power. The reformists also struggled against the rising influence of 
traditional jurists and succeeded in imposing a new reality on society through reformist 
thought. In 1939 the political project of the merchant class clashed with the social project 
of the religious scholars to such an extent that many feared an armed confrontation 
between the merchants and the ruling family. These reformist movements were the 
harbinger for many other later reform projects, including the Muslim Brotherhood which 
considered itself an extension of the reformist religious scholars.
20
 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was established according to the same principles of the 
reformist movement in Kuwait. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood is considered an 
extension of the reformist thought of al-Afghani, ʿAbduh and Rashīd Rida, followed by 
Hasan al-Banna who worked as an editor at al-Manar Journal while a student under 
Rashīd Rida. Al-Banna transformed reformist thinking from theory into practice, and 
sought to establish a strong movement that could successfully implement the reformist 
project within both the state and society. At that time, movements and political parties 
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were widespread in Egypt, Turkey and Greater Syria, and included, for example, The 
Young Egypt Party, the National Party, the Wafd party and others. However, despite the 
existence of a wide variety of liberal, nationalist and leftist ideologies, there were no 
Islamist movements. The Muslim Brotherhood was the first movement to succeed in 
surpassing the influence of most other parties in just a few years. The success of the 
Brotherhood in Egypt encouraged al-Banna to begin holding meetings during Hajj seasons, 
with Arabs from other countries in order to invite them to form similar movements. It was 
during one of these trips that he met and inspired the founder of the Kuwaiti Muslim 
Brotherhood ʿAbdulʿaziz al-ʿAli al-Mutawwaʿ. 
2.2 Reformist Ideas Enter Kuwait 
On the eve of the 20th century, Kuwait was a country still in thrall to its local concerns.
21
  
The intellectual and cultural mood at that time was not conducive to a greater degree of 
openness; thus religious issues were restricted to matters related to the daily rituals of 
prayer, ablution, and family laws. Geographically, Kuwait’s contact with the outside world 
did not extend beyond the few bordering towns and villages such as Zubair and al-Hasa, 
and whatever little Wahhabi doctrines trickled in with merchants and immigrants to 
Kuwait. The main religious influence resulted from the conservative religious movements 
in the nearby al-Hasa region of Saʿudi Arabia.22 Some merchants went beyond the nearby 
towns for business, to Basra, Zanzibar, and India since trade was very strong with these 
parts of the world. Like many coastal emirates on the Gulf, Kuwait persisted in this 
traditional and rigid environment, detached from the rest of the Arab and Islamic world 
and disconnected from the intellectual and political debates surrounding democracy and 
modernism which were being explored in Egypt and the Levant at that time.  
Intellectual reform in the Gulf in general, and in Kuwait in particular, saw its first stirrings 
in the early 20th century with the arrival of Pan-Arabist and Islamist publications such as 
al-Hilal, al-Muqattam, and al-Manar which had a wide readership.
23
Newspapers and 
intellectual journals were circulated by middle and upper-class readers who could afford to 
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buy them, and they would often be read and debated at diwaniyya.
24
  With a fresh focus on 
Arab and Islamic issues, a new atmosphere of cultural and political interests was born that 
was a far cry from the traditional religious knowledge and folklore to which the country 
had been accustomed. A new breed of intellectuals had heated discussions about 
colonialism, Arab and Islamic identity, liberal modernism, and women’s emancipation. Al-
Khudair, a prominent Kuwaiti family which had subscriptions to a number of well-known 
Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian publications, was usually the first stop for these publications. 
Zaid and ʿAbdulrazzaq al-Khalid al-Khudair subscribed to al-Manar and al-Muʾayyad in 
1902 and would read them every night at their shops in the presence of friends and 
acquaintances.
25
 The publications would then make their way to other places and 
gatherings such as the diwaniyya of al-Naqib family. Yusif bin ʿIsaal-Qinaʿi26 recalls the 
impact of these publications on his intellectual and cultural development,  
I grew up in Kuwait and, like many others, I was raised in an 
extremely rigid and unyielding environment dominated by 
myths and falsehoods. The works of bin Taymiyyah and bin al-
Qayyim, and journals such as al-Manar dispelled many of these 
myths while my moderation could be attributed to journals such 
as al-Hilal, al-Muqattam and others. 
27
 
A number of young men, labelled by ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid “the pioneers of renaissance 
in Kuwait”,28 formed the core of the first generation to embrace the modern intellectual 
movement in Kuwait, and included Hamad al-Khalid, Mishʿan al-Khudair al-Khalid, Ali 
and Sultan al-Kulaib, Hamed al-Naqib, Marzuq al-Bader, and certainly Shaikh Yusif bin 
ʿIsaal-Qinaʿiand Shaikh ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid in addition to others.29This process was 
further strengthened by visits from leading Arab and Islamic intellectuals sponsored by 
Kuwaiti businessmen such as Qasim al-Ibrahim, who invited Muhammad Rashīd Rida to 
visit Kuwait following their meeting in India. As a token of gratitude for al-Ibrahim’s 
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efforts in supporting the establishment in Egypt of Dar al-ʿUlum, a project proposed by 
Rida, Rida accepted the invitation. Several other thinkers, most importantly ʿAbdulʿazizal-
Thaʿalibi and Amin al-Rihani, visited Kuwait, but the greatest influence exerted on the 
nascent intellectual movement in Kuwait was undoubtedly that of Shaikh Muhammadal-
Shanqiti and Shaikh Hafez Wahba. Being able to interact with the leading figures for 
change in the Arab and Islamic world, meant that debates were carried from the world of 
books into the arena of direct engagement. These new cultural trends reached their peak in 
the form of intellectual and political movements at the hands of Yusif bin ʿIsaal-Qinaʿi, 
ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid, Muhammadal-Shanqiti and shaikh Hafez Wahba.  
The reformist movement in Kuwait was built on the religio-nationalist principles of the 
school of the leading figures: al-Afghani, ʿAbduh, and Rashīd Rida. This school differed 
from the nationalist movement developed in the Levant by Christian Arab Nationalists 
which excluded Islamic principles from social life and treated it in the way new secular 
nationalist European states treated Christianity. Secular Arab Nationalists looked on 
Islamic history as a period of glory that had influenced human civilization positively in 
such fields as philosophy and science. However, this positive influence diminished over the 
centuries, and a new era based on secular nationalism began to emerge. The reformist 
school also differed from the Salafi school of MuhammadʿAbdulwahab that based its 
teachings on reviving orthodox Islamic values and purifying it from innovations. 
Wahhabism also implemented a strict Islamic system based on Hanbali School of fiqh with 
the support of al-Saʿud, the ruling family in Saʿudi Arabia. The alliance between the ruling 
family and the Wahhabis drew a clear division between the political domain and the socio-
religious domain with the former controlling the political domain and the latter dominating 
the socio-religious domain.  
The reformist school of Rashīd Rida dealt with both domains, political and social, but 
focused more on the social domain in order to protect the identity of Muslim societies. The 
political demands were a reaction to the West’s imperial and colonial intrusion in the 
Muslim World, since this political intervention carried a social and cultural project that 
challenged domains that had traditionally been controlled by the religious establishment. In 
Islamic history, the Golden Age (632-661 CE) of the Four Guided Caliphs (Abu Bakir, 
ʿUmarbinal-Khattab, ʿUthmanbinʿAffan, and ʿAli binAbi Talib) represented for Sunni 
Muslims the role model for all aspects of life. The four Caliphs were religious scholars as 
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well as political leaders, as were their advisers. Politics and society both followed Islamic 
values and the head of the state, or Caliphate, was also the leader of the religion, the Imam.  
Under the Umayyad dynasty, the political domain separated from the religio-social domain, 
with the former controlled by the ruling dynasties and the latter by scholars, clerks, and 
religious judges (or what could be referred to as the ‘religious establishment’). As the 
ruling dynasties in the Muslim World waned and the superiority of Western powers 
increased, the latter’s intervention in the Muslim World was inevitable. However, Western 
intervention in the Muslim World carried an unfavourable social and cultural project that 
threatened the heart of the social domain. Therefore, fighting the Imperial West became a 
sacred obligation to protect both state and identity.
30
 
2.3 Reformists and the Social Domain 
The religio-nationalist trend of al-Afghani, ʿAbdu, and Rida worked on fighting Western 
intervention and reforming Islamic societies against the socio-cultural and political project 
of the West. In Kuwait, these teachings met the requirements of the Islamist Reformists 
who saw the Western presence as a social more than a political threat. The best way to 
protect the society was by spreading awareness of reformist ideas among Kuwaitis, through 
education, literature, and the press. Islamist Reformists also worked on controlling the 
social domain and taking it from the hands of traditional conservative Islamists who 
obstructed reformist activities and did not like the idea of losing control over the religious 
establishment to the new Islamists.  
2.3.1 Reforming the Educational System 
The first step in this reform was the educational system which witnessed significant 
transformations. Rather than being based exclusively on Qurʾanic schools, British 
Government Records indicate that education gradually became the domain of modern 
schooling systems with the establishment, encouraged by Rida,
31
of al-Mubarakiyyah 
School. Al-Mubarakiyyah was partly a response to the classes that had been organised in 
the same year by Mr and Mrs Calverley, who were American missionaries.  Fearing their 
children would be converted to Christianity, local families were initially reluctant to send 
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their children to these classes, but Calverley reacted to their hesitation by visiting 
diwaniyyas to convince parents of the benefits to be gained from attending thee lessons, 
and did succeed in attracting a few children (none of whom was influenced by the Christian 
teachings).
32
 
Shaikh Yusif bin ʿIsaal-Qinaʿi recalled how the idea for the al-Mubarakiyyah school was 
first proposed during the ceremonies held on 12 April 1911 to celebrate Prophet 
Muhammad’s birthday.  The sermon in the mosque was delivered by shaikh Yasin al-
Tabtabaʾi who concluded by saying,  
The purpose behind celebrating the birth of the Prophet (Peace 
Be Upon Him) does not simply lie in reading verses from the 
Qurʾan but in following in the Prophet’s (PBUH) footsteps and 
we cannot do that without knowledge of his life and 
achievements. Such knowledge can only be attained from books 
and good schooling.
33
 
Shaikh Yusif bin ʿIsaal-Qinaʿi was inspired by this, since it resonated with his earlier 
writings on the importance of education and knowledge. He therefore embarked on a 
concerted effort to collect donations from members of the ruling family (Naseral-Subah, 
and Salem al-Subah), and businessmen (Ibrahim bin Mudaf, al-Khalid al-Khudiar, Hilal al-
Mutairi, Qassim and Yusif al-Ibrahim), whose contributions went towards building the new 
school. Named al-Mubarakiyyah after the Ruler of Kuwait at the time, shaikh Mubarak al-
Subah, the school opened on 22 December 1912, shaikh Yusif bin ʿIsaal-Qinaʿi was 
appointed its first principal, and Hamad al-Khalid al-Khudair, Shamlan bin Ali bin Saif and 
Ahmadal-Humaidi became members of its first council.   
Al-Mubarakiyyah put an end to the traditional forms of teaching where a mulla sitting on a 
bench taught students in his own house, without supervision or curricula.  A school now 
occupied a separate building, was subject to rules and regulations, and followed a strict 
curriculum. Despite these changes, subjects remained fundamentally traditional and did not 
venture beyond the teaching of Arabic, the Qurʾan, and rudimentary mathematics, until 
1915 when ʿUmar Asim al-Azmiri became principal. He overhauled the system and 
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introduced a more modern school curriculum based on what was being taught in Iraq at the 
time.
34
 
However, al-Mubarakiyyah was destined to remain ensnared by an inflexible curriculum, 
since despite many attempts, the school administration failed to introduce the teaching of 
foreign languages, as was the practice at the more advanced Arab schools at the time. This 
situation was due mainly to the extreme views of certain uncompromising religious 
scholars who considered that the teaching and learning of foreign languages and modern 
sciences was sinful, and the school’s main financial supporters were either influenced by 
these views or wished to spare themselves the unsavoury task of confronting the religious 
scholars. ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid’s solution to this dilemma was to establish a new school 
that would have more freedom to manoeuvre.  
Shaikh Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi recounted the story of how al-Ahmadiyyah school was 
founded, 
When shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber al-Subah came to power, he 
entrusted me with the task of tackling some of the pressing 
issues at al-Mubarakiyyah where subjects were limited to 
teaching the Qurʾan, reading, basic arithmetic and Islamic 
jurisprudence.  My only condition was that I be allowed to work 
without interference from teachers who were very difficult to 
deal with when I worked there as principal. Shaikh al-Subah 
instructed me to discuss my vision for the curricula with them, 
so I offered to introduce modern sciences and English but they 
were vehemently opposed to the idea.  Loath to have another 
confrontation with them, I abandoned al-Mubarakiyyah. During 
subsequent meetings at Khalaf al-Naqib’s shop, ʿAbdulʿaziz al-
Rushaid proposed that we leave al-Mubarakiyyah to its current 
format and establish a new school that would reflect our own 
educational vision. The idea was met with great enthusiasm by 
everyone.
35
 
Al-Ahmadiyyah school opened in May 1921, with the moral and financial support of 
Shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber and reformist merchants such as al-Khalid family. Away from the 
influence of the conservatives, Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi became simultaneously al-
Ahmadiyyah’s President and a teacher, and successfully introduced foreign languages as 
well as science into the curriculum. As a result, many students left al-Mubarakiyyah to join 
al-Ahmadiyyah, which clearly showed how reformist ideas had penetrated the society.  
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2.3.2 The Cultural Reaction to the Missionaries Presence in Kuwait 
Reforms were not limited simply to education, which was propelled from its traditional 
modes into some very modern structures of learning. Cultural and intellectual life was 
greatly influenced by the reform movement led by Rashīd Rida, as indicated by his visit in 
1912 that further cemented his status among the burgeoning intellectual classes. 
Commenting on that visit, ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid noted that, 
The first to sow the seeds of intellectual revival was the great 
scholar Muhammad Rashīd Rida. People flocked to the main 
mosque where he delivered his great sermons. Many Kuwaitis 
who had previously doubted him were left in awe. There was 
renewed interest in knowledge and science and the number of 
subscribers to his journal increased exponentially.
36
 
Chief amongst Rida’s concerns was the danger to Muslim culture and identity posed by 
Christian missionaries in Islamic countries, a threat he warned against constantly as part of 
the imperial goal of the Western powers. Rida mentioned his visit to Kuwait in an article in 
al-Manar entitled “Our Indian-Arab Trip: A Public Expression of Gratitude to the people 
of Oman and Kuwait”, but did not elaborate on the intellectual and cultural aspects of the 
trip. However Captain Shakespeare, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, included details 
of the visit in his annual report of 1912,  
[Rashīd Rida] arrived in Kuwait on the 9th May and the next 
day delivered a lecture attended by shaikhs Jabir and Nasir 
(Shaikh Mubarak’s sons) and some 1,000 Arabs of all classes. 
He lectured on the rites and the propagation of the Islamic faith, 
and in the course of it warned his hearers against foreign 
missionaries and others like them who endeavoured to obtain a 
footing in Muhammadan countries. The lecture was not actively 
anti-European or anti-Christian, but its tone undoubtedly 
indicated that foreigners should be discouraged. Though the 
Saiyid [Rida] remained more than a month in Kuwait, his 
subsequent lectures were confined strictly to interpretation and 
elucidation of the Koran and Hadaya [Guidance], possibly on a 
hint from Shaikh Mubarak, whose guest he was.
37
 
 
                                                     
36
Al-Rushaid, Tarikh, 353, and as British Government Record show. 
37“Administration Report for the Political Agency, Kuwait, 1912” in the Annual Report of the Persian Gulf 
Political Residency for 1911, IOR: R/15/1/711/2 (British Library, London), 113.  
  37 
2.3.2.1 Establishing the al-Jamʿiyyah al-Khairiyyah al-ʿArabiyyah [Arab Charity 
Society] in 1913 
The visit of Rida encouraged a group of Kuwaitis to move more seriously against Christian 
missionary efforts. In addition to al-Mubarakiyyah school, these efforts culminated in the 
establishment in 1913 of al-Jamʿiyyah al-Khairiyyah al-ʿArabiyyah [the Arab Charity 
Society] by young Kuwaitis, such as Farhan al-Khalid al-Khudair, influenced by the new 
intellectual trends. The Society directed its efforts against Christian missionaries in Kuwait 
as epitomised by the American Hospital.
38
 Rida received an anonymous letter –widely 
believed to have been written by the founder of the society himself, Farhan al-Khudair – in 
which he concurred with Rida about the dangers posed to Kuwait by the growing numbers 
of Christian missionaries in Bahrain and Kuwait, and emphasised the importance of 
stemming the tide of these missionary efforts.
39
 
The Society was established with the help and financial support of Farhan’s family and a 
number of prominent figures in Kuwait such as shaikhʿAbdullah al-Khalaf al-Dehayyan 
and Shaikh Nasser al-Mubarak al-Subah. Most of the founding members, including the 
founder himself, were quite young (the oldest was 35), clearly indicating the youthful 
nature of the movement that was inspired by the intellectual revival sweeping through the 
Arab and Islamic world. Captain Shakespeare attests to this in his 1913 report: “...with the 
blessings of Shaikh Nasser bin Mubarak, a number of young Arab men with purported 
aspirations for progress established a charity organisation in February.”40 According to its 
initial statement, the Society was founded to serve society and indirectly to oppose the role 
of missionaries and foreigners in Kuwait: 
The purposes of our Society are to: 
1. Send students on scholarships to study at Islamic universities in 
distinguished Arab countries. 
2. Appoint a pious speaker to deliver lectures and act as a spiritual 
guide for the people. 
3. Appoint a doctor and a pharmacist to treat the poor and the 
impoverished. 
                                                     
38
 Extract from the Majallat al-Manar of Cairo, Vol. 15, Part 7, dated Rajab 1330 (14 July 1913), 559, in 
IOR: 15/5/62 (British Library, London), 32. 
39
Sa’ih Nasih, “Christianity Missionaries in Bahrain and Arab Land,”Majallat Al-Manar, No. 5 (May 1913), 
379-383. 
40“Administration Report for the Political Agency, Kuwait, 1913” in the Annual Report of the Persian Gulf 
Political Residency for 1912, IOR: R/15/1/712/2 (British Library, London), 126. 
  38 
4. The distribution of clean water is one of our most important 
priorities. 
5. Fund the burial of the poor and those visiting from out of 
town.
41
 
 
These objectives were set forth in response to Christian missionary activities and the 
presence of the American Hospital. A Turkish doctor, Assad Efendi, and a Turkish 
pharmacist were appointed to run the newly-established local clinic, and medicines and 
surgical equipment were imported from Bombay.
42
A library set up in the Society’s 
headquarters was supported by local people who donated books, journals, and newspapers; 
later it subscribed to several journals and purchased books from abroad. Shaikh 
Muhammad Amin al-Shanqiti, at the time a resident of Zubair, was invited to join the 
Society, and delivered various lectures on religious and intellectual issues in a style that 
was considered a long way from traditional modes of religious indoctrination. The Society 
also kept its promise to provide clean drinking water – not the easiest of feats – and played 
an important role in funding burials, in addition to its other charity activities.
43
 
However, the Society was not destined to survive beyond its first year. At the end of 1913 
it was dissolved, the clinic was closed down, and both the doctor and the pharmacist were 
let go. There have been conflicting reports about the reasons for its closure. Some 
attributed it to the death of its founder Farhan al-Khalid,
44
 others to the reluctance of the 
local community to embrace the Society’s vision and aspirations,45 while yet another group 
blamed its demise on the clash between the Society’s reformist efforts which favoured the 
Islamic Ottoman government, and the political leanings of shaikh Mubarak al-Subah who 
preferred to accommodate the British presence despite the associated Anglo-American 
missionary activities.
46
 These factors probably all contributed to the Society’s downfall, 
but the most important reason was the pressure of the foreign political presence 
(represented by the British Political Agent), the foreign cultural presence (represented by 
the American Hospital and Christian missionaries), and shaikh Mubarak, who regarded the 
Society as a threat to his relations with Britain. 
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Those reasons aside, the Society’s importance lay in its being the first cultural and political 
project with a reformist agenda, thereby paving the way for several secular and religious 
movements geared towards reform. The seeds of change survived long after the Society 
had closed its doors, and as many political and cultural events would later show, a number 
of its young members carried on its message.  Shaikh Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi and shaikh 
ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid were among the most prominent figures who spread the reformist 
message. Although both came from a religious scholarly background and had originally 
acquired their knowledge through traditional routes, such as attending the sessions of 
renowned religious scholars at the time in Zubair, al-Hasa and Medina, they deviated from 
the norm by choosing instead to keep abreast of the latest political and cultural 
developments in the Arab and Islamic worlds and to inject some of these ideas into 
Kuwaiti society. Al-Mubarakiyyah and al-Ahmadiyyah schools were established according 
to the latest trends in education and, in the case of al-Ahmadiyyah, English was taught as a 
subject, despite fierce opposition from traditional conservative forces within the Kuwaiti 
society.
47
 
While shaikh Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi was busy with the school, shaikh ʿAbdulʿaziz al-
Rushaid turned his attention to the world of journalism. Journals and newspapers took their 
place in the reformist movement’s ‘awareness project’. ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid was in fact 
the founding father of journalism in Kuwait, having published the first journal in Kuwait, 
al-KuwaitJournal. He wrote in the first issue that publishing a journal for Kuwaitis by 
Kuwaitis was one of their highest aspirations.
48
 The topics covered in the Journal were 
varied and the journal included sections dedicated to religious issues, ethics, literature, 
language, and biographies. However, its ‘History’ and its ‘Old and New’ sections were the 
most revolutionary, since al-Rushaid adopted a scientifically-sound method for presenting 
Kuwait’s history that was an unequivocal departure from traditional methods of 
documenting history on the basis of oral narratives. Later, his book, Tarikh al-Kuwait 
[History of Kuwait], adopted a similar method for narrating the history of the country.  
In the section entitled ‘Qadim wa Jadid’[Old and New], al-Rushaid examined the latest 
burning topics, chief amongst which were modernism, civil society, gender issues from a 
religious perspective, and a number of other themes that resulted directly from the clash 
between the cultures of the coloniser and the colonised. These topics were meant to protect 
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the pure Kuwaiti society from the Western cultural intervention that other Muslim 
societies had witnessed. Al-Rushaid adopted the reformist ideas of Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani, Muhammed ʿAbduh and Rashīd Rida who maintained that there was no conflict 
between Islam and science, and encouraged Muslims and Arabs to learn from Western 
civilisation and acknowledge the role of women in society, since none of this jeopardised 
religious and moral values or threatened the family unit that was considered the corner 
stone of society, even though this view contradicted Western culture’s emphasis on 
individualism.
49
 
In addition to the two important figures of al-Qinaʿi and al-Rushaid, shaikh Muhammad al-
Shanqiti and Shaikh Hafez Wahba played an equally important role in spreading the 
message of reform, even after the Society, of which they were founding members, had 
closed down. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that these four men had a 
tremendous influence as the driving force behind the education of a whole generation of 
young people, a mission that would eventually lead them to clash with British interests in 
the region.  
2.3.2.2 Islamists and Social Reforms 
There was relatively little in the way of political reform, compared with the social and 
cultural reform that was initiated by the reformists, especially Islamists. During the 1920s, 
the pioneers of reform, mainly Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi and ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid, 
continued to exert efforts in many domains of life, with a particular emphasis on cultural 
activities. Al-Ahmadiyyah School, as noted above, surpassed al-Mubarakiyyah by 
introducing subjects like English language and natural sciences, while students were 
encouraged to take part in cultural activities such as acting, which sometimes formed part 
of the final assessment of the student’s performance in school. ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid’s 
influence was discernible in the production of a school play called “A Reformist Dialogue” 
which he wrote and directed, and which was performed by students as part of their final 
exams and end of year celebrations.  
In addition to progress made in the field of education, cultural reforms were extended to 
other domains of life; a national library was established in 1922 on the metaphorical ruins 
of Al-Jamʿiyyah al-Khairiyyah al-ʿArabiyyah’s own library. Yusif bin ʿIsa who, with 
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Sultan al-Kulaib and ʿAbdulhamid al-Saniʿ, was one of the founders of the national library, 
joined the Muslim Brotherhood later. The library, which grew in size over the years, 
became a meeting place for writers and intellectuals who converged upon it to debate 
issues in fiqh, literature, and politics.     
A literary club was established by Khalid al-ʿAdsani in 1924, which in turn helped create a 
venue for those interested in discussing literary, political and scientific topics. Poets like 
Saqiral-Shabib, Ahmad al-Bishr al-Rumi and several others honed their talents at the club, 
as explained by al-ʿAdsani, 
A period of active cultural and political engagement led to the 
establishment of the Literary Club whose idea was first 
proposed by the author of these lines. A member of the ruling 
family was invited to become an honorary president. Within a 
few years, the club was a cultural force to be reckoned with 
among young people. More than a hundred members joined its 
ranks and the scientific and literary lectures delivered on its 
podium resonated with developments in both Kuwait and 
neighbouring countries.
50
 
2.3.3 Islamist Reformists and their Opponents 
However, these reforms had as many opponents as supporters. Conflict arose mainly over 
control of the social domain; this had previously been regulated by other forces, mainly 
traditional conservatives who had viewed the reforms with great suspicion and often 
equated them with heresy. Figures like ʿAbdulʿaziz al-ʿAlji and Ahmad al-Farisi had a big 
following from all classes, including several very influential people who lent their support 
to al-Mubarakiyyah. The conservative forces generally had very strict views about 
teaching foreign languages and natural sciences, and allowing girls to attend schools. In 
addition, they had strong views on other issues like the spherical nature of the earth, the 
use of printers to publish religious books, and reading journals like al-Manar, since, along 
with Rashīd Rida, they were considered a very bad influence on young people. Al-ʿAlji 
and al-Farisi blocked the introduction of certain subjects (foreign languages and modern 
sciences) into the school curricula at al-Mubarakiyyah through their influence on some of 
the school’s main financial supporters, such as Hamad al-Saqir and Ibrahim bin Mudaf; it 
was this setback that prompted Yusif bin ʿIsa and ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid to leave al-
Mubarakiyyah and establish al-Ahmadiyyah away from the dominance of al-ʿAlji and al-
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Farisi. Nor could al-Ahmadiyyah escape the criticisms levelled by the conservatives, who 
often described it as a Christian school.     
Nevertheless, Ahmad al-Jaber, a Kuwaiti prince was instrumental at the time in keeping 
the conservatives at bay by lending both moral and financial support to al-Ahmadiyyah 
because of his special relationship with Yusif bin ʿIsa. This enabled the school to introduce 
modern curricula and attract teachers from more advanced countries such as Iraq, the 
Levant, and Egypt. The school also emphasised the importance of extra-curricular 
activities such as debates, speeches, and the theatre. The conflict between the 
conservatives and the proponents of reform was showcased in al-Rushaid’s play 
“Muhawarah Islahiyya” [A Reformist Dialogue], which took the form of a dialogue 
between an enlightened student and a narrow-minded ultra-religious man, and was 
performed at the end of the school year in 1924, before a huge audience. In the 
introduction to the play, which he later published in a small booklet, al-Rushaid mentions 
that the play was based on an imaginary dialogue between a turbaned shaikh and his 
brother who wished to consult him about enrolling in a modern school. The shaikh 
provided a long list of reasons why these schools had a corrupting influence, whereupon 
another student hastened to refute the shaikh’s entire claim with solid evidence and logical 
argument, 
Shaikh: Isn’t it true that these modern schools like al-
Ahmadiyyah teach geography, history and English. And can 
anyone dispute the corrupting power of these subjects? Wasn’t 
it the scientists of geography who claimed the earth was round 
and that rain was no more than steam rising from the earth and 
other sacrilegious allegations? I warn my dear brother against 
enrolling in this school 
Student: Don’t be swayed by him, brother, for his tongue does 
not speak the truth of his mind. And soon he will be exposed for 
what he is. I once heard him tell his a group of his companions 
that “We are in an age where the young have overtaken us with 
the power of knowledge and now competing with us for jobs.”51 
From the student’s point of view, the real reason the conservatives opposed the tide of 
reform and fought it tooth and nail lay in the perceived loss of social and religious status 
that they would incur. Yet, the influence of the conservatives gradually declined as 
increasing numbers of young people joined the ranks of the reformers, along with the 
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political and social developments that occurred during the 1930s and dramatically reduced 
the impact of the conservative element on the minds of the youth. 
2.4 Reformists and the Political Domain 
Nationalist reformers were more interested in politics than the Islamists, who focused more 
on the social domain. Nationalist reformers strove to give more power to the people in 
general, and in particular to the merchant class to which many belonged. The reformist 
movement worked over the years to spread political and cultural awareness, but their 
efforts were restricted to urban centres in which Sunni Arabs resided. This was construed 
by urban Shiʿas, Kuwaitis of Persian origin, and tribes, as a form of exclusion from a 
movement that considered them second-class citizens. As a result they rushed to form an 
alliance with the ruling family in its struggle against the reformists, especially in 1938 and 
1939 when matters came to a head. The conflict between the nationalist reformers and the 
ruling family led to rifts in the reformist movement, especially when the Islamists refused 
to antagonise the ruling family (being not very interested in politics, the Islamists thought 
that the nationalists had gone too far in their demands).
52
 
The reformist movement undoubtedly contributed to the creation and spread of a fresh 
kind of political culture. The reformists introduced the notions of shura, democracy, and 
political participation in a society where shura had previously been limited to those close 
to the ruler, while democracy and political participation were virtually non-existence in 
Kuwaiti political life.  The reformist movement also introduced successful administrative 
experiences from neighbouring countries such as Bahrain’s municipalities experiment.  In 
1938 and 1939 there were clashes between reformists and the ruler and his supporters, 
when the Emir and his followers realised how much was at stake in the success of the 
reformists who were gradually usurping some of their traditional powers. The Emir 
managed, however, to marginalise the reformists and to steer the country back onto its 
traditional track, and the discovery of oil and the resulting flow of revenues from 1949 
served only to concentrate more power in the hands of Kuwait’s rulers, who no longer 
needed support from the merchants. 
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2.4.1 The Beginnings of Political Opposition and the Role of the Islamists 
The early seeds of opposition in Kuwait were political and against the ruler, although 
opposition sometimes took an economic shape. When shaikh Mubarak al-Subah ascended 
the throne through fratricide, having killed his two half-brothers, Jarraḥ and Muhammad in 
a political move unprecedented in the history of Kuwait, Yusifal-Ibrahim, the brother-in-
law of Jarrah and Muhammad, who was a prominent merchant and a powerful personality, 
objected to the coup and roused public opinion against shaikh Mubarak. Mubarak had 
meanwhile prevailed upon several of Kuwait’s major figures to sign a letter addressed to 
the Ottoman Porte in Istanbul claiming that it was Yusifal-Ibrahim who had murdered the 
ruler and his brother.
53
Some of these individuals refused to sign the letter.
54
 
Al-Ibrahim then intensified his political opposition to Mubarak at both the local and 
regional level by striking up an alliance with Mubarak’s arch-enemy, ʿAbdulʿaziz bin 
Rashīd, the ruler of Haʾil, as well as with the Ottoman government which was opposed to 
the British and, by default, to their ally shaikh Mubarak.  Given this level of internal and 
external animosity, Mubarak was forced to improve his standing with the people of 
Kuwait, and especially with its influential figures. Such flattery was to last ten years until 
1906, when bin Rashīd was killed, and until the death of al-Ibrahim in 1907, after which 
Mubarak finally felt free to sever all ties with the local opposition, which consisted of al-
Ibrahim’s allies and a considerable number of influential Kuwaiti figures.55 
Since numerous battles had exhausted his coffers, Mubarak was also in desperate need of 
money, and therefore imposed hefty taxes on the population in general, and on the 
merchants in particular, in order to fund more of his war efforts.
56
Pearl fishers were 
banned from diving for the precious stones at a time when pearl diving was one of the 
pillars of the Kuwaiti economy and sustained the livelihood of most Kuwaiti families.  
Unable to handle the ramifications, major pearl merchants such as Hilal Fajhan al-
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Mutairi,
57
 Shamlan bin ʿAli,58 and Ibrahim bin Mudaf,59 reacted by leaving the country and 
heading to Bahrain, departing in secret for fear of the shaikh’s retaliation.  Mubarak’s rule 
clearly could not have survived the economic implications of this boycott and he was 
forced to send a delegation armed with a letter of apology in an attempt to persuade them 
to return but to no avail. On the pretext of visiting the Emir of Bahrain, Shaikh ʿIsa al-
Khalīfa, Mubarak then visited Bahrain himself and, having no choice but to comply with 
all the conditions laid down by the pearl merchants, he managed eventually to win them 
back.
60
 This incident represented the first real opposition moves against the ruler in 
Kuwait, but it was merely political opposition via economic means; this explains why the 
Islamists neither participated in, nor even commented about it, since it was so far from 
their social domain.  
2.4.2 The Political Role of Muhammadal-Shanqiti and Hafez Wahba 
During the early years of the twentieth century shaikh Muhammad al-Shanqiti travelled 
from the extreme west of the Maghreb to the eastern part of the Arab world in a search for 
knowledge that took him to Egypt, Medina, Mecca, India, Oman and al-|asa. He 
eventually settled in Zubair, in southern Iraq, at the request of one of his mentors who 
asked him to stay and teach at the school that had been established by Mezʾil Pasha 
Saʿdun.  Despite the focus of al-Shanqiti’s studies on Maliki fiqh, he was more influenced 
by the views of bin-Taymiyyah and bin al-Qayyem (the two main Hanbali scholars), 
especially concerning contrivances such as pleading with the righteous, the construction of 
shrines, and similar practices that should be eradicated. Al-Shanqiti remained in Zubair for 
four years (1909-1913) during which time his reputation as a learned scholar reached as far 
as Basra and Kuwait. As noted above, when the Arab Charity Society was established, al-
Shanqiti was invited to lecture and deliver sermons in Kuwait, where his charm, skilled 
oratory, and modern Islamic views coincided with the reformist zeal of the time.  
Al-Shanqiti’s colleague Hafez Wahba, a graduate of al-Azhar in Cairo, had travelled 
extensively between the urban centres of the Islamic world such as Istanbul and the 
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Levant, before receiving an invitation from Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi to teach at al-
Mubarakiyyah, a job he combined with lecturing and, outside school hours, with 
awareness-raising activities. Together Wahba and al-Shanqiti were a reforming duo, 
alongside Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi and al-Rushaid. The teachings of al-Shanqiti and Wahba 
educated a whole generation of young people who in turn sought to articulate a reformist 
vision that reconciled Islamic, Pan-Arabist, social and political aspirations.  An inevitable 
clash ensued between these aspirations on the one hand, and British interests and 
traditional conservative forces on the other (as is discussed later in the thesis).  
The establishment of the Arab Charity Society marked the beginning of this cultural 
conflict, since the Society’s declared goals of combating missionary efforts in Kuwait were 
frowned upon by the British. When the Society closed down, they were very relieved as 
was shaikh Mubarak who agreed with them that the Society’s ambitions were simply too 
big and too dangerous. However, calls for reforms did not end with the demise of the 
Society but continued unabated at mosques, diwaniyyas, and, to some extent, at al-
Mubarakiyyah. Things came to a head when Mubarak called upon Kuwaitis to support his 
friend, the ruler of Muhammara, shaikh Kazʾal, a staunch ally of the British, in his battle 
against pro-Ottoman rebels. The Kuwaitis, spurred by al-Shanqiti and Wahba, have 
rejected Mubarak’s orders.  Al-Rushaid recalls, 
When the Kuwaitis learned they were being asked to fight 
against their brothers [the rebels rising against Kaz’al], they  
resorted to civil strife and vociferously rejected Mubarak’s calls, 
especially since al-Shanqiti and Hafez Wahba were touring the 
city warning people against obeying Mubarak, arguing that it 
constituted a sin to fight their brothers. Their words were met 
with great enthusiasm and emboldened the masses further. 
When Jaber bin Mubarak ordered them to march, they said, “We 
don’t hear nor shall we obey.” Jaber, taken aback, asked them 
for their reasons. They replied, “We cannot obey that which 
angers Allah.”61 
The religious impetus of the political activities of al-Shanqiti and Wahba is obvious in 
their reaction to Mubarak in that they saw this war against Ottomans as a ‘sin’ by 
empowering a non-Muslim state over a Muslim state.  
In 1914, al-Shanqiti and Wahba played an important role in recruiting youth and 
mobilizing people under the Islamic principle of supporting the Muslim Ottoman state 
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against the non-Muslim state of Britain. An angry Mubarak returned to Kuwait and 
immediately summoned al-Shanqiti and Wahba to chastise them for turning public opinion 
against him and the British, 
I am an Ottoman Muslim who jealously guards his religion and 
his country and I don’t like those who want to harm either one 
of them. But I have reached an agreement with the British over 
something which I believe is of great benefit to my country and 
I will not tolerate any opposition to that decision, despite the 
fact that I don’t like the British and acknowledge that their 
religion is very different from mine. Children in schools and out 
on the streets are cursing the British and praising the German. I 
am sure they are too young to make up their own minds and 
they are just repeating what is being taught to them.
62
 
Following this incident and fearing retaliation or exile, both al-Shanqiti and Wahba felt 
compelled to leave Kuwait. The former took up a teaching post in Zubair, while the latter 
accepted an invitation to teach in Bahrain.  This act of civil strife was unprecedented and 
came on the heels of al-Ibrahim’s political opposition and the decision of the three 
merchants to engage in economic boycott. It thus formed the seeds of intensive political 
and cultural activism which, in turn, transformed domestic social and political issues into 
matters with wider regional, Arab and Islamic implications.  
2.4.3 The Ruling Family and the Reformists 
The ruling family’s reaction to the reforms fluctuated, according to the matter at hand and 
the ruler in power. Shaikh Mubarak al-Subah was very interested in expanding the base of 
his power in the region and struck several alliances with British allies such as Shaikh 
Khazʿal and tribes that were hostile to the pro-Ottoman bin-Rashīd who wielded absolute 
power in the heart of the Arab Peninsula. This inevitably put Mubarak on a collision 
course with public opinion which was sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire and regarded it 
as the protestor of Islam in the face of European greed. Mubarak’s brutal rule also left 
people little space to manoeuvre and express their opinions. Although Mubarak was out of 
the country when al-Shanqiti and Wahba spearheaded an opposition movement in Kuwait, 
both had to leave Kuwait when he returned.  
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Mubarak’s close friendship with Shaikh Khazʿal, infamous for his decadent lifestyle, 
introduced him to a life of luxury and opulence he attempted to mimic in his own 
household. This, in addition to Mubarak’s dictatorial style of rule, prevented any reform 
movement from flourishing. The fact that reforms were being pushed by religious scholars 
who supported the Muslim Ottoman government in its struggle against Mubarak’s 
European-backed ally, and called for religious values in their versions of reform made 
them Mubarak’s worst enemy.  
Mubarak’s son Jaber (1860-1917) ruled for a short period during which he revoked some 
of his father’s policies vis-à-vis Kuwait’s elders and improved his relations with them, and 
also repealed some of the taxes his father had imposed, but he did not live long enough to 
effect any significant changes. When his conservative, traditionalist brother Salem (1864-
1921) ascended the throne in 1917, conservative scholars found themselves once more in 
fashion. A believer in old-fashioned methods of rule, Salem was loath to consult anyone 
and intensely disliked the kind of political change pushed by the reformers. He took advice 
(mainly social and economic) from Kuwait’s prominent figures infrequently and on 
specific occasions, such as al-Jahra’ incident when he sought their guidance as to whether 
or not to negotiate with Faisal al-Duish’s envoy after al-Duish found himself under siege 
by the British forces in Kuwait. Salem was advised not to accept al-Duish’s conditions 
which he did.  
Salem had inherited his father’s legacy of despotism, but unlike his father who had lived a 
life of luxury and extravagance, this power was contained by his religiousness and 
predilection for all that was traditional.  When al-Shanqiti returned to Kuwait to visit his 
family, Salem admonished him for this unexpected visit for which he had not sought prior 
permission. Pushed by the traditional conservatives, Salem found the visit quite 
disconcerting due to al-Shanqiti’s history with his father and his reformist views, and his 
nervousness over the visit became quite evident when he had al-Shanqiti put under 
surveillance. Even after al-Shanqiti had left Kuwait to return to Zubair, Salem tracked him, 
and even sent a letter to the British-appointed Governor of Basra (since Zubair was under 
the Basra’s jurisdiction), warning him that al-Shanqiti was agitating the masses against the 
British government in the name of religion.
63
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The Governor of Basra wanted to keep al-Shanqiti under control and questioned shaikh 
Ibrahim, who was hosting al-Shanqiti in his house, about al-Shanqiti’s activities. In return, 
Ibrahim assured the Governor that al-Shanqiti no longer regarded the war against the 
British as a religious one but as a purely political one, and that he had left Kuwait not for 
political reasons but because of disagreements with some students.  However, the real 
reason behind Salem’s opinion of al-Shanqiti and Wahba was their intervention in the 
political domain in the name of religion, which threatened the legitimacy of the ruler in the 
society.
64
 
2.4.4 Islamists and Socio-Political Reform after Shaikh Mubarak 
Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi and ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid entered the reformist arena following 
the departure of al-Shanqiti and Wahba in 1914, but maintained a low profile until 
Mubarak’s death. During his rule, they were very busy with al-Mubarakiyyah and also 
feared his persecution and that of his son, Salem, the successor to Jaber who had ruled 
only briefly. Whispers of the need for reform began to circulate during the rule of Shaikh 
Salem who had also inherited his father’s uncompromising attitude,65 but talk of political 
change remained subdued and sporadic until late 1920 and early 1921, when several 
Kuwaiti figures stressed the importance of involving the general population in the process 
of decision-making. They proposed to pressure shaikh Salem into forming a council of six 
members from the local community –including shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber – to act as 
permanent advisers, a step that they believed would secure a lasting social peace.
66
 
No sooner had shaikh Salem died, than they seized the opportunity to demand a bigger 
piece of the political pie, especially in the absence of shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber, the man who 
was considered most likely to succeed Salem (at the time al-Jaber was away, negotiating 
with ʿAbdulʿaziz bin Saʿud at al-ʿUqair Conference). A group of men met at the home of 
Nasser al-Bader on the day Salem of Salem’s death and drafted a political manifesto that 
was published by Saif al-Shamlan in his book The History of Kuwait. This version differs 
slightly in language and considerably with regard to names from the version reproduced in 
Khalīfa al-Wuqayyan’s book Culture in Kuwait: Beginnings, Trends and Pioneers. The 
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document contained demands that would have been deemed virtually impossible during 
Mubarak’s reign six years earlier. Al-Wuqayyan’s version was as follows, 
In the name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful  
We the undersigned have agreed on the following: 
1. Reform the House of Subah to avoid disagreements over the line of 
succession. 
2. The three candidates for the throne are shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber, 
Shaikh Hamad al-Mubarak, and shaikh ʿAbdullah al-Salem. 
3. If the Subah family reaches a consensus on one of the candidates or 
if the government chooses one of them, we shall accept the decision 
in both cases. 
4. The appointed ruler shall be the president of the Shura Council. 
5. Several members of the Subah family and Kuwaiti people shall be 
elected to run the country on the basis of fairness and justice.
67
 
 
Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi was one of the signatories on the al-Wuqayyan version of the 
document, in addition to being a member of the twelve representatives on the advisory 
council as recommended by the negotiations between a number of Kuwaiti figures and 
Shaikh Ahmadal-Jaber on board his ship upon his return from al-ʿUqair Conference.  
Al-Rushaid was also a member of the Council which did not survive for long. Suleiman al-
ʿAdsani records in his memoirs that court advisers encouraged the Shaikh to agree to the 
delegation’s demand because they were deeply convinced that disagreements among 
council members would soon spell the end of the Council. Sure enough, the Council did 
not survive longer than six months due to irreconcilable differences between its members 
over policy issues and future plans, and the intrigues perpetrated by court staff.
68
In this 
incident, the Islamists represented by Yusif bin ʿIsa and ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid did not, 
for several reasons, play a crucial role. First, the Islamists had had a bad experience with 
Mubarak and Salem before al-Shanqiti and Wahba had been expelled from Kuwait. 
Second, Yusif bin ʿIsa and al-Rushaid were still young and had not reached the point of 
being able to lead the traditional merchant families and other influential figures. Finally, 
and most importantly, although Islamists were part of the reformist movement, they did 
not consider this political demand as a priority because their real focus was the social more 
than the political domain.                     
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Despite being short-lived and small, and with its membership being limited to certain 
classes, mainly merchants and religious scholars, the 1921 Council was the first experience 
of its kind in the modern history of Kuwait and the Gulf, in that its principles were guided 
by the notions of democracy, as understood by Islamic shura, even though the people did 
not directly elect their representatives. The absence of a culture of democracy also 
contributed to the 1921 Council’s rapid downfall, nor was fresh elections called to form a 
new council. Arab society in general and the Gulf in particular were still governed by 
tribal and familial ties.  
The fact that the pioneers of reform had proposed such revolutionary ideas and had 
attempted to realize them in the form of the Council soon became an inspiration, albeit a 
rather romanticized one, for all those who aspired to introduce democracy into the Arab 
Gulf. The 1921 Council represented a historical moment when the people forced the ruling 
family to accept their demands. The 1921 Council was also presided over by a commoner, 
and despite its simplistic nature, its manifesto regulated the line of succession to prevent 
future disputes. All these achievements in 1921 paved the way for a culture of democracy 
that would inspire later generations to demand bigger political reforms.  
Shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber al-Subah ruled for 20 years during which time the country 
underwent significant periods of political, social and economic transformation, chief 
amongst which was the discovery of oil and the awarding of the first oil concession 
agreements to British and American companies.  The ruling family increased its political 
and economic power through direct control of all oil resources. Shaikh Ahmad‘s 
relationship with the proponents of reform was full of friction from the moment of shaikh 
Salem’s death (while shaikh Ahmad was at al-ʿUqair Conference negotiating over borders 
with ʿAbdulʿaziz bin Saʿud). A number of Kuwait’s elders then decided to amend the laws 
of autocratic rule that Mubarak, Jaber, and Salem had followed in order to make them 
more democratic and more oriented towards Shura. Despite the short lifespan of the Shura 
council, the reformers persisted in their cultural and intellectual efforts during the 1920s, 
and the notion of re-establishing the council surfaced again the 1930s, when several reform 
leaders such as Shaikh Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi, Suleiman al-ʿAdsani, Sayyid ʿAli Sayyid 
Suleiman and others suggested establishing an elected municipal council that would be 
entrusted with the task of keeping Kuwait’s streets clean. The council would be funded by 
an increase from 4 to 4.5 percent on taxes on imported goods. Shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber 
liked the idea, especially as it cost the government practically nothing while 
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simultaneously functioning as a form of financial control to limit cases of corruption in 
some government agencies.
69
 
Despite Ahmad al-Jaber’s approval, several parties that had long benefited, financially, 
socially and politically, from the old arrangements were deeply opposed to the municipal 
council. An open conflict ensued between the old guard and members of the council whose 
twelve members were elected by 50 of Kuwait’s prominent figures. Council members 
included: Yusif bin ʿIsa, Mishʿan al-Khudair, Suleiman al-ʿAdsani, Sayyid ʿAli Sayyid 
Suleiman, Muhammad Ahmad al-Ghanim, and Nisf Yusif al-Nisf. Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani 
was elected as the president of the council, while shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber’s brother, 
ʿAbdullah al-Jaber, was appointed the honorary president of the first municipal council,70 
which was elected for two years; after which the number of prominent figures eligible to 
vote increased to 200. Most of the same members were re-elected for the council’s second 
session, with al-ʿAdsani as president for the second time running.   
There was a sharp conflict of interest between the reformists and several figures, close to 
Ahmadal-Jaber’s court, who had taken advantage of their positions for personal gain. The 
most prominent of these was Saleh al-Mulla who, since the days of shaikh Mubarak al-
Subah, had occupied what in modern times would be equivalent to the position of prime 
minister. Saleh al-Mulla had gained much authority and influence over the years by the 
simple expedient of being increasingly invested with a wider range of powers by a 
succession of rulers. He was thus authorised to write letters in the name of the ruler and 
held all the official seals. Al-Mulla also had an entourage of like-minded sycophants who 
benefited greatly from their relationship with him – or were simply too afraid that he 
would hamper their interests. 
This affected group attempted to stem the tide of reformist ambitions and when it was time 
to elect the third council, they succeeded in their attempt. Saleh al-Mulla used the official 
seals to issue letters in the name of the emir, banning certain reformist figures from 
running as candidates. They also put up their own candidates and pressured people to vote 
for them (at the time the small size of the electorate allowed for such power).  Al-Mulla 
also revoked the membership of several winners, such as Zaid Sayyid Muhammad, on the 
pretext that he held dual nationality (Kuwaiti and Iraqi), despite the fact that at the time it 
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was common practice for merchants to hold other nationalities to facilitate travelling and 
their business deals. The reformists then felt compelled to boycott the council, with 
Yusifbin ʿIsa describing the elections as ‘rigged.’ Suleiman al-ʿAdsani was also removed 
from the presidency when al-Mullah’s men voted him out.71 
Despite these setbacks, the reformists maintained the same zeal. After the incident of 
forgery, two young Kuwaitis from prominent merchant families, ʿAbdullah Hamad al-
Saqir and Muhammad Ahmad al-Ghanim, worked on founding the Education Council to 
advance cultural and educational causes. Al-Saqir and al-Ghanim, and a number of 
Kuwaiti figures proposed to Shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber that a 0.5 percent increase in customs 
duties could be introduced to support the Education Council. Ahmad al-Jaber welcomed 
the proposal, especially as it did not dip into his coffers, but on condition that the 
merchants agreed to the idea – which they did. Members of the Education Council were 
elected away from the negative influence of Saleh al-Mulla who was kept at arm’s 
length.
72
 The elections followed the same format as that of the Municipal Council. 
73
 
The first Education Council was founded in 1936, was headed by ʿAbdullah al-Jaber and 
had twelve members, including Yusif bin ʿIsa, since most were reformists, this created a 
very harmonious environment in which to achieve the council’s goals of developing the 
field of education and school curricula.
74
 Saleh al-Mulla was once again deeply 
disconcerted by the presence of so many reformers on the Education Council since it 
threatened his own interests. The elected Education Council was therefore dissolved in 
1937, one year after it had been set up, in order to get rid of the reformists and appoint pro-
establishment members. Elections were again rigged and results were tampered with. The 
reformists were left with no choice but to resign, and to regroup in secret to avoid Saleh al-
Mulla and his cohorts.
75
 
2.4.4.1 The National Bloc 
Until the dissolution of the Municipal and Education Councils, reformists, Islamists and 
nationalists, worked as one entity. However, In the aftermath of the Municipal and 
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Educational Councils fiasco perpetrated by Saleh al-Mullah, most reformists opted to 
withdraw from the two councils and began to hold secret meetings to address some of the 
more pressing political issues and work out how to put an end to Saleh al-Mullah’s glaring 
interferences. Three of their most enthusiastic nationalist members, ʿAbdullah Hamad al-
Saqir, ʿAbdulatif al-Ghanim, and Khalid Suleiman al-Adsani (general secretary of the two 
councils), met and formed the core of the National Bloc which called for an elected 
legislative council with comprehensive powers to govern the emirate; in other words, a 
legislative rather than an advisory or shura council.
76
 
During the 1930s, the Arab world witnessed a surge in Western-style secular Pan-Arabist 
ideologies which, surprisingly enough, did not clash with Islamic schools of thoughts since 
both shared similar views regarding colonialism and imperialism and called for the 
advancement of the Arab and Islamic nations. These trends were spearheaded by a new 
generation of young Arab scholars influenced by secular Pan-Arabist thinkers like Satiʿ al-
Husari
77
 more than they were influenced by Islamic intellectuals such as Muhammad 
ʿAbduh and Rashīd Rida.  
These schools of thoughts brought with them clandestine organisations such as the Pan-
Arabist, communist and other underground movements whose ideologies were channelled 
from Iraq via newspapers, journals and meetings between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
intelligentsia. Al-Saqir and al-Ghanim also opened channels of communication with 
several cultural and intellectual centres with Pan-Arabist orientations in Iraq and the 
Levant. These two, along with al-ʿAdsani, joined the Secret Arab Movement and obtained 
ranks within it.
78
 The inspiration for the National Bloc came from these secret 
organisations, which extended invitation to other reformists to join them; shaikh Yusif Bin 
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ʿIsa gave them his blessing, but did not join them.79The National Bloc published its reform 
programme in the Iraqi newspaper al-Zaman. The programme included various demands, 
such as establishing more schools and ending the emigration of Iranians to Kuwait to 
preserve the demographic balance. A number of articles were published in 1938 in Iraqi, 
Egyptian and Syrian newspapers that criticised the ruling family and expressed sympathy 
with the demands of the National Bloc. Qasr al-Zuhur, the Iraqi radio station, allocated 
segments of its programmes to promoting the demands of the National Bloc.
80
 
2.4.4.2 The First Legislative Council (1938)  
The pressures exerted by Iraqi newspapers and Qasr al-Zuhur, in addition to the 
disagreements between shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber and the British Political Agent, proved 
quite opportune for the National Bloc, whose members took the opportunity to present 
their demands to Shaikh Jaber through the respected businessman Muhammad Thnian al-
Ghanim who supported the National Bloc’s mission. Shaikh Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi 
blessed the move, although he did not participate, and the British Political Agent’s tacit 
approval of the demands gave further support. The following letter was presented to 
Shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber,  
Your Highness, the nation swore its allegiance to you on the day 
you ascended the throne on the understanding that the principles 
of your rule would rest on the notions of Shura which Islam 
decreed and was adopted by the four Righteous Caliphs but 
these notions have been quickly forgotten by both sides in 
Kuwait due to the unique circumstances the country has 
endured. This has prompted several of your subjects to offer 
their advice and counsel to redress the situation and spare you 
and themselves the vagaries of time and the unpredictability of 
circumstances and safeguard our country and its sovereignty and 
independence. They seek to remove the roots of discontent 
through dialogue and have, therefore, decided to propose the 
establishment of a legislative council to run the country’s 
affairs. We have authorised the bearers of this letter to discuss 
the matter with you. We beseech Allah to guide us onto the path 
of all that is good and righteous.  
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30 Rabi’ al-Awwal, 1357 Hijri (31 May 1938).81 
Al-Ghanim duly met shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber in the presence of shaikh ʿAbdullah al-Salem 
al-Subah, who was second in line to the Kuwaiti throne, and a cousin of Shaikh Ahmad. 
ʿAbdullah, who was sympathetic to the National Bloc’s demands, advised his cousin to 
accept the demands lest the Bloc should resort to violence,
82
 and also recommended that 
elections be brought forward before further foreign immigrants arrived, particularly in the 
absence of any official records of electorates.
83
Ahmad al-Jaber approved all the demands 
and a committee was formed to supervise the elections that included Ahmad al-Humaidi, 
Yusif bin ʿIsa, and Muhammad Thnian al-Ghanim.  
Three hundred and fifty men were invited to cast their votes at Diwan al-Saqir. This small 
electorate of merchants and the intelligentsia represented the cream of society. The 
remaining 65.000 or so of the population were marginalised and excluded from the 
democratic process, so that the Legislative Council could safely be described as an elitist 
or aristocratic council.
84
 Members of the National Bloc won most of the seats and included 
Mishʾan al-Khudair, Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani, Sayyed Ali Sayyed Sulaiman, ʿAbdullah al-
Saqir, ʿAbdulatif al-Ghanim, Yusif al-Marzuq, Sultan al-Kulaib and Yusif al-Saleh Al-
Hamidi. Other members were National Bloc supporters, most importantly Yusif bin ʿIsa 
al-Qinaʿi who was elected vice president of the council.85 The council consisted of 14 
members, ten elected from among the people and four elected from the ruling family, with 
the Crown Prince Shaikh ʿAbdullah al-Salem becoming the Legislative Council’s 
president. This was also the first elected council to appear in the Gulf. 
86
 
The council introduced many reforms, revoked several fraudulent monopolies, and pushed 
for developments in the fields of health and education. It won the respect of both the ruler 
and the people, apart from Saleh al-Mulla’s group, certain members of the ruling family, 
and individuals of Iranian origin and Shi’is who were excluded from the elections and the 
                                                     
81
Al-’Adsani, Mudhakarat, 27. 
82
Al-Rumaihi, “The 1939 Reformist Movement,” 36.Also; Salah al-ʿAqqad, Political Movements in the Gulf 
from the Beginning of Modern Eras until the Crisis of 1990-1991 (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian, 1991), 232. 
83
Al-Adsani, Mudhakarat, 28. 
84
 Najat al-Jasem, Political and Economic Development of Kuwait between the Two Wars 1914-1939 
(Kuwait: al-Majlis al-Watani Lilthaqafah wa al-Funoon wa al-Aadab, 2002), 165-166. Also, ʿAbdulmehsin 
Jamal, Lamahat min Hayat al-Shiʿa fi al-Kuwait(Kuwait: Dar al-Naba’, 2005), 82. 
85
Al-Jasim, Political and Economic Development, 165. 
86ʿAbdullah Al-Nuri, Muthakkarat min waqt al-Shaikh Ahmad al-Jabir al-Hakim al-ʿAashir lil Kuwait 
(Kuwait: That al-Salasil, 1978), 21-46. Also, “Administration Report for the Political Agency, Kuwait, 
1939” in the Annual Report of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for 1938, IOR: R/1/P. & S./12/3894 
(British Library, London). 
  57 
legislative council. Members of this disenchanted group intensified their efforts to bring 
down the council; thus, when the council requested that an ammunition warehouse be 
placed under the council’s control, both al-Mulla’s group and the British Political Agent 
were dismayed. The group seized the opportunity to mobilise the ruler and the British 
Political Agent against the council which, however, stood its ground and refused to 
withdraw its request.  
The stand-off escalated to the point where it was feared an armed clash might ensue, 
especially after some members of the ruling family had armed several pro-establishment 
tribes and instructed them to lay siege to the council members who were hiding inside the 
main ammunition warehouse at Dasman Palace. Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi mediated between 
the two parties, especially as the balance of military power was on the side of the ruling 
family, and succeeded in persuading the council members to surrender. As a result, 
Bedouins loyal to the emir toured the streets chanting “Rule is for Allah and then al-
Subah.”87 Two council members attempted to contact the British Political Agent to settle 
the problem but he refused to extend any help and even advised the emir to grant himself 
veto power over the council’s decisions to avoid similar problems in the future.88 
The council convened to discuss what had transpired, and several members reproached al-
Qinaʿi for failing to defend the council members before the ruling family. The reason 
behinds al-Qinaʿi’s stance was that he believed the National Bloc had exaggerated its 
political demands when it suddenly took over all powers from the ruler and the ruling 
family for the newly elected council. As a part of the religious establishment al-Qinaʿi 
considered reform of the social domain more important than the political domain, and 
Islamists represented by al-Qinaʿi gave more weight to social reform over political reform. 
When these elements contradicted each other, they preferred to protect the social project 
rather than to support the political project. Al-Qinaʿi did not believe in changing the 
political system or taking power from the hands of the Emir, since the real problems were 
found in the social domain and included various social ills such as the spread of alcohol 
consumption, lack of a good education for boys and girls, corruption in the judicial system, 
and so on.
89
 Furthermore, al-Qinaʿi has a good relationship with the ruler, Ahmad al-Jaber, 
who supported many of al-Qinaʿi’s social projects, such as al-Ahmadiyyah school which 
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allowed the reformists a free hand in shaping the social domain. For the reasons noted 
above and because of the good relationship between Ahmad al-Jaber and al-Qinaʿi, the 
latter was constrained from acting against the former.  
The incident also placed the president of the council and Shaikh ʿAbdullah al-Salem al-
Subah in an unenviable position. Shaikh ʿAbdullah tried to strike a middle ground between 
the two sides but had in the end to side with his own ruling family. The emir entrusted 
shaikh ʿAbdullah with running the council and issued a decree confiscating all weapons 
that were in the hands of the people, to ensure that all legislative and executive powers 
remained with the ruler.
90
 
2.4.4.3 The Second Legislative Council (1939) 
Fresh elections were called on 27February 1938 in order to select members for the second 
Legislative Council. Those eligible to vote rose from 300 to 400, while council seats were 
increased to 20. According to a British document, attempts were made to buy votes; yet the 
council’s make-up did not differ by much from its predecessor.91 All former members 
were re-elected along with some new faces, while only three of the opponents of the 
previous council won seats. Shaikh ʿAbdullah al-Salem was again re-elected as president. 
Although the council was infused with the same ethos as the first one, it was no match for 
the power of the Emir who was now fully supported by the British Political Agent.
92
 
Shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber proposed a new constitution based on the constitution of the 
Emirate of Transjordan which effectively conferred absolute power on the ruler despite the 
existence of a legislative council.
93
 However, the reformists were very resistant to the 
changes introduced by shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber and the new constitution, an opposition that 
was accompanied by vitriolic criticism from the Iraqi press and the Qasr al-Zuhur radio 
station. Appalled by these developments the shaikh summoned Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi and 
asked him to keep the opposition in check, but al-Qinaʿi indicated that it was quite 
impossible to stem the tidal wave emanating from the press. Al-Qinaʿi also succeeded in 
reining in shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber on several occasions and managed to prevent him from 
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harming the reformists as, for instance, in the case of ʿAbdulatif Thnian al-Ghanim who 
had sent a letter to Qasr al-Zuhur radio station inciting the public against the ruling family 
and was on the verge of being arrested.
94
 
Shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber tightened his grip on power by proposing a new constitution, but 
the council voted against ratifying it.  This led to a new political crisis which ended with 
the dissolution of the council on 7 March 1939, only a few months after it had been voted 
into power. Shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber was encouraged by the support of the British Political 
Agent, and by ʿAbdulʿaziz bin Saʿud, who having congratulated Shaikh Ahmad on the 
dissolution of the council, then offered to send him members of the Mutair and al-ʿAjman 
tribes to help him to consolidate his power before the virus of democracy spread further 
in the region.
95
 
2.5 The 1940s 
The Second World War had far-reaching implications for the region. In Kuwait, people 
were grappling with the effects of the war on their trade and livelihoods, while the British 
Political Agent played a central role in consolidating the shaikh’s grip on power so as to 
pre-empt any undesirable political developments that might distract him from 
international events. Shaikh Ahmad al-Jaber also strengthened his power base by 
appointing members of the ruling family to high- and mid-level government positions. 
The tide of reform also lost some of its popular support due to the various political crises 
noted above. The reformists were too keen to reap the fruits of their reforms too fast and 
found themselves embroiled in political battles that have a negative impact on their 
mission. 
The end of the Second World War saw the beginning of a new era in the history of 
Kuwait. Due to the discovery and export of the first shipments of oil in 1946, Kuwaiti 
society was catapulted from extreme poverty to unprecedented levels of prosperity. 
Although the ruling family took the lion’s share of the oil revenues, a considerable share 
was channelled to the general population who responded by increasing their support for 
the ruling family, seeing them as the source of affluence after years of recession and a 
devastating world war. Pearl fishing, which had been a main pillar of the Kuwaiti 
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economy, had been crushed by the production of artificial pearls in Japan; thus the oil 
seemed heaven-sent, and after years of the ruling family taking money from the people 
and the merchants, the balance of economic power was reversed. Now the government 
had become the party that disbursed money and provided the merchants with their main 
contracts. In effect, the ruling family now secured political power through the economy.
96
 
2.6 The Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World 
Hasan al-Banna had founded the Muslim Brotherhood at the end of the 1920s, as a 
response to political and intellectual developments in Egypt and the Arab region as a 
whole. The movement was a natural extension of Islamic and nationalist thinking, as well 
as being a form of resistance to colonisation and the westernisation of Egyptian society.
97
 
Initially the Muslim Brotherhood’s thinking was inspired by the intellectual and 
organisational trends of several movements, chiefly Sultan ʿAbdulhamid II’s notion of 
Pan-Islamism as a means of unifying Muslims under one anti-colonial banner, in addition 
to the Nationalist Party of Mustafa Kamil Pasha, Muhammad Farid and ʿAbdulʿaziz 
Jawish that emerged in Egypt according to the same principles of Pan-Islamism but with a 
greater focus on Arabism.  
Yet the greatest influence on the movement was the reformist trend of Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani and his students Muhammad ʿAbduh and Muhammad Rashīd Rida (the latter had 
been Hasan al-Banna’s mentor during his time at al-Manar, the journal established by 
Rashīd Rida).98 Tariq al-Bishri explains the genealogy of the reformist trend starting from 
al-Afghani, the founder of a political Islam that resists colonisation and works to unify 
Muslims, and also refers to MuhammadʿAbduh’s role in disseminating the idea of reform 
in the fields of fiqh and Qur’anic interpretation, as well as extolling the virtues of 
education.  Rashīd Rida followed ʿAbduh’s efforts by linking reform with returning to the 
principles of the Golden age of Islam. Hasan al-Banna came at the end of this chain of 
reformist figures when he proposed a holistic vision of Islam and succeeded in 
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incorporating thinking with activism, daʿwah with dynamic organization, and politics with 
religion.
99
 
Although the Muslim Brotherhood movement was a natural extension of former Islamist 
and nationalist movements, its emergence marked a turning point in the modern history of 
Islamist activism. The Muslim Brotherhood freed political issues from their narrow elitist 
framework and took them into the public sphere. Also, by linking thought with activism 
through the organization, their ideas spread throughout Egypt where urban and rural 
dwellers became part of everyday political and religious debates and worked together to 
tackle these issues under the umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood. The charisma and 
influence of al-Banna and the lively activism of members of the Muslim Brotherhood who 
penetrated various sectors of society enabled the Muslim Brotherhood successfully to in 
mobilize the Egyptian ‘street.’100 
In one of his most important letters, addressed to members of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-
Banna defined the movement, 
Dear brothers, you are not a welfare organization, nor a political 
party, nor a local association with strictly limited aims. Rather 
you are a new spirit making its way into the heart of this nation 
– reviving it with the Qur’an; a new light dawning, dispelling 
the darkness of materialism through the knowledge of Allah; a 
resounding voice rising high – echoing the message of the 
Apostle (PBUH). …  If someone asks you: “To what are you 
calling?” say: “We are calling you to Islam, which was brought 
by Muhammad (PBUH): Government is part of it, freedom is a 
religious obligation.” If someone should say to you: “This is 
politics!” say: “This is Islam, and we do not recognize such 
divisions.”101 
This definition focused on the comprehensiveness of the Muslim Brotherhood which, in 
turn, represented Islam as an all-inclusive system covering all aspects of life, an identity 
to which both the educated and uneducated could relate. Al-Banna avoided miring his 
audience in unnecessary details, preferring instead to write brief letters and deliver short 
eloquent speeches to serve the objective of creating a dynamic movement capable of 
tackling political and social contingencies without recourse to superfluous intellectual 
disagreements over trivia. The Muslim Brotherhood was marked by a great degree of 
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pragmatism, despite subscribing to what some might describe as an unrealistic notion of 
the dominance of Islam and its ability to lead the world at a time when Europe was 
colonizing many Arab and Muslim countries. Al-Banna proposed the Muslim 
Brotherhood as the savior of the Muslim umma [nation] from the state of deterioration 
and backwardness it was reeling under. In order to reach this goal, he drew up a clear 
plan that started by creating the real Muslim person, then the Muslim family, the Muslim 
society, and then the Muslim umma that would lead the world. 
102
 
Because of his international vision of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Banna’s concern with 
spreading the movement among the people of Egypt was equaled by his interest in 
disseminating its message in other Arab countries. Thus, the Hajj season was the perfect 
opportunity to meet people from all over the world, some of whom were greatly 
influenced by al-Banna’s personality and way of thinking. Al-Banna kept in touch and 
invited some of them to Egypt to get to know his movement better. He also sent some of 
his representatives to various Arab countries to spread the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas 
and establish branches of the organization.  
Mustafa al-Sibaʿi, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, has been a student at al-
Azhar University and became involved in Egypt’s vibrant political life, including 
participating in demonstrations against the British. During his studies at al-Azhar, al-
Sibaʿi met al-Banna and became a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. On his return to 
Syria in 1942, al-Sibaʿi contacted a number of religious scholars, Islamist organizations, 
and various Syrian figures and succeeded in persuading them to form a single, strong 
organization that would be a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Syria. Al-
Sibaʿi was elected al-Muraqib al-ʿAam [General Observer], as the head of the movement 
in 1945.  
ʿAbdulatif Abu-Qura from Jordan admired the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance on the 
Palestinian cause, and worked to establish a Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in 1945, following a series of meetings with al-Banna and other leaders of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In Iraq, a number of young men were influenced by the Muslim 
Brotherhood publications they received from Egypt, as well as by the Egyptian teachers 
who were members of the Muslim Brotherhood and who had come to Iraq to work. Chief 
amongst those was Husain Kamal al-Din who established the Faculty of Engineering in 
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Baghdad, and MuhammadʿAbdulhamid Ahmad who taught in Basra’s schools. At the 
same time, Muhammad Mahmud al-Sawwaf left Iraq to study at al-Azhar where he was 
introduced to the Muslim Brotherhood. Upon his return to Iraq, he and the famous 
religious scholar Amjad al-Zahawi founded the Islamic Fraternity Society in 1948. This 
was a front for the Muslim Brotherhood, due largely to the difficulty of naming their 
society after the mother organization in Egypt because of problems they were facing at 
that time from the Royal family.  
In addition to his effort to spread the movement internationally, al-Banna met King 
ʿAbdulʿaziz bin Saʿud during Hajj in 1936 and invited him to join the Muslim 
Brotherhood and apply its principles to the newly-founded state. ʿAbdulʿaziz tactfully 
refused, announcing “We are all Muslim brothers”, although the Muslim Brotherhood did 
succeed in entering Saʿudi Arabia much later.  It also took much longer for the Muslim 
Brotherhood to find its way into the Gulf countries which were quite detached from the 
Arab world’s major cultural and political centres, such as Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus. 
Kuwait was the first Gulf country to become acquainted with the Muslim Brotherhood 
ideas, as is discussed later. 
Although the Muslim Brotherhood movement spread to a number of Arab countries, it 
retained its core identity. All branches adopted the Egyptian hierarchical model, though 
with some modifications to accommodate differences in opinions, circumstances, and 
security concerns. All branches were united in their adherence to the ideas of Hasan al-
Banna which, in addition to his memoirs, were collected in a single volume entitled 
Rasail al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna [The Letters of the Martyred Imam Hasan al-
Banna]. These ideas shaped the structure and identity of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
education topped the list of priorities. Al-Banna believed that the first stage of Islamist 
revival lay in gradual reform, first of the individual, then, as noted, the family, society 
and the state leading to a Caliphate that could lead the world with its Islamic values.  
Despite the clarity with which al-Banna outlined the various stages of shaping the 
Muslim individual and Muslim family, later stages were less clearly defined and became 
even less so as talk turned to the desired Caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood was a great 
educator but politically somewhat amateurish, possibly because it was easier to deal with 
issues on an individual basis but not with wider social and political ones. Moreover, al-
Banna had very little experience with politics and his assassination at the very young age 
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of 40 contributed to the lack of maturity in some of his ideas. The security crack-down on 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria and Iraq paralysed the Movement’s intellectual 
output in terms of developing a social and political model that could offer a more 
comprehensive approach, particularly as the Muslim Brotherhood’s members were often 
too busy protecting themselves and their movement from persecution.  
Moreover, the shift from public work in the first decade of the movement’s life and 
during the life of its founder (whose death and the loss of its intellectual and 
organisational compass shook the Muslim Brotherhood to the core), to the secret 
underground activism required to protect the lives of its members, contributed to this lack 
of comprehensive vision. In addition, following the death of al-Banna the Muslim 
Brotherhood suffered considerably, due to the absence of a fully-integrated social project 
and the new leadership’s lack of charisma compared with al-Banna. The movement 
witnessed yet another setback with the rise in the Arab world of the nationalist/secularist 
parties of Jamal ʿAbdulnasser, Communism, and the Baʿath Party. All these factors 
restricted the Muslim Brotherhood’s work to education and training and hampered the 
political participation which was often at the whim of the leader in any given Arab 
country. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was not the only movement born in response to Western 
political domination and cultural colonisation following the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. A similar movement, Jamaat-e-Islami, was founded in India in 1941 by Abul 
Aʿla Maududi. Maududi began by challenging critics of Islam then moved on to establish 
a practical project inspired by Islamic values, similar to the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
idea was born following calls by the Indian National Congress for the establishment of a 
secular state that would serve to unify Indians from various sects, chiefly Muslims and 
Hindus. As his writings show, Maududi rejects the notion of a secular state based on 
nationhood rather than Islam.
103
 As far as he was concerned, the interests of a nation-
state present a conflict with the universality of Islam where Allah is the source of 
government. The road to such a state is by building the ummah then a state. This ummah 
would spread the message of Islam among people. According to Maududi, an ideal would 
be governed according to the principle of Shura with Islamic terms of reference in what 
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is known as a ‘Theodemocracy’.104 In addition to the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizb al-Tahrir was established in 1953 by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani whose 
ideas first spread in Palestine and Lebanon before reaching other parts of the world. 
According to the Party’s official website  
Hizb al-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam. Its objective is to 
resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic State that executes 
the systems of Islam and carries its call to the world. Hizb al-Tahrir has 
prepared a party culture that includes a host of Islamic rules about life’s 
matters. The party calls for Islam in its quality as an intellectual leadership 
from which emanates the systems that deals with all man’s problems, 
political, economic, cultural and social among others. Hizb al-Tahrir is a 
political party that admits to its membership men and women, and calls all 
people to Islam and to adopt its concepts and systems. It views people 
according to the viewpoint of Islam no matter how diverse their nationalities 
and their schools of thought were.
105
 
The Party’s goals were not different from those of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Jamaat-e-Islami, albeit the methods were different. 
Several Islamic movements and groups- and later offshoots thereof- emerged in the 
Muslim world, each with its own distinctive methods despite the similarities in goals and 
objectives. Some groups were established for the sole purpose of spreading the Islamic 
faith and have no interest in politics. They focused exclusively on daʿwah and raising 
pious Muslims. Other movements such as Takfir wal-Hijra [Excommunication and 
Exodus] believed that modern Muslim societies were closer to Kufr than they were to the 
true spirit of Islam and as such described them as “ignorant societies.”  Jihadi offshoots 
of these groups believed in the use of force to establish a true Islamic state. Some Islamic 
groups focused on local issues while others were more international in their concerns. 
Many theories have been proposed to explain the spread of those Islamic movements 
especially with the Islamic revival of the 1970s and 1980s and the emergence of Jihadi 
Islam in the 1990s and the beginning of the 21
st
 century. While Islamic movements may 
have initially be born in response to Western political, military and cultural hegemony 
(sometimes described by Islamic movements as Secular and other times as Christian), 
Islamic ideologies became increasingly popular following the failure of secular 
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movements (nationalist, Ba’athist, Marxist, etc.).106 And contrary to what occurred in the 
case of Christianity, Secularism and westernisation contributed to the rise of Islamic 
movements.
107
 Secularism also failed to win the hearts of people.
108
 Many considered the 
spared of Islamic ideologies a natural occurrence since Islamic values have always been 
the prominent ones in Muslim societies and any return to Islamic thought is a return to a 
point of origin prior to the arrival of secularism. Many Islamic leaders had studied in the 
West and their programmes reflect western influence on their methods and way of 
thinking.
109
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Cultural and intellectual movements in Kuwait, the product of several internal and 
external factors, gained increasing popularity over the years as calls for reform reflected 
changing political landscapes across the whole Arab region. Reformists soon found 
themselves at loggerheads with the Kuwaiti ruling family, those close to them, and with 
British interests in the region, while the discovery of oil further consolidated the power of 
the ruling family and led to disarray among the reformists. 
The reformist movement was distinguished by unity of its objectives which revolved 
around the need to spread knowledge and combat illiteracy. The movement called for 
furthering the values of shura and democracy, establishing elected councils (municipal, 
educational and legislative), and modernising in a manner that did not conflict with 
Islamic values. Its most distinctive feature was the absence of any ideological conflicts 
within its ranks. In Lebanon, for example, the secular reformist movement was opposed 
to the Islamist reformists, despite both being Pan-nationalist in orientation. The difference 
in Kuwait was that the secular movement – like the European model – limited nationalism 
to the Arab world whereas the Islamist movement called for both Arabs and Muslims to 
unite, a view supported by Rashīd Rida.  
Calls for reform had a number of clear goals, focused mainly on education in a society 
with a very high illiteracy rate. Reformists gradually broadened their agenda to emphasise 
the values of shura, democracy, and free elections, and also advocated modernity, such as 
                                                     
106
 John Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 11-14. 
107
 Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (London: Penguin Books, 1994). 
108
 Aziz al-ʿAzamah, al-Almaniyya min Manthour Mukhtalif, (Bbeiruit: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 
1992), 221-248. 
109
 Dale F.Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
28-36. 
  67 
granting women bigger roles in society, provided this did not conflict with the values of 
Islam. Their goals were not controversial and gave no cause for disagreement as 
happened in the case of Greater Syria where secularist and Islamist reformers clashed, 
with the secularists following the European model and adopting an Arab nationalist 
agenda while the latter called for an Arab Islamic identity since they considered the two a 
unified entity. Due to the conservative nature of Kuwaiti society, which was 
predominately Muslim though with some Christian and Jewish families, Kuwaiti 
reformers followed an Arab Islamic path.  
Several domestic and foreign factors shifted the political and cultural landscape of 
Kuwait. The discovery of oil changed the economic and demographic structure, 
especially after large numbers of immigrants seeking work arrived in Kuwait. The 
broader Arab world was also deeply influenced by the emergence of liberation 
movements in other parts of the world and Communism found fertile ground in which to 
flourish in the Middle East, while the Palestinian issue and the establishment of Israel 
probably had the biggest impact on people’s awareness of the need to struggle against 
colonialism and western imperialism. All these factors helped shape Arab consciousness 
in general and by default, that of Kuwait in particular. Foreign and domestic factors 
contributed to the rise of intellectual and cultural trends in Kuwait, where reform was 
concomitant with dramatic changes in the Arab region but was very much impeded by the 
ruling family and British interests. Oil discoveries had greatly strengthened the position 
of the ruling family which rejected most calls for reform. 
While these developments were taking place, the Muslim Brotherhood movement 
emerged in Egypt and was transported to Kuwait where it was well-received because it 
represented an extension of the Islamic nationalist intellectual trends for which Rashīd 
Rida had called. Nonetheless, Gulf societies, which were less complex than those of 
Egypt, Iraq and the Levant, were not used to political and social organisations, and found 
the notion of an organised movement quite alien, despite the existence of several 
nationalist and left-wing movements. Kuwait was not a source of culture or of particular 
political importance; rather it was on the receiving end of political and cultural trends 
from the Egyptian, Levantine and Iraqi educated elites who, attracted by the oil boom, 
had come to work in Kuwait. These circumstances were to bring about many changes, 
both domestically and regionally, in the wider Arab World.  
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Chapter III 
Organizational Structure of the Movement in Kuwait 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The political project of the reformists petered out because of the detrimental influence of 
the conflict on society following the political confrontation between the Nationalist Bloc 
and the ruling family. Islamist reformists such as Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi found themselves 
in a tricky position.  On the one hand, al-Qinaʿi was a crucial element in the reformist 
project that opposed the actions of the ruling family. On the other hand, he rejected the 
military action taken by the council when it seized Nayef Palace by force.
110
 This 
disagreement between the reformists weakened the movement to reform the political 
system in Kuwait. However, other social and intellectual reforms, such as cultural clubs 
and intellectual discussions in diwaniyya continued via different channels. In this 
politically-restricted and intellectually-open environment, the new foreign ideology of the 
Muslim Brotherhood found its way into Kuwaiti society through the efforts of a young 
merchant, ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Ali al-Mutawwaʿ, who was a student of Yusif bin Isa al-Qinaʿi.  
3.2 The Muslim Brotherhood Ideology Enters Kuwait 
The Muslim Brotherhood was the first Islamist organization to be inspired by modern 
organizational theories and structures such as Marxism, and is the largest Islamist 
organization in the world today. It was established in 1928 in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna, 
and rapidly gained a huge following, estimated at half a million members and fifty 
branches in Egypt by 1935.
111
 The Muslim Brotherhood established The Muslim 
Brotherhood newspaper in 1933, al-Nathir newspaper in 1938, and al-Shihab newspaper 
in 1947, along with other newspapers and journals to propagate the ideology of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.
112
 In Egypt the popularity of the movement threatened not only the 
government of Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi, but also the interests of Britain, France, and the 
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United States, because of its call to free Egypt from British control and eliminate 
imperialism and foreign presence in the region. In 1949, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
accused of assassinating al-Nuqrashi, with mourners at the funeral calling for the “head of 
al-Banna for the head of al-Nuqrashi.”113 Shortly after, also in 1949, al-Banna was 
assassinated. He left behind the largest Islamist movement in Egypt, which continued to 
spread its message to other Arab countries: to Djibouti in 1932, Syria in 1939, Transjordan 
in 1943, Sudan in 1946, and also Kuwait in 1952.   
In 1941, ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ114 met Muhammad ʿAbdulhamid Ahmad, a member of 
the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt, in Basra where he was teaching.
115
 This meeting was 
followed by others between the two men and eventually led to al-Mutawwaʿ joining the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Ahmad sent an introductory letter to Hasan al-Banna about al-
Mutawwaʿ and asked for al-Mutawwaʿ to be accepted as a member in the movement.116 In 
1941, al-Mutawwaʿ formally became a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and spent the 
month of Ramadan visiting Egypt where he met al-Banna and members of the movement 
for the first time in a spiritual and intellectual environment. Al-Mutawwaʿs experience of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in its heyday under the leadership of al-Banna himself inspired 
and motivated him to carry this ideology back to Kuwait.
117
 While they were in Mecca for 
the Hajj in 1946, al-Banna consented to the establishment of a Muslim Brotherhood branch 
in Kuwait.
118
 
When they returned to Kuwait, ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ and his brother Abdullah started 
to work on building a new network among their friends and people they knew. They also 
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invited ʿAbdulʿaziz Jalal, a teacher and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, to 
visit Kuwait to help them set up the new branch. Additionally, a few members of the 
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood (Muhammad al-Najjar, Khalil al-Wazir, and Khalid al-
Hasan) arrived in Kuwait in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation of Palestine in 1948 
and offered their help in establishing the new branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Kuwait.
119
 
The period between 1946 and 1952 witnessed the early beginnings of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Kuwait led by a small group along the lines of its Egyptian counterpart. 
The activities of the al-Mutawwaʿ brothers in Kuwait paved the way for the new ideas of 
the Muslim Brotherhood to spread locally. In late 1949 and early 1950, the small informal 
nucleus of the Muslim Brotherhood group in Kuwait comprised a few Kuwaitis from 
notable families, such as Abdullah Budai and his brother Muhammad who, with 
Muhammad al-ʿAdsani, Abdullah al-Kulaib, and others decided to go public by forming 
Jamʿiyyatal-Irshadal-Islami [the Islamic Guidance Society] in 1952.  
3.3 The Beginnings of The Muslim Brotherhood, Jamʿiyyat al-Irshad al-Islami in 1952 
 
The 1940s witnessed the modest beginnings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait during 
which time the movement was launched by a handful of people and disseminated through 
the distribution of Islamic books and pamphlets. This small group soon took its activities 
to a new level. In 1952, according to Abdullah al-Mutawwaʿ, the members held several 
meetings in the homes of Abdullah al-Kulaib and ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ and decided to 
establish Jamʿiyyat al-Irshad al-Islami.120Al-Irshad, as its members called the society, was 
the formal pseudonym for the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, which resembled the 
society in Iraq that was known as Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwah al-Islamiyyah [the Islamic 
Fraternity Society]. The oppressive political atmosphere at the time made it extremely 
risky to name it “the Muslim Brotherhood” officially, probably also because of the 
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negative association of the name with Kuwait’s old enemies, the Saʿudi Al-Ikhwan 
(Brotherhood).
121ʿAbdullah al-Mutawwaʿ recalls how al-Irshad was started, 
the background of the establishment of al-Irshad can be 
traced to the vibrant enthusiasm of a number of Muslim 
youth in creating an Islamist movement similar to other 
Islamist movements in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.  That explains 
the emergence of an Islamist coalition in the form of 
Jamʿiyyat al-Irshad al-Islami.122 
The founders finalized formal procedures and paperwork for the new Society which 
emerged during Ramadan 1371 (May 1952) to represent Islamist opinion, specifically that 
of the Muslim Brotherhood.  In its first publication, al-Irshad revealed that, 
The goal of our society is to provide an education that is 
compatible with our religion and great history, and to support 
true aqidah and pure tawhid with good deeds. Also, it aims to 
raise good Muslims and connect them with other Muslim 
brothers … and to protect the ummah from moral deviance by 
educating a generation of solid believers who can build a 
strong society, and present Islam as an esteemed faith and 
global system that can address the problems of life and create 
the ideal society.
123
 
In the introduction to Al-Barnamaj al-Tawjihi [The Guiding Programme], al-Irshad 
declared that “this society is a religious one and does not interfere in politics as a group; its 
goal is wise preaching and guidance based on the values of tolerance.”124 The goals and 
methodology of al-Irshad as al-Barnamaj al-Tawjihi can be summarized as: apolitical, 
global, cultural and intellectual, and in touch with local issues with a modified 
methodology, goals, and curriculum borrowed from the mother organization of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt.  
Al-Barnamaj al-Tawjihi also specified the conditions of the membership and the penalties 
incurred by breaching the membership rules, stating that “members must be Muslim and 
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have good manners, and if a member breaches the rules, he will jeopardize the reputation 
of the society; the board of directors will advise, warn, or dismiss a member in violation of 
the rules.”125 In his book Ayyam al-Kuwait [Days of Kuwait], Ahmad al-Sharabasi126 
examines the goals, internal rules, and activities of al-Irshad and summarizes the society in 
a few words, 
Anyone who reads the by-laws of the society [al-Irshad] will 
discover the diversity of methods and goals, and this is what 
characterized modern Islamist movements. Preachers in 
modern Islamist movements believe that Islam is a religion 
and a state, worship and leadership, Qur’an and sword, 
mosque and school, temple and barrack, and it is the religion 
of economics, sociology, education, culture, and sports. 
Therefore, programs created by and for the movement aim to 
embody this comprehensive concept of Islam.
127
 
A board of directors was established consisting of Shaikh Yusif bin Isa (honorary 
president), ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ (vice president and general observer) where the 
name refers to the head of the society and the movement and was taken directly from the 
mother organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,
128
 Muhammad al-ʿAdsani129 
(secretary), and the rest, like Yusif al-Nisif,
130
 held lower positions such as head of the 
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youth branch, while others were ordinary members of society.
131
 There were also members 
from other Arab countries who had to work in Kuwait or came to help build up al-Irshad. 
For instance, Muhammad Salīm was sent by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to help 
with promoting the movement and the society it aspired to create. According to al-Nisif, 
Salīm was the most influential person in al-Irshad because of his outstanding abilities in 
administration and organizational development as well as his propagation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s ideas through Friday sermons.132 
There were also Palestinian members who had moved from Palestine to Kuwait when the 
conflict with the Zionist movement escalated. The Palestinians were known for being well-
educated in comparison with Kuwaitis, which enabled them to work in education and in 
technical fields. The Palestinian members of al-Irshad used to work in the mornings, and 
dedicate their afternoons to the society. The society took the Muslim Brotherhood to a 
higher level in Kuwait and al-Irshad, as their front line, opened the door for them to access 
different sectors in society such as the ruling family, merchants, and workers, and to move 
freely and officially to spread their ideas, especially among the youth who became the 
bedrock of the society.  
3.3.1 Organizational Activities 
When ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ and Hasan al-Banna met in Mecca in 1946, they agreed to 
launch a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. After that, al-Mutawwaʿ became a 
member of the Maktab al-Irshad [the Guiding Office – similar to a Board of Directors] of 
the mother organization in Egypt, and the founding body of the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
attended the meetings of these leading bodies of the movement in Egypt along with 
Muslim Brotherhood leaders from other countries. such as Mustafa al-Siba’i (Syria), 
Muhammad al-Sawwaf (Iraq), Ali Jaballah (Sudan), Muhammad ʿAbdulrahman Khalifah 
(Jordan), and others from Palestine, Lebanon, and Djibouti.
133
 Between 1946 and 1952, al-
Mutawwaʿ worked on building the new branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, helped by 
members of the movement from other countries (such as Muhammad Salīm from Egypt). 
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When ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ had succeeded in establishing the first group in Kuwait’s 
Muslim Brotherhood, he undertook the founding of al-Irshad.  
Initially the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait was fairly simple, although 
as membership numbers increased, the organization developed structurally, creating a 
hierarchal and rather more complex organization. As in Egypt, the structure of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Kuwait was built on a system of usar “cells”, in which every usrah 
consisted of five to eight members, including the usrah’s leader. The group’s activities 
were aimed largely at the public, with a few special preparatory programmes meetings 
confined to male, largely adolescent Muslim Brotherhood members only.   
3.3.2 Organizational Structure of the First Organization 
In terms of organizational structure, the Muslim Brotherhood divided Kuwait City into the 
three districts in which most Kuwaitis lived: Mirqab, Qiblah, and Sharq.
134
Thus, there was 
less focus on those who lived outside the walls of Kuwait City in areas such as al-Jahra’ or 
Abu Hulaifah. The movement used the institution of al-Irshad to spread its ideas 
throughout society and to recruit people to its mission by creating two sections specifically 
for this purpose: a men’s section and a students’ section. The men’s section was made up 
of the older members of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Muhammadal-ʿAdsani, 
Muhammad and Abdullah Budai, and Rashid al-Duaij. Members of the men’s section ran 
al-Irshad as well as general activities within Kuwaiti society. Members of the students’ 
section included Ahmad al-Duaij, Isa al-Mishari, Abdullatif al-Ruwaishid, Faisal al-
Masʿud, and Yusif al-Nisif, as well as a few Arab teachers.  
The students’ section was most active among students at Shuwaikh High School.135 
According to Faisal al-Saniʿ,136 the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood were quite 
prominent at Shuwaikh High School which had become the centre of political and 
ideological activities since the dissolution of the Legislative Parliament in 1938. Al-Saniʿ 
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provides a good description of the political and ideological activities at Shuwaikh High 
School: 
There were many political groups at the high school such as 
Arab Nationalists, Ba’athists, Communists, Hizb al-Tahrir, 
however, the Muslim Brotherhood had the best organization and 
mobilization which increased its influence among students. Both 
students and some Arab teachers worked on spreading the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology and mobilizing students into 
their organization. The structure of the organization was based 
on what they called usar system which was a key characteristic, 
in addition to their enthusiasm, of the success of their efforts to 
rally students more than Arab Nationalists, Ba’athists, 
Communists, and other groups.
137
 
According to Yusif al-Nisif, the open environment at Shuwaikh High School apparently 
supported the Muslim Brotherhood’s activism by enabling its members to spread their 
ideologies and move freely and without restriction among the students. The main activities 
that the Muslim Brotherhood students used to attract their colleagues intellectually were 
sport and Scouts. The students’ section of al-Irshad was the best haven for youth because 
of the new, interesting, and entertaining activities for students, along with religious 
activities that made parents feel more confident about the Muslim Brotherhood and al-
Irshad. In the small society of Kuwait, around 300 students used to attend al-Irshad’s 
programmes which, given the small size of Kuwaiti society at that time, represented a 
sizeable number.
138
 
There were several reasons for the rapid success of al-Irshad. First, the conservative nature 
of Kuwaiti society offered fertile ground for Islamic ideology to flourish. Ordinary people 
welcomed al-Irshad by participating in its different activities and allowing their sons to be 
part of this new movement. Secondly, as Aman asserts, al-Irshad was part of the regional 
Islamist revival that had started with Muhammad Rashīd Rida and continued with the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. In addition, Islamist revival had had an 
early influence on Kuwaiti intellectuals and religious scholars such as Yusif bin Isa al-
Qinaʿi, Abdullah Khalaf al-Duhaiyyan, and ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid, as well as on visiting 
Arab scholars like Muhammad al-Shanqiti and later Ahamad al-Sharabasi. Islamist revival 
dominated the intellectual discourse in Kuwait which prepared the environment for an 
Islamist movement.  
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Thirdly, Al-Irshad did not present any threat to the regime of al-Sabah ruling family. On 
the contrary, the path that Yusif bin Isa al-Qinaʿi followed by focusing on the social more 
than on the political domain buttressed the ruling family’s position, and as a result they 
welcomed the new Islamic society of al-Irshad, knowing that Yusif bin Isa al-Qinaʿi was 
its honorary president. Fourth, the experience of Muslim Brotherhood members from more 
sophisticated Arab countries played a crucial role in creating and running the society 
professionally, which impressed the less-sophisticated society of Kuwait. Although there 
were many ideological groups in the society, they did not embark on direct confrontation, 
which gave every group space to work peacefully among the general population and 
students in particular. This peaceful environment encouraged al-Irshad to put all its 
energies into spreading its ideology among people and intermingling with them. Al-Irshad 
was the first society of its kind in Kuwait because of its well-organized and various 
activities, which appealed to the various sectors of society.
139
 
3.3.3 The Decline 
This dynamic activity on the part of al-Irshad did not last long. At the end of 1953, only 
two years after its establishment, the first spark of conflict was ignited among the founders 
and was transmitted to the members. This conflict split al-Irshad into two groups: one led 
by ʿAbdulʿaziz Salem (whose real name was Najib Juwaifil)140 and Muhammad al-
ʿAdsani, and the other by Muhammad Salīm and ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ. According to 
Yusif al-Rifaʿi, the conflict started when Juwaifil’s militant background and al-ʿAdsani’s 
family history of opposition to the government clashed with the quietist approach of Salīm 
and al-Mutawwaʿs towards the ruling family.  
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This disagreement escalated when two members of the ruling family, Abdullah al-Jabir al-
Subah (the brother of the former Emir at that time and the head of the Education 
Administration) and Fahad al-Salem al-Subah (the brother of the current Emir at that time) 
asked to become honorary members of al-Irshad. The request was welcomed by al-
Mutawwaʿ and Salīm; however, on the basis of al-Banna’s teachings that the movement 
should stay away from the control of notables and any existing political bodies, al-ʿAdsani 
and Juwaifil were less positive and disliked the idea of any links with the ruling family.
141
 
Juwaifil also attracted a sizeable group of young members to al-Irshad, and, away from the 
eyes of al-Mutawwaʿ created a special unit similar to the secret apparatus of the mother 
organization in Egypt, which created a crisis of trust between the two leaders.
142
 Juwaifil 
and al-ʿAdsani organized several clandestine activities with this group and designed a 
militant jihadi curriculum that was more radical than Muhammad Salīm’s programme. 
However, the activities of this group never extended past the training camp, due probably 
to the hasty departure of Juwaifil from Kuwait in mid-1955.
143
 
The other issue that escalated the conflict was Jamal Abdulnasser’s attack on the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, after which ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ remained silent while al-
ʿAdsani insisted on a public display of opposition against Nasser. Ahmad al-Ruwaishid 
states that al-ʿAdsani accused al-Mutawwaʿ of refraining from voicing any opposition in 
order to protect his business interests in Egypt.
144
 Al-Mutawwaʿ responded by stressing the 
importance of respecting Egypt’s domestic affairs and avoiding transferring the conflict 
between Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood to Kuwait since it would negatively affect 
the movement in Kuwait.
145
 Another reason of this conflict as al-Ruwaishid asserts is the 
refusal by al-ʿAdsani of centralizing the leadership and management of al-Irshad in the 
hands of al-Mutawwa’, demanding a more democratic structure,146and criticized the long 
absence of al-Mutawwaʿ whose business travels had caused al-Irshad’s progress in Kuwait 
to slow down and had affected the organization’s ability to make important decisions.  
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As a result of this disagreement, al-Irshad split into two camps, each of which worked 
separately from the other, and although al-Irshad continued with business as usual, many 
members started to leave the society because of the tense environment. Troubles escalated 
when Muhammad Salīm left Kuwait because of the conflict, and when ʿAbdulʿaziz al-
Mutawwaʿ decided to resign from his position as the General Observer of al-Irshad. In a 
letter that was published in Al-Biʿtha journal on 1 October 1953 he wrote, 
In the Name of God, the Most Graceful and the Most 
Merciful.To the children of my Nation and to the members of 
Jamʿiyyatal-Irshadal-Islami. Dear Brothers: you have honored 
me with your trust and overwhelmed me with your favor by 
choosing me as a member of the Municipal Council and as the 
General Observer of Jamʿiyyat al-Irshad. Therefore, I vowed to 
God and promised you to do well and do my best and to live for 
my country and in my country so my primary residence would 
be in Kuwait. 
However, my intent to serve Kuwait more broadly in Egypt and 
other Arab countries has made residence in Kuwait difficult. 
Setting up a business office in Cairo and the growing business in 
Arab countries has been a source of great embarrassment in my 
relationship with my brothers, colleagues, and supervisors.  
Therefore, I hope that my brothers will forgive me and accept 
my refusal of re-election [as a General Observer] and would like 
to thank them for their noble feelings and generous sentiments. 
Every charitable activity for the sake of the nation is considered 
holy worship, and every institution that champions the cause of 
national achievement is a mosque that prayers should be held in. 
If I cannot work in the front rows, I will work in the back rows, 
or any place where I can work and fulfill my duty toward my 
nation. I will work in the back lines believing that my brothers 
who are working in the front are more capable than me in taking 
responsibility, and residing in Kuwait. 
I would like to thank all of you again for your precious trust, and 
I vow to God to fight with every reformist who seeks the best 
for our small country, Kuwait, and for the greater Arab nation. 
May God lead you to the best of our nation’s future. 
(ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Ali al-Mutawwaʿ)147 
 
As his son Ahmad mentions, in an attempt to keep the organization united, ʿAbdulʿaziz al-
Mutawwaʿ blamed the problems of al-Irshad on his absence, without mentioning the other 
accusations. A number of his followers refused to accept his resignation, and in a signed 
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petition in which they elaborated on his excellent leadership abilities and faithfulness to 
the organization requested him to withdraw it.
148
 However, all attempts to stop him from 
resigning from al-Irshad failed, despite efforts from such Muslim Brotherhood figures as 
Mustafa al-Sibaʿi (General Observer of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria), Muhammad 
Mahmoud al-Sawwaf (General Observer of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq), and Kamil 
al-Sharif (a leading figure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan).
149
 
After al-Mutawwaʿs resignation, the Board of Directors met to elect a new General 
Observer from the two candidates: Muhammad al-ʿAdsani and ʿAbdulrazzaq al-Saleh who 
was close to ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ. The Board duly elected al-Saleh as the second 
General Observer of al-Irshad in the hope that he would rise to the challenges of the 
struggling society. Al-ʿAdsani remained in his position for some time in order to focus on 
his youth group before leaving al-Irshad. Inevitably this group did not survive since many 
of its members were high school students and had to leave Kuwait to study abroad, while 
Juwaifil’s sudden departure had left al-ʿAdsani without any support.   
Meanwhile, in the aftermath of al-Manshiyya incident, Nasser started to attack the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and abroad, accusing them of being opportunistic and violent.
150
 
This animosity spread from Egypt to other parts of the Arab World, including Kuwait, 
since Nasser’s voice carried significant weight throughout the region. This obsession with 
Nasser in the Arab world and his regime’s strong media campaign negatively changed the 
image of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. Al-Nisif describes the beginnings of this 
change, noting that when al-Irshad members dealt with ordinary people in the street they 
used to say quite bluntly that “we know that you [the Muslim Brotherhood] are good, but 
your problems with Nasser have changed everything… if there is a prophet after 
Muhammad that would be Nasser.”151 While the presence and the popularity of the 
Muslim Brotherhood were declining, Nationalists, Communists, and other non-Islamist 
groups were flourishing.  
Before the conflict started between Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood, reformists in the 
Arab World had not distinguished between Islam, reformism, and modernity in the way 
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that Rashīd Rida did.152 Among Syrian and Lebanese reformists, where the Christian 
influence was important, there were huge disagreements on many issues concerning the 
shape and the identity of the future state and the role of Christians, although this 
disagreement existed only among Syrian and Lebanese reformists because most of the 
people and reformists in the rest of the Arab World were Muslims. Therefore, until the 
confrontation between Nasser, who imported communist ideology, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood with their Islamist-based ideology, Rida’s Islamic model had dominated 
reformist and nationalist discourse in Egypt and the rest of the Arab countries, except for 
Syria and Lebanon. Kuwait was not far away from this ideological change, with the 
Nationalists renouncing Islamic ideology and becoming more secular as they moved more 
towards leftist and nationalist ideologies where they began to flourish. All the secular 
groups had a part in attacking the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Irshad in Kuwait, and made 
this part of their discourse on the fight against opportunism, backwardness, and darkness.  
While this severe attack on al-Irshad did not altogether end its activities, attendance at 
lectures and general support gradually diminished. Al-Irshad journal was published less 
regularly and became totally divorced from local concerns due to a shortage of Kuwaiti 
writers and particularly to the effects of internal conflict. The magazine was eventually 
transformed from a publication that represented al-Irshad to one that stood for a new 
school which was established by al-Irshad to continue the work of the Society for 
Eliminating Illiteracy and was then expanded to cover all levels of education: elementary, 
middle, and high school.  
This school was established in 1958 by ʿAbdulwahid Aman153 who had moved from Basra 
to Kuwait in 1957. Al-Irshad school was the only successful project during the period of 
al-Irshad’s decline (1954-1959). With numbers increasing to 1,000 students, Aman, the 
manager, was encouraged to move to a bigger building donated by the government, and 
Jasim al-Marzuq, the Minister of Education, agreed to the al-Irshad students enrolling in 
public schools.
154
Al-Irshad’s student group continued to operate, especially in Shuwaikh 
High School. For instance, the school decided in 1957 to divide the students into groups of 
100 to 150 who would elect the leaders of each group; five of al-Irshad members were 
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elected as leaders of five groups.
155
 However, when the leaders of al-Irshad’s student 
group graduated, such activities ceased and with them leaving Shuwaikh High School the 
presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in such schools diminished.  
Politically, al-Irshad became dormant except for a few activities organized by other groups 
in Kuwait, such as the events held in support of the Algerian Revolution and of Egypt 
during the Suez Crisis in 1956 that were arranged by the nationalist coalition of Kuwaiti 
Clubs. Al-Irshad also participated in an event held by the Nationalist Cultural Club to 
celebrate the withdrawal of British troops from Port Said after the Suez Crisis, although 
the event took a surprising turn when Jasim al-Qatami, a prominent Nationalist leader, 
harshly criticized the tribal system of government in Kuwait in front of important members 
of the ruling family, including Abdullah al-Jabir. As a result, the government decided to 
close down all clubs in Kuwait, including al-Irshad. According to Hasan al-Madhun, al-
Irshad re-opened shortly after due to the good relationship with the ruling family; however 
it was not recognized by the public or by its members most of whom failed to return after 
the closure. Realizing that the environment was too hostile for a re-opening, the members 
themselves closed al-Irshad again, effectively putting an end to this institution that had 
enjoyed a brief but influential impact.
156
 
3.3.4 The Dispersal of the Muslim Brotherhood  
The period from the mid-1950s to the Six-Day War in 1967 was dominated by nationalist 
ideologies, especially the secularist branches of nationalism. The Islamist movement was 
quite fragmented and was further weakened by the withdrawal of its historic leaders like 
ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ and Muhammad al-ʿAdsani, as well as non-Kuwaiti figures such 
as Muhammad Salīm and Najib Juwaifil; this resulted in the absence of any truly 
intellectual and organisational leadership for the Muslim Brotherhood. Many Muslim 
Brotherhood members had joined the Nationalist movement or had simply been side-
tracked by life’s concerns. Given the difficult circumstances faced by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, such as the conflict with the Nationalists, internal divisions within the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and the decision to close down al-Irshad, the Muslim Brotherhood 
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found itself struggling through some very difficult times between the mid-1950s and 
1960s.   
However, several Kuwaiti, Palestinian and Egyptian members remained in touch on a 
personal rather than an organisational level.  Kuwaitis would gather at the diwaniyya of 
Mohamed Budai, and would meet non-Kuwaitis at the diwaniyya of Abdullah al-ʿAqil who 
had come from Zubair. Such gatherings usually included former members of the al-Irshad 
as well as Islamists who sought intellectual refuge from the rising tide of Arab Nationalism 
and Leftist ideologies. Islam and spiritual issues were debated and Islamist figures from 
abroad were often hosted.  
The activities of the diwaniyya of the Budai brothers in practice became a gathering of 
former members of al-Irshad such as Muhammad and Abdullah Budai, Salim Turki, and 
Humud al-Rumi, in addition to Yusif al-Nisif who was entrusted with the task of selecting 
books to be read by the group. Al-ʿAqil’s diwaniyya focused on issues related to the 
Muslim Brotherhood in other places like Iraq, Egypt and the Levant. Several other Arab 
Muslim Brotherhood gatherings, such as those of the Palestinians and the Egyptians, were 
quite large. Since the security fears of the Egyptian led them to isolate themselves, 
especially as Nasser had made a point of chasing them down all over the world, they had 
very little contact with members of the Muslim Brotherhood from other countries. Such 
gatherings kept the Islamist trends alive in Kuwait,
157
 and also formed the birthplace of al-
Manar library, Jamʿiyyat al-Islah al-Ijtimaʿi [the Social Reform Society] and the calls for 
participating in parliamentary elections and other activities that preceded the rebirth of the 
Muslim Brotherhood organisation in 1968. 
3.4 The Arrival of ʿAbdulwahid Aman to Kuwait in 1957 and Attempts to Revive the 
Islamist Movement 
The Iraqi president ʿAbdulkarim Qasim, who was allied with the Communists in the early 
years of his presidency let the Communists loose against his and their opponents, 
especially the Nationalists and the Muslim Brotherhood. A group of young Communists in 
Basra attacked the two main Muslim Brotherhood institutions, Jamʿiyyat al-Islah al-
Ijtimaʿi and al-Manar Islamic bookshop, but were repelled by members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. However, news that the Communists were planning to eliminate young 
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leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Zubair, namely Abdullah al-ʿAqil, ʿUmar al-Dayel, 
and ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rabiʿah, forced the Muslim Brotherhood to ask those three to leave 
Zubair and head to Kuwait. All three duly joined the weak Islamist movement in Kuwait, 
in an attempt to prop it up and breathe some life into it.
158ʿAbdulwahid Aman was an 
another member of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood who travelled to Kuwait from Basra for 
purely economic reasons; he became the most influential figure in the history of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait and succeeded in re-launching the movement in 1968. 
Aman was born and raised in Basra in Iraq where it was the norm for many families to 
have homes in both Kuwait and Basra for trade purposes and because several Kuwaiti 
families had come originally from Basra. Aman’s neighbours were the al-Qanaʿat family 
and his house was within walking distance of one of the houses owned by Ali al-
Mutawwaʿ, the father of ʿAbdulʿaziz and ʿAbdullah al-Mutawwaʿ. At that time, Iraq was 
much more advanced and progressive than Kuwait. Aman’s father owned a house in 
Kuwait where he worked and another in Basra where his family lived. While growing up 
Aman was greatly influenced by several Muslim Brotherhood authors and joined the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Basra following a meeting with Muhammad ʿAbdulhamīd Ahmed, 
envoy of Hasan al-Banna to Iraq.  
While studying accounting at the University of Baghdad in the late 1940s, where the 
intellectual environment was fraught with conflict between various ideologies, Aman’s 
personality and thinking were very much shaped by this challenging scholarly milieu. The 
Muslim Brotherhood in Baghdad was influenced by various Nationalist and other left-wing 
ideologies which tended to be highly organised, and very secretive. As in Turkey, Egypt, 
and the Levant, these organisations were widespread in Iraq at that time. The fierce 
conflict between various intellectual groups and ideologies had a direct impact on 
reshaping the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood organisation into a more complex, conservative 
and clandestine movement. This new trend was in sharp contract with the open nature of 
the original Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt, although the 
hostile policies of Presidents Nasser and Sadat towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
eventually made it less open. The highly-organised nature of the Muslim Brotherhood was 
quite evident in Baghdad and to a lesser degree in other parts of Iraq.  
                                                     
158
Al-ʿAqil, Interview. 
  84 
Having obtained both a degree and new modes of thinking, Aman returning to Basra with 
the clear aim of disseminating the results of his newly-acquired knowledge. However, the 
death of his father meant that Aman, as the eldest son, found himself suddenly responsible 
for all his siblings in addition to his work with the Muslim Brotherhood.
159
 
ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ who had first met Aman during a work visit to Basra now 
offered him a highly-paid job in Kuwait, which Aman felt compelled to accept to support 
his family. Aman moved to Kuwait in 1957 at a time when the Muslim Brotherhood there 
was divided and weak. His work in ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿs office brought him closer 
to ʿAbdulʿaziz’s brother ʿAbdullah. ʿAbdullah then convinced Aman to leave ʿAbdulʿaziz 
and work for him instead; he also invited Aman to be active in al-Irshad to prop up the 
moribund movement. Aman accepted both offers and began work in earnest.  
Disagreements between ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ and Muhammad al-ʿAdsani had greatly 
weakened the leadership of al-Irshad and, as noted, had eventually forced both of them, 
and many other members, to abandon the cause altogether. Nevertheless, despite the 
gradual petering out of all its activities, al-Irshad managed to survive by the skin of its 
teeth under the leadership of ʿAbdulrazzaq al-Saleh, who galvanised efforts to establish al-
Irshad school to eliminate illiteracy. Aman volunteered as an accountant at the school, 
working during the evening shift in addition to his job at Abdullah’s office in the morning. 
During Aman’s tenure, the school expanded to include students from the primary to the 
secondary levels and was transformed from a school for adult illiterates to a formal 
educational establishment which adopted the 1955 government curriculum, a new system 
that comprised two years of pre-school, four years of primary school, four years of middle-
school and four years secondary school.
160
 There were soon 1,000 students, most of them 
of various other Arab nationalities. The school was located near the existing government 
headquarters before it moved to one of the Board of Education buildings, the Khalid bin 
al-Walīd School.  The increasing enrolments led to another move, this time to al-Muthanna 
School, which remained open even after the al-Irshad school had closed down in 1959. 
The building eventually became the headquarters of the Kuwait Finance House, after 
which students were transferred to other government schools. 
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Abdullah al-ʿAqil who came from Zubair, with its Najdi origins that were very similar to 
Kuwaiti culture, moved to Kuwait soon after Aman had arrived from Basra. In Zubair, 
Abdullah al-ʿAqil, ʿUmar al-Dayel, ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rabiʿah, in addition to ʿAbdulhadi and 
Yaqub al-Bahsain had worked on spreading the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood in their 
society. They founded three libraries in Zubair (al-Manar, al-Hidaya and the Muslim 
Brotherhood library) in order to spread Islamist ideas in society. Al-ʿAqil went on to study 
in Cairo at al-Azhar, where he formed strong bonds with the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement there and eventually joined them. He returned to Zubair after graduating and 
focused all his efforts on spreading the Muslim Brotherhood ideas through Jamʿiyyat al-
Islah in Zubair and at al-Manar Library. 
When Abdullah al-ʿAqil, ʿUmar al-Dayel and ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rabiʿah left Zubair, 
following communist death threats, they settled in Kuwait with help from Fahd al-Nafisi. 
Al-ʿAqil joined Aman in reviving the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, starting with the 
setting up of a library fashioned after al-Manar library in Basra. The Kuwait branch of al-
Manar library was launched in 1960 with the support of a number of Islamists under the 
supervision of al-ʿAqil and Aman. As the only source of books about Islam and the 
Brotherhood at a time when Nationalist and Leftists dominated social and political 
domains, al-Manar was very popular among young people with an interest in Islamist 
movements.
161
 
Despite these attempts to revive the Islamist spirit through al-Irshad, its school and the new 
library, efforts to attract old and new members to the movement failed miserably, due to 
the internal conflicts within the Muslim Brotherhood, combined with Nasser’s propaganda 
machine which resorted to fear-mongering to scare people away from the Muslim 
Brotherhood by portraying it as backward, oppressive and treacherous.
162
 Such media 
pressure was compounded by security pressures in Egypt and Iraq. The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Kuwait shared the plight of the movement in other countries, and although 
Islamists in Kuwait in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular were never 
targeted by Kuwait’s Ministry of Interior, they did suffer from media and social isolation.  
As the influence of the Islamists began gradually to dwindle during the 1950s, secularist 
nationalist parties and Islamist movements made fierce attempts to gain control of the 
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social domain, as was clearly evident in the calls to liberate women from the shackles of 
tradition, custom, and Islamist teachings.. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s social 
change was remarkably rapid, as society left the old customs and traditions behind and 
adopted a more westernised lifestyle. The loss of the social domain over which they had 
maintained total control for centuries shocked the Islamist movements, which perceived 
this modernising process as a great threat to the social space it had historically dominated 
as well as further evidence that colonial powers were winning the battles for the hearts and 
minds of local communities. Their response was to launch an attempt to reclaim the social 
domain through a new project which was the establishment of the Jamʿiyyat al-Islah al-
Ijtimaʿi, the Social Reform Society.163 
Generally speaking, the attempts of Aman and al-ʿAqil to revive the Muslim Brotherhood 
and Islamic thinking took different ways. Although they did not succeed in re-building the 
Muslim Brotherhood organization in the begining, their work focused on general Islamic 
activities such as launching the al-Manar Islamic bookshop, running al-Irshad school, and 
helping to establish Jamʿiyyat al-Islah al-Ijtimaʿi. These attempts were informed by their 
experience in Iraq, but this by itself was not sufficient to create an established Islamist 
movement, even though they did succeed in spreading Islamic thinking among young 
people interested in Islamist activities, such as some Boy Scouts and students at al-Irshad 
school.   
The end of the 1950s and 1960s in Kuwait was a period of great decline for Islamist 
movements in favour of the secularist nationalist movement.  Islamists had failed in their 
efforts to present their ideas and principles to the general public and opted instead to 
withdraw from public life. The writings of Sayyid Qutb were particularly influential. 
Notions popularised by Qutb, such as “jahiliyyah” (age of ignorance of  divine guidance), 
“emotional isolation”, and “fighting tyrants”, as well as stories of the suffering of Muslim 
Brotherhood members in Nasser’s prisons (including the symbolic and romanticised 
account of Qutb’s imprisonment and subsequent execution), constituted the intellectual 
background for a whole generation of Kuwaitis, along with the teachings of Hasan al-
Banna which called for spreading the message of Islam and establishing a true Islamic 
state. Aman states that Qutb’s writings were much admired by many young Kuwaitis to the 
extent that they withdrew from a society they thought had abandoned tradition and 
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morality. They blamed the Nationalists who controlled the media and influenced political 
life, for these forms of depravity, and found in Qutb’s ideas consolation and a refuge from 
social rejection.  
As William Shepard explains, Qutb’s ideas developed during the ordeal in prison. Qutb’s 
glossary and terms such as taghout [the despot] in reference to the repressive ruler (at the 
time Jamal ʿAbdulnasser), and Jahiliyya which Qutb used to refer to those who did apply 
the teachings of Islam. Qutb called upon the pious few to detach themselves from Jahili 
societies, not physically, but emotionally and work towards reinstating the rule of Islam 
through the notion of Allah’s Sovereignty (hakimiyyah), the idea that Allah is the source of 
all laws. 
164
 These ideas were proposed at a time when members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood were being persecuted by Nasser. Those influenced by Qutb’s ideas 
perceived society as irreligious based on the notion of Jahiliyya. But the leader of the 
Muslim Brotherhood opposed to this idea. The Supreme Guide Hasan al-Hudaybi 
published a book entitled “Duʿat la Qudhat [Preachers, not Judges]” in which he 
emphasised the difference between faith and actions by remarking that a true believer may 
commit sins but that does not make him a Kafir or a disbeliever since he is usually aware 
that he has sinned. Al-Hudaybi opined that “the notion of hakimiyyah is a new term that 
ought not to be used to judge any Muslim, especially since many misunderstood what 
Qutb meant by the term.”  165  
Al-Hudaybi did not directly criticise Qutb despite correcting his understanding of some 
Quranic verses as the one dealing with Allah’s government. He also elaborated on many 
articles of faith pertaining to religious disaffiliation, takfir and other issues Islamists 
commented on during their time in prison. Al-Hudaybi called for re-reading Qutb’s ideas 
in light of the Muslim Brotherhood’s interpretations. The Muslim Brotherhood leadership 
succeeded in keeping the movement together and define the parameters of their thinking in 
Egypt. Qutb’s dichotomies (taghout vs. hakimiyya – Muslim Society vs. Jahili Society) did 
not have any noticeable influence on the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood who enjoyed 
excellent relations with the ruling family. Nor did the latter opposed Islam as source of 
legislation, in addition to the fact that hereditary rule had had long been accepted in Islam. 
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The 1967 war with Israel which, under Nasser’s leadership, was lost by the Arabs, shook 
the foundations of Arab Nationalism and ended Nasser’s support for nationalist parties and 
movements and his state-funded propaganda machine directed against the Gulf state 
leaders (who were described as “the enemies of God”).166 Arab public opinion entered a 
period of introspection to examine the causes of the 1967 defeat, as well as the Arab 
nationalist philosophies and methods. It was the perfect opportunity for the Islamist 
movement to rise from the ashes and renew the call for adopting Islam as a solution to all 
political, social and economic problems. Others called for following in the footsteps of the 
Islam’s golden generation (the Prophet and the four Caliphs), which many middle- and 
lower-class Kuwaitis found very appealing. The collapse of nationalist ideologies in the 
Arab world undoubtedly caused a shift to right-wing schools of thought, such as Islamism. 
Society welcomed this shift while the Islamists seized the opportunity to mobilise once 
again, following a period of stagnation and pressure from governments that had viewed 
them with great suspicion, due mainly to Nasserist propaganda that branded them as agents 
of the West.  In Kuwait young Muslim Brotherhood leaders were united under one banner 
to set the stage for a new and more organised phase of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
3.5 The New Organisation in 1968 
The 1967 defeat, which put the last nail in the coffin of Nasserite and Pan-Arabist 
ideology, was heaven-sent for the Islamists who had long suffered from the effects of 
antagonistic public opinion. Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, had been 
equally persecuted by several Arab security apparatuses, but the new political atmosphere 
that arose after the 1967 defeat provided them with an ideal opportunity to move more 
freely and hit back at secular nationalist ideologies. Islamists blamed secularism for the 
trouncing that had been inflicted on Muslim societies. Aphorisms which propounded the 
merits of Islamic faith and rule duly spread far and wide and found their way into the 
hearts and minds of an Arab Muslim society still reeling under the pain of defeat. Arab 
societies began to embrace Islamic thought which, coupled with the lifting of pressure on 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, set the scene for a new era in many Arab countries. 
Leaders of various Islamic activist groups in Kuwait agreed it was time to unify their 
scattered efforts under one Muslim Brotherhood umbrella. Following an initiative by 
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ʿAbdulwahid Aman, assisted by Salim Turki who was on good terms with various Islamic 
groups adhering to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, consultations were held 
between several young movements; former al-Irshad members with their extensive 
experience in organised movements also took part in the consultations. Young groups that 
had previously been under the leadership of ʿIsa al-Shahin and others, now unified under 
one Muslim Brotherhood umbrella. The new leadership of Aman, Abdullah al-Mutawwaʿ, 
and Mishari al-Bedah organised a meeting to introduce all the members to each other, 
although integration proved quite easy since most Islamists had already met previously 
through the Jamʿiyyat al-Islah and al-Muhanna Mosque in Hawalli. The goal was clear: to 
establish a new organization of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Kuwait under one 
leadership.  
The first meeting was held in September 1968 at the residence of ʿAbdulwahid Aman in 
the Kaifan area. Participants agreed on a list of ideas and objectives, and scheduled a 
meeting with a bigger group of young activists who wished to join the newly-formed 
organisation. The second meeting was held a week later in the presence of around 30 
members well-known for their commitment to Islamic thought and who formed the 
nucleus of the new Muslim Brotherhood organization. ʿAbdulwahidAman was chosen as 
leader of the group with Salim Turki as his deputy. The organisational structure of the 
Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood was based on its Egyptian
167
 and Iraqi counterparts but with 
more influence from the latter due to Aman’s historical links with the Iraqi version of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.
168
 
A thorough reading of the Muslim Brotherhood by-laws reveals that most of the power 
resides with al-Muraqib al-ʿAam (General Observer) who is defined as the president of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and head of the Maktab al-Irshad (Guidance Bureau) and 
Shura Council and has the right to attend all meetings held by various committees of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.
169
 Al-Muraqib also directly supervises the work of all the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s branches. In 1949, on the eve of the assassination of its founder, Imam 
Hasan al-Banna, the number of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt alone was 
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estimated at one million.
170
 The organisational cell ‘usra’ [family] is the smallest unit in 
the Muslim Brotherhood and lies at the bottom of the pyramidal organisation structure 
with an average of five to eight members supervised by a naqib [captain].
171
 The naqib is 
responsible for providing intellectual and educational training to young cadres. He 
prepares a report about each member and nominates those whom he thinks are ready to 
move up the organisational ladder. ʿAbdulhalim Mahmud offers insights into the structure 
and intellectual and educational methods of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in his book 
Education Methods of the Muslim Brotherhood, in which a whole chapter is dedicated to 
the notion of the usra and its importance as a stepping stone.
172
 
The organisational ethos of the Muslim Brotherhood rests on the belief that organised 
work is the most effective tool for transferring Islamic reformist thought from the confines 
of books and ideas to the solid ground of reality. Muslim Brotherhood thinkers firmly 
believe that the main problem resides in the absence of good leadership to guide people 
away from foreign influence and onto the path of independence, and to build a modern 
Islamic state where the Muslim Brotherhood will arrive to fill the gap in the political order. 
Hasan al-Banna, founder of the movement, who was aware that his project would come 
into direct conflict with government interests, colonial powers, and other local political 
forces, stressed the importance of being steadfast in the face of oppression and persecution 
and warned the Muslim Brotherhood members that the cost of reform would be very high. 
Despite the difficulties faced by the Muslim Brotherhood, it adhered to non-violent 
methods which advocated starting with the reforming of individuals, followed by families, 
society, and finally the state. Such a huge project necessitated the establishing of a 
movement like the Muslim Brotherhood.  
According to Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid, training members, especially leaders, to carry 
out the tasks entrusted to them was essential for the success of the Muslim Brotherhood 
project.
173
 The Muslim Brotherhood also regards their project as a ‘holy mission’ to restore 
Islamic values in Muslim societies. Thus, protecting the organisation, as the carrier of the 
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project, in order to ensure the survival of the reformist project, became a fundamental 
objective. Al-Banna pointed out that what distinguished the Muslim Brotherhood from 
other movements and groups was its non-partisan nature and its comprehensive vision; the 
Muslim Brotherhood, he argued, was a movement with an all-inclusive and wide-ranging 
programme covering all aspects of life. It aimed to unite people under one slogan and one 
objective; however, before addressing the masses, such a slogan and objective were to be 
directed in the first instance to members of the Muslim Brotherhood themselves who were 
required to cast aside their own personal interests and work towards achieving the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s goals.  
This explains why the Muslim Brotherhood engages in an arduous process of training and 
re-educating itsir members to avoid the pitfalls and problems faced by other parties and 
groups who often end up fighting over power and influence.  Such forms of education also 
ensure physical and mental resilience in the face of challenges. The history of the Muslim 
Brotherhood is testimony to the success of this strategy especially when, for example, the 
regimes of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak cracked down on the movement’s members. Nor 
has the Muslim Brotherhood witnessed any major dissents which have threatened the 
organisation’s structure. The high degree of discipline and respect for leadership 
guarantees the resilience of the organization.
174
 
3.5.1 The Iraqi Experience and Influence 
Although the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Kuwait derived its principles and inspiration 
from Egypt, the greatest influence, as noted, came from the Iraqi branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood due to the historical links between the new leadership of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Kuwait and the Iraqi branch. The Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood was not as 
open as its Egyptian counterpart despite the fact that, under the leadership of Muhammad 
Mahmoud al-Sawwaf who was known for his mild mannerisms and spontaneity, the 
Muslim Brotherhood had initially been very accessible. The Muslim Brotherhood’s front 
in Iraq was Jamʿiyyat al-Ukhuwwah al-Islamiyyah [Islamic Fraternity Society]. Al-
Sawwaf’s style was reminiscent of al-Banna’s, in terms of its focus on daʿwah in Iraq. 
Various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were set up in Iraqi cities and attracted many 
people. Following the revoking of licences of all parties to operate in Iraq during the 
period of Hashemite rule, the Muslim Brotherhood remained active through the al-
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Ukhuwwah society from 1943 until 1954. This period was notable for the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s great freedom to attract new members and spread the group’s ideas. 
However, the last few years of Hashemite rule were marked by political upheavals, with 
most Nationalist, Communist and Leftist parties declaring their fierce opposition to the 
British-controlled ruling family. The 1956 war against Egypt also left an indelible mark. 
The Muslim Brotherhood came together to debate these political developments and elected 
Muhammad al-Sawwaf as the General Observer with Kamal al-Qaisi as his deputy. These 
were to be the last elected leaders; since from then on, most Muslim Brotherhood leaders 
were appointed rather than elected. The 1958 coup, which was led by Abdulkarim Qasim 
and which saw him seek the support of Communists to establish and stabilise his rule, 
threw the country into turmoil. The Communists effectively terrorised their opponents to 
the extent of committing atrocities such as the massacre of Kirkuk, and also persecuted the 
leaders of Nationalist and Baʿthist parties and the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Sawwaf 
survived an assassination attempt and was arrested and sentenced to death but several 
government leaders interfered on his behalf to plead with Qasim to spare him. He was 
released from jail and fled to Saʿudi Arabia via Syria in 1960. 
The new political order placed great limitations on the activities of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Following the departure of al-Sawwaf and his deputy al-Qaisi, the movement 
decided to select a new leadership that could tackle these political challenges. Abdulkarim 
Zaidan
175
 was chosen as leader, a position to which he agreed, subject to several conditions 
such as choosing by himself three of the foundational committee members to act as 
advisers. His most important condition was that he should not be bound by shura 
(Consultation), and he presented the organization with a study that outlined the non-
compulsory nature of entrusting the leader with shura. The Muslim Brotherhood agreed to 
Zaidan’s conditions, seeing in him the perfect man to lead them through this critical phase. 
Around fifty members from various Iraqi cities were there for his inauguration. In 
addressing the issues of the moment, the new leadership adopted a different approach. 
Political, media and security pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood forced it to go 
underground, after which Zaidan remained virtually unknown, even to the Iraqi 
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government intelligence services, to the extent that he was actually nominated for the post 
of Minister of Religious Affairs during the Baʿth rule; however his name as Muslim 
Brotherhood leader was leaked by some dissenting members, thus preventing his 
appointment from materialising.  
Zaidan was a man of very few words and his deputy, Saleh Saʿdun, was equally reticent.176 
Saʿdun supervised all the Muslim Brotherhood departments and reported to Zaidan whose 
identity remained a secret. The circumspect and very guarded personalities of the two men 
stamped the movement with a secretive character which soon became the norm as the 
Muslim Brotherhood gradually put an end to most of their public activities. The security 
situation in Iraq at the time also forced other parties to go underground and shroud their 
activities in mystery. 
The Muslim Brotherhood then decided to face up to the Communists and other secular 
political forces by establishing their own political party to represent Islamist trends. Al-
Hizb al-Iraqi al-Islami [the Iraqi Islamic Party] was established in 1960 and from then on 
served as a political front for the Muslim Brotherhood after al-Ukhuwwah Society had 
been closed down. The party was very active in challenging Communists and refused to 
cooperate with Baʿthists and Nationalists because al-Hizb al-Islami considered that these 
last two were not much different from Communists in their rejection of Islam. The party 
also clashed with Qasim and the Communists on a number of occasions, including the 
sending of a memo to the government containing scathing criticisms of its performance. 
Several party leaders were arrested but mediation efforts secured their release. A decree 
was issued dissolving the party less than one year after its establishment.
177
 
The Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood continued to work in secret, finding inspiration in the 
writings of Sayyid Qutb that were the polar opposite to the secular thought of Communists 
and Baʿthists. An Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood member who met Qutb in Egypt was told by 
the latter that the organisation closest to his line of thinking was the Iraqi one.
178
 The Iraqi 
Muslim brotherhood was highly centralised with most of the powers vested in Zaidan who 
saw it as his right, as an elected General Observer, to do whatever he saw fit, even if the 
majority or the Shura Council disagreed with him. From his strong background in Islamic 
scholarship and shariʿa, Zaidan wrote a memo in which he defended the powers he 
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enjoyed from a logical and religious perspective. From a religious perspective, Zaidan 
quoted the verse “So by mercy from Allah, [O Muhammad], you were lenient with them. 
And if you had been rude [in speech] and harsh in heart, they would have disbanded from 
about you. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult them in the matter. 
And when you have decided, then rely upon Allah. Indeed, Allah loves those who rely 
[upon Him].”(3:159) 179, which he understood to mean that Allah had instructed Prophet 
Muhammad to consult his Companions but then decide for himself how to proceed. 
Logically, Zaidan argued, the leader was held liable for all his actions and thus should not 
be forced to follow the opinion of others if he was not convinced it was the right path to 
follow. Being responsible for one’s decisions and actions meant being able to choose 
freely and not be subject to the choices of others especially since at the end, he was the one 
who would be held fully responsible for his actions.
180
 Zaidan cited a few examples from 
history to support his theory, such as the story about Caliph Abu Baker when he insisted 
on dispatching troops formed by the Prophet under the leadership of Osama bin Zaid 
although his Companions were of the view that they should not be dispatched but kept 
instead in Medina to protect it from the threat of apostates. Zaidan also mentioned another 
incident when Abu Baker insisted on fighting apostates who refused to pay zakat despite 
the objections of his Companions who advised granting them more time. In both cases, the 
leader followed his own opinion despite the objections of others.
181
 
As previously noted, the literature of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood focused on the 
importance of secret work. A case in point is an unpublished memo from the leadership of 
the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood branch listing the rules and regulations and philosophy of 
the movement in Iraq. The memo referred to various types of secrecy such as the secrecy 
of activities, organisation and identities. Secrecy of activities meant carrying out the task 
of daʿwah in great secret and the best way to do that was through direct contact with 
individuals and bases. Activities usually involved a small number of people who would 
meet socially, go together on trips and so on. The movement recommended members hide 
their membership even from their closest relatives. The identity of members, especially 
leadership figures, was also kept secret, and aliases were used in correspondence. The 
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Muslim Brotherhood considered secrecy an essential component of daʿwah dictated by 
political contingencies.
182
 
As a result of the militant threat to the organization, the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq 
established a secret armed branch to protect the organization; it also participated in 
planning a number of coups but always pulled out at the last minute, either because the 
plan was exposed or because they were not ready for the fallout. Armed activities were 
kept secret until fierce disagreements broke out between veteran Muslim Brotherhood 
members and Zaidan, who was criticised for his centralised administration. The veteran 
members were also critical of what they perceived as his weakness and inability to face up 
to the government. Some members left the Muslim Brotherhood and so a few names were 
leaked, including Zaidan’s identity. The Baʿthist government, which staged a coup in 1968 
to overthrow Qasim and the Communists, also learned of the existence of the armed 
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s. The Baʿth 
party purged the political scene of all political opponents, and having got rid of the 
Communists, turned its attention to the Muslim Brotherhood. After the names were leaked, 
the government put the Muslim Brotherhood members under surveillance, and several 
members who lashed were assassinated by the government.
183
 In 1971 Zaidan announced 
the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood to protect its other members.
184
 Some respected 
the decision but others who rebelled against it were later traced and expelled by the 
government.
185
 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq suffered from many internal problems, the most 
dangerous of which were the lack of trust in their leadership, and disagreements over how 
the organization should be managed. The divergent intellectual, educational and 
organisational resources from which the various members drew their inspiration had a 
clear impact on the direction these members adopted. Some were inspired by the Egyptian 
teachers who came to work in Iraq while others were influenced by the Sufis and their 
belief in working openly. Another group subscribed to Zaidan’s advocacy of secrecy. The 
final blow came with the leaking of names to the Baʿth government which cracked down 
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on the Muslim Brotherhood until most members had been assassinated or were forced to 
flee the country. 
In Kuwait, the burgeoning Muslim Brotherhood organization was heavily influenced by 
the experience that the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood had witnessed. The teachings of Hasan 
al-Banna were the bedrock of all Muslim Brotherhood branches, yet different 
circumstances left their imprint on each branch. Also, the great gap in numbers between 
the Kuwaiti branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members did not exceed thirty 
when it was formed, and the Egyptian movement with its hundreds of thousands of 
members, made the Kuwaiti branch seem very humble and simple in comparison with its 
Egyptian and Iraqi counterparts. The members who met at Aman’s house opted to 
establish the Executive Office and the Supervisor of the Organization, which paralleled the 
Guidance Bureau and the General Observer respectively. It was a very simple 
organisation, with Abdullah al-Mutawwaʿ and Mishari al-Bedah in leadership roles while 
Aman managed the youth department in addition to being the Supervisor of the 
Organization.
186
 
Over time the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood grew and soon included a women’s 
branch and a social work department. Yet, due to its small size and to certain security 
concerns, the movement never ventured beyond basic activities such as daʿwah and social 
gatherings. The relatively young age of both the members and the organisation meant that 
the movement lacked depth of vision and knowledge of the intricacies of the Kuwaiti 
political and economic order which, not unnaturally, differed from those of Egypt and Iraq. 
Aman states that the Kuwaiti branch of the organization had been founded on the 
principles of educating the young in order to overcome the shortcomings of its 
predecessor, al-Irshad, and the reasons that had led to its demise. It aimed to revive the 
Muslim Brotherhood organization in Kuwait and unite its members under one sturdy 
umbrella, and to combat the secular trends of nationalists. This new generation of young 
men and women would be entrusted with the task of establishing the desired Islamic 
society, in their homes and social circles and finally society as a whole, to tackle all forms 
of corruption. This was not a new goal for the organization but it sought to implement 
these objectives in a manner more suited to Kuwaiti society and the abilities of the new 
movement. Political reform as a theme was absent from the new movement’s literature, as, 
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to a lesser extent, was economic reform, although the writings of ʿIsa ʿAbduh and 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, which were published by al-Manar bookshop, did refer to these 
issues. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood emerged in Kuwait as an ‘educator’ rather than as a 
‘politician’. 
In addition to the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Iraq, Zubair, an old cultural and Islamic 
centre, had a great influence on Kuwait due to the close proximity between the two. Al-
ʿAqil explains that many residents of Zubair and Kuwait share a common origin from the 
tribes of Najd, making Zubair closer to Kuwait in terms of culture, customs and traditions 
than Iraq.
187
 Zubair was more culturally and scientifically advanced than Kuwait and 
exerted a great influence on the young state. Home to the first school in the region, al-
Dweihis School, established in 1781 to teach Hanbali school of jurisprudence
188
, and al-
Fudailia School for girls
189
 which was established at the end of the 19
th
 century, Zubair 
was the source of many Islamic reformist ideas which spread to Kuwait with the influx of 
magazines, religious teachers and scholars from Zubair to Kuwait.
190
 Many Kuwaiti 
students studied in Zubair such as shaikh ʿAbdullah al-Duhian in 1892 and shaikh 
ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid in 1903. Many Najdi families moved to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
after the collapse of the Najdi rule and the Iraqi of Zubair in 1920 but the biggest wave of 
immigration occurred after the discovery of oil in the Gulf region.
191
 Immigrants brought 
with them new ideas such as the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood which had spread in 
Iraqi and Zubair before Kuwait. Mohammed Abdul-Hamid who was studying in Basra 
introduced the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood into Zubair. Young men and Sheiks 
influenced by him established a number of religious and cultural organisations similar to 
those founded by the Muslim Brotherhood in Baghdad and Basra. The Muslim 
Brotherhood library was established in 1946 followed by al-Hidayya and al-Manar 
libraries.
192
 The Muslim Brotherhood established a branch of the Islamic Brotherhood 
Society in Zubair in 1950. The Society was dissolved by the Iraqi authorities in 1954 and 
so the Muslim Brotherhood founded the Social Reform Society as a replacement. The 
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influx of Brotherhood members from Zubair to Kuwait in the 1950s and 1960s galvanised 
the Kuwaiti branch of the Brotherhood at a time when the movement was being persecuted 
elsewhere. The new arrivals founded a number of cultural and religious organisations 
similar to the ones in Zubair such as al-Manar library, al-Islah and other foundations that 
the Muslim Brotherhood still operates in Kuwait until the present day. 
3.5.2 The Foundations of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood Movement 
The Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood movement benefited greatly from the Iraqi experience, 
and its organization was based on the principles adopted by the Iraqi model. The 
movement was established with a limited number of families (usra) who were mostly 
urbanite members due to the ease with which they embraced Muslim Brotherhood 
thinking, most of them having witnessed the Muslim Brotherhood’s first experience in 
Kuwait. The new leadership also consisted of urbanite elements so it seemed natural to 
embark on the process of daʿwah among this group. The message of the new organization 
was being spread among young elements but in a more secretive manner than before. 
Members would contact young men on an individual rather than a collective basis. There 
was much more emphasis on religious and moral issues without reference to political and 
intellectual concerns, so as to avoid disagreements with the individual being 
approached.
193
 
Sports and recreational programmes were among the best methods of attracting people to 
the organization, which did not identify itself as Muslim Brotherhood to members outside 
the movement. Once the members of the Muslim Brotherhood had ascertained that an 
individual was committed to the principles of Islam on which the movement was founded, 
they would invite him to join the group; the process of meeting the individual to inviting 
him to become a member usually took around two years. The Kuwaiti branch also 
borrowed extensively from their Iraqi counterparts in terms of daʿwah and organisation. 
On the level of daʿwah, the Muslim Brotherhood took great care to establish a 
comprehensive educational system with equal emphasis on the spiritual, physical and 
intellectual aspects of education.  
Young people were the prime target for the organization. Excursions, camps and 
gatherings were organised along the lines of the Iraqi model although that dated back to a 
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model designed by Hasan al-Banna himself. Gatherings of almost fifty people would be 
organised in someone’s home or on the seaside or even at the mosque, and were 
considered a crucial means of focusing on the spiritual growth of the movement’s young 
members.  The programme would usually start after evening prayers or after breaking their 
fast, and the group would then recite verses from the Quran and pray throughout the night 
before going to sleep after dawn prayers. During excursions, the group would spend time 
at someone’s weekend home or chalet, with the programme focusing on refining 
leadership, managerial and intellectual skills.  Sports contests and games would be held in 
addition to lectures by established members, while camping programmes aimed at 
instilling Islamic values in addition to physical training and were similar to those of the 
international scout movement with its emphasis on mental, physical and spiritual 
development. 
Muhammad Ahmad al-Rahsid explains the organisational structure which was based on a 
nucleus of less than ten members headed by a naqib who was directly linked to the raqib, a 
person of higher status and, in turn, linked with the upper leadership. This hierarchy was 
inspired by the Iraqi model which devised the post of raqib although it did not exist in the 
Egyptian model.
194
 The naqib’s role was more important than that of the raqib because he 
was the one who prepared new members spiritually and intellectually. The daily contact by 
the naqib with individuals placed him in the position of guide and mentor. He/she was also 
entrusted with the task of following through with individuals from the moment he/she 
were first introduced to the naqib until they became full members. The usra was the cradle 
from which individuals drew their intellectual, organisational and spiritual inspiration. The 
movement was thus constantly in motion, spreading the message of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and attracting new members. The Muslim Brotherhood leaderships in Egypt, 
Iraq and Kuwait took great care in preparing naqibs for their roles and singled out them for 
specific directives where naqibs would be required to obey all orders from above and put 
the organization first, ahead of their own interests, to ensure that the main goals of the 
movement were realised.
195
 
3.5.3 The Establishment of the Movement on the Philosophy of the Iraqi School 
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ʿAbdulwahid Aman played a major role in shaping the structure and outlook of the 
Kuwaiti movement, bestowing upon it the characteristics of its Iraqi counterpart. From a 
quick comparison between the Iraqi and Egyptian movements and their impact on the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, it is immediately evident that despite the importance of 
the Supreme Guide in the Egyptian model, there were other members who took part in the 
decision-making process, in addition to a comprehensive body that followed through with 
the leadership to ensure that all decisions were implemented. This body consisted of the 
deputy Supreme Guide, the secretary general and the deputy general.  The charisma and 
leadership abilities of Hasan al-Banna made him the centre of decision-making, while the 
security grip of Nasser’s regime highlighted the role of Hasan al-Hudaybi, the second 
Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, in managing the crises and challenges faced 
by the movement. But the central role of Supreme Guides began to wane in favour of the 
Guidance Bureau. Such new forms of management allowed other members to participate 
in the decision-making process and transformed the spirit of the movement from being 
leader-based into one that was more institutionalised.  
In the case of the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement lacked any clear 
structure under al-Sawwaf due to his spontaneous and relaxed personality. When Zaidan 
assumed power, the Muslim Brotherhood entered a new era marked by challenges from 
other organisations and from the government itself. The movement took on new forms and 
gradually became more centralised as Zaidan moved in on most of the powers. For security 
reasons, as noted above, his deputy Saʿdun was entrusted with all the tasks.  
The organisational structure demonstrated the centralised nature of power within the 
Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Zaidan and Saʿdun. The structure of the 
Kuwaiti branch was influenced by the Iraqi more than the Egyptian organization. Aman 
enjoyed far-reaching powers similar to the Iraqi model.  Shura was also marked out for the 
Supreme Guide without obligation, as set forth by Zaidan in Iraq. These rules were 
distributed in a memo among the members to reassure them of the legitimacy of the 
leadership’s actions. Yet, it was not a smooth operation; Abdullah al-Nafisi, one of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s veterans, stipulated shura as a precondition for his agreeing to join 
the movement.
196
 Though he joined the organisation later he left for other reasons. The 
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majority of members approved of Aman’s decision, not out of conviction, but rather 
because they trusted him as a person and a leader.
197
 
Even though most of the powers were vested in Aman, the centralised mode on which the 
Kuwaiti branch was founded did not reflect on the form of its organizational structure; the 
Shura Council elected members of the leadership, including the highest officials. 
Authorities were generally vested in the upper echelons of the Muslim Brotherhood who, 
in turn, supervised the work of other departments. Aman paid close attention to the 
structural and organisational aspects of the new movement by ensuring that the powers and 
authorities of various departments were kept separate. He managed the movement in a 
hierarchical manner whereby each member referred to his direct supervisor if he needed to 
contact someone in another department. This naturally resulted in most powers becoming 
centralised in Aman’s hand which meant the movement looked up to the leadership in all 
matters, even those pertaining to their own relationships with each other. Although the 
organization’s codes did not entrust all the authorities to the leader personally but rather to 
the leadership office, reality on the ground, members’ backgrounds, and the fact they were 
influenced by the Iraqi branch all signified that the Supervisor was the one with all the 
power.  
As pointed out above, the new Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood organization followed the 
Iraqi model. In addition to centralised authority, the identities of both leaders and members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood were kept secret from new members and the general public, as 
in the Iraqi case. This did not prevent some members of the organization and the public 
from recognising vertain individuals as members of the Muslim Brotherhood from their 
discourse, manner of dress, and beards. The Kuwaiti government was also aware of the 
names of the leaders because of the strong ties between Abdullah al-Mutawwaʿ and 
members of the ruling family. Al-Mutawwaʿ played a major role in creating trust between 
the government and the Muslim Brotherhood and also in alleviating anxiety that the 
movement was trying to undermine the ruling family or else had ties with foreign 
elements. These good relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government in 
Kuwait raises questions as to why the movement chose to keep its activities under wraps 
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without there being any real threat to Islamist movements from the government or the 
other political and social movements. In Iraq, it was quite understandable for the Muslim 
Brotherhood to go underground but in Kuwait no such justification existed. The only 
explanation was that the events in Egypt and Iraq had greatly impacted the structure and 
mode of work of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. 
The main impetus behind all these principles of operation (centralised authority, non-
obligatory nature of shura and secrecy of work) was the need to build a strong 
organization. Muhammad Ahmed al-Rashid, the Muslim Brotherhood thinker who 
belonged to the Iraqi movement, referred to this as the ‘al-Qaʿida al-Sulbah’ [the solid 
base], which is defined as the nucleus of the Muslim Brotherhood and the base on which 
the movement is founded.
198
 This solid base must reflect the unique political, cultural and 
social forces that sympathise with, or are antagonistic to, the Muslim Brotherhood. Aman 
worked hard to achieve these goals by working closely with his first group to prepare a 
generation of Muslim Brotherhood members who were loyal to the leadership and 
possessed a thorough understanding of the whole philosophy behind the movement. 
Muslim Brotherhood members endured hardships to attract others to their movement and 
invested a lot of time and effort physically and intellectually to prepare members for the 
solid base. The special qualities required in the solid base meant that the leadership needed 
to take great care in selecting members.  
3.5.4 The Mechanism of Mobilization 
Various independent religious scholars and shaikhs played a positive role in spreading the 
message of Islam among members of the public and young people, which contributed to 
the time being right for society to embrace the Muslim Brotherhood. Shaikhs such as 
Hasan Tannun
199
 from Sudan and Shaikh Hasan Ayyub, an Azhar graduate from Egypt,
200
 
spread Islamic culture among the masses and were widely-respected and revered for their 
depth of knowledge and for the authority imparted by well-rounded and well-informed 
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religious scholars back then.  Hasan Ayyub’s lessons at al-Othman mosque in the al-Nuqra 
area emphasised the importance of charity work, an interest shared by Abdullah al-
Ruwwaiḥ, and the two collaborated to establish the al-Othman Zakat Committee at al-
Othman Mosque in 1973; this was the first zakat committee of its kind in 
Kuwait.
201
Tannun and Ayyub had originally arrived in Kuwait in the mid-1960s, at the 
request of some Islamist activists, to give religious lessons as well as to spread Islamic 
culture and thought among members of Kuwaiti society.
202
 A series of lessons and articles 
entitled “The Message of the Mosque” by Ayyub was intended to attract people to the 
mosque, an aim in which he was very successful.  
In addition to these two, Shaikh ʿUmar al-Ashqar and Shaikh ʿAbdulrahman ʿAbdulkhaliq, 
both educated in Jordan and then at the Islamic University in Saʿudi Arabic, came to 
Kuwait. Their studies in Saʿudi Arabia had proved short-lived after they were accused of 
destroying mannequins that had been imported to display women’s clothing in some shops 
in Medina. Al-Ashqar later recalled that the mannequins had caused quite a stir in the city, 
especially among the Islamists. Al-Ashqar and ʿAbdulkhaliq, both with connections to 
Salafi groups, including the Juhayman al-ʿUtaibi203 group, had conferred with them on 
how best to put a stop to this sin. They agreed to lecture people on the importance of 
ensuring that these idols did not spread, and advised shop owners against using them. After 
an initial period of lecturing and dispensing advice, al-Ashqar and ʿAbdulkhaliq were 
shocked to learn that, despite the Salafi groups not advocating such a course of action, the 
shops where the mannequins had been displayed had been destroyed. It soon emerged that 
Juhayman’s group had been behind the destruction,204  and a decision was taken to deport 
Al-Ashqar and ʿAbdulkhaliq for spearheading the campaign against the mannequins. The 
two of them moved to Kuwait in summer 1965 to resume their activities though without 
belonging to any particular group. Along with Hasan Ayyub and Hasan Tannun, they 
played a major role in spreading Islamic thought. 
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The lessons given by al-Ashqar and ʿAbdulkhaliq were very well-attended and revolved 
around Islamic fiqh, ʿaqidah, and shariʿa. The Salafi influence was evident in their 
lessons, especially in issues related to ʿaqidah. They continued to teach at Kuwaiti 
mosques for a number of years and accumulated a large following among Kuwaiti and 
foreign students, due to the practical nature of their lessons which differed from the 
lectures of Ayyub and Tannun. The four of them delivered a series of lectures at the al-
Islah society, and were on very good terms with its members.  
Al-Islah was the front for the Islamists in Kuwait. As mentioned above, it was established 
in response to an invitation from Abdullah al-Mutawwaʿ for all Islamists to come together.  
The Society was run by a group of independent Islamists, and the Muslim Brotherhood 
had no direct bearing on its management, since the movement had not been set up until 
1968, when its sole focus was on forming the solid base of the Muslim Brotherhood rather 
than on anything else. The relative youth of the Muslim Brotherhood members prevented 
them from assuming leadership roles in the al-Islah society as did the secretive nature of 
the organization’s work. 
After the Muslim Brotherhood was formed in Kuwait in 1968, organised work began in 
earnest. Aman explains how the Muslim Brotherhood’s members were arranged into five 
usras according to age and location. Work was focused initially on spreading daʿwah 
among the young through personal contacts and without revealing the identity of the 
members and their affiliations. Once the young recruit’s credentials were ascertained, he 
would be asked to join the organization. This was representative of the manner in which 
the Muslim Brotherhood operated in many countries, including Kuwait. The new 
organisation focused mainly on bringing together young men and introducing them to 
Islamic values. With time, methods of attracting new members became more varied and 
included inviting them to mosques, schools, and neighbourhood meetings. The Muslim 
Brotherhood also established centres and youth clubs, such as the al-Kasb Club at Najib al-
Rifaʿi’s house, Abu Bakr Club at Abdulmuhsin al-Othman’s house, and a centre at 
Mohamed al-Ruwaiyyiḥ’s house in al-Shamia area.205 The organisation introduced these 
young men to Islamic values and Muslim Brotherhood thinking through methods designed 
by Hasan al-Banna and developed by the Iraqi organization. Methods included private 
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lessons, fasting, night prayers, special programmes, camping trips and excursions, in 
addition to lessons at the mosque.  
From the outset, members, who were selected on the basis of their faith, intellectual 
abilities, and physical prowess, were taught the importance of respect and loyalty to the 
organisation. Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid explains how the idea of terms and conditions 
was developed by the Iraqi organization which also developed the notion of stages through 
which a member had to pass until he was deemed fit to become naqib. The details of these 
conditions were set forth in the “al-Shurut” [provisos or conditions] letters; al-Rashid had 
played a big role in drawing up these letters when he lived in Iraq, and they were later 
modified to suit the nature of activities in Kuwait. They were taught, among other letters of 
guidance, to naqibs and candidates for being naqib and remained the basis for work for a 
very long time, even after the solid base had been founded. There were two levels initially, 
which had progressed to four before a member was made naqib in order to ensure that 
he/she was ready for the tasks that lay ahead. The idea of levels originated with al-Banna 
who explained that there were types of “advocates of ideas” who liked or supported or 
implemented these ideas, although such divisions generally lacked any further details as to 
how best to choose a Muslim Brotherhood member and promote him/her. The Iraqi 
movement developed these levels with clear criteria and they were later adopted by the 
Kuwaiti branch. 
The daʿwah that the Muslim Brotherhood decided to work on started at mosques. At the 
time, praying five times a day at the mosque was not very common but the movement 
succeeded in attracting a number of young men to the mosque. Young Muslim 
Brotherhood members spread the idea in person at the schools they were attending. It was 
a slow process at first due to the secrecy and the newness of the whole experiment. 
Support from former members of al-Irshad and the founders of al-Islah gave the young 
men good cover to enable them to move freely. Their efforts were also supported by giving 
them full use of the old headquarters of al-Islah in Umm Sedda and the new building in al-
Rawdah in which to hold their various activities. Other venues included mosques, with the 
help of mosque imams, such as the al-Muhanna Mosque in Hawali.  
The division of members’ work was based on their geographic location but that did not 
prevent them from holding joint activities in order to concentrate the work within the 
boundaries of the areas near the capital, from which most members hailed, in addition to 
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al-Salimiyya area where most of the ʿAwazim tribe was concentrated. The absence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood from more distant areas prompted the leadership to attempt to 
penetrate places such as al-Jahra’ in the north, al-Farwania in the west, and al-Ahmadi and 
al-Fintas in the south. They took their inspiration from al-Banna, who used to visit far-
flung villages in Egypt. The usra would visit a certain area on a Friday and attend Friday 
prayer at one of its famous mosques to deliver the sermon and get to know the young men 
of the area. They would visit the area a number of times to stay in touch with the young 
men they had attracted to the Muslim Brotherhood through lessons in the Qur’an and other 
activities. They succeeded in penetrating these remoter areas and recruited many young 
men, especially from the tribes of ʿAnza, Shammar, al-Dufair, Mutair, al-Reshaida, al-
ʿAjman, Otaiba, and al-ʿAwazim, as well as a number of urbanites. Ali Zumai’, a Muslim 
Brotherhood member at that time recalls that daʿwah focused on the sons of influential 
families within the tribes. The movement had better luck among the tribes of Farwnia than 
it had with al-Jahra’ and al-Ahmadi.  
The solid base of the Muslim Brotherhood was formed in less than a decade with various 
usras spread throughout Kuwait, especially among middle-class urbanites and poorer 
classes. Compared with al-Irshad, the Muslim Brotherhood was not very successful in 
appealing to the sons of influential urbanite families, but had a positive impact on the 
educated class that was similar to that of the nationalist parties because this was a dynamic 
section of society. The Muslim Brotherhood did not aim to work among Shiʿa because of 
doctrinal differences with them and because they were more likely to subscribe to a Shiʿi 
religious movement or to secularist nationalist ideologies.
206
 
3.5.5 Muhammad Ahmed al-Rashid and the Intellectual Formation of the Movement 
Aman was greatly concerned with unifying the ideological and intellectual resources of the 
organisation of members to avoid the pitfall of ideological disagreements over cultural and 
political issues like those that occurred in Syria and Iraq and among the members of the al-
Irshad whose diverse intellectual and organisational backgrounds had led to many 
arguments. Aman drew his inspiration from the diaries and memoirs of the Iraqi Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
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ʿAbdulmenʿim Saleh al-Ali, who went by the alias Mohamed Ahmed al-Rashid, was the 
author of the most important ‘letters of guidance’ of Iraq’s Muslim Brotherhood. They 
were later used in a number of other countries and are considered second in importance to 
the letters of al-Banna. Al-Rashid had to flee from the Baʿth regime and was invited by 
Aman to seek asylum in Kuwait and to design the organizational and intellectual frames of 
reference for the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood. The two men had already met in Baghdad 
and their firm friendship prompted al-Rashid to accept Aman’s invitation and offer; he 
arrived in Kuwait in the early 1970s.
207
 
Al-Rashid’s writings were unique in their field of Islamic thought and in the religious and 
historical sources he drew upon. He coined the terms “fiqh of daʿwah” and “fiqh of 
movement”. His teachings outlined the principles the movement should adopt. These were 
not simply religious teachings or detailed plans but rather detailed principles. His style, 
similar to that of Sayyid Qutb, was animated and very inspiring, mixing Islamic tradition 
with modern-day realities and creating links between the two. This nexus between abstract 
values and reality on the ground meant that members’ faith in the movement was well-
grounded on both an intellectual and a practical level. The Muslim Brotherhood was not 
viewed merely as a tool but rather as an idea and a weapon for achieving the desired goal. 
In fact, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood was considered by many as an article of 
faith. 
The first of the organisational letters had appeared in Iraq as the conflict between various 
political parties intensified, and were greatly influenced by leftist ideas that were wide-
spread at the time. A letter entitled “The Cause and the Islamist movement” published in 
1960 outlined the differences between the goals and objectives of the Islamist movement, 
and left-wing movements like the Nationalists and Communists. The purpose was to deter 
Muslim Brotherhood members from becoming mesmerised by these other ideologies. It 
also sketched out the organisational framework of the movement in light of the difficult 
security conditions prevailing, and the wave of internal dissent that was unsettling the 
organization. 
208
 
The letters of ‘al-Shurut’ [provisos] directed at middle-tier leadership included a detailed 
overview of the conditions for accepting new members by requiring them to take a series 
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of educational and physical tests to ensure they were genuine, rather than elements planted 
by intelligence services or other parties. The ‘Al-Naqib Reminder’ letter was concerned 
with the most important element in the movement, the naqib.  The letter and an internal 
publication entitled ‘Al-Naqib Journal’ were directed at naqibs and contained directives 
and recommendations as to how recruit and train members. Naqibs were trained in the art 
of organising meetings and activities, editing pamphlets and documents, etc., in addition to 
managing usra. The letter of ‘Siyasat’ [Policies] outlined the principles of political work, 
to prepare members for dealing with various political movements and parties and for 
assuming power in Iraq.
209
 
These letters were marked by their simple and direct discourse. They were greatly 
influenced by the difficult circumstances in Iraq which complicated the lives of the 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although they had a lot in common the letters 
written in Kuwait were different from those produced in Iraq. Al-Rashid’s life in Iraq had 
been quite volatile compared with the quiet and easy life he led in Kuwait where he wrote 
the letters of ‘al-Muntalaq’ [the Start],210‘al-ʿAwa’iq’ [the Obstacles],211‘al-Masaar’ [the 
Path]
212
 and ‘Sinaʿat al-Hayat’ [the Making of Life]213 plus ‘Rasa’il al-ʿAin’[the letters of 
Eye] serial. All these letters formed the basis of Islamic thinking and organizational 
ideology for the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait and other branches in the Arab World.  
Al-Muntalaq summarised the mobilisation lessons of the movement that al-Rashid brought 
with him to Kuwait and established the foundations of movement for the Muslim 
Brotherhood there. This form of thinking would not be suitable for a political or secular 
party because many of its ideas were drawn from Islam as a religion. Al-Muntalaq set forth 
clear directives to members who had faith in what they were doing, and was not a 
document to introduce the Muslim Brotherhood to the public. Al-Rashid drew parallels 
with the Muslim nation’s glorious past and the Muslim Brotherhood by emphasising the 
spirit of pride and loyalty in the hearts and minds of members. He also drew attention to 
the comprehensive nature of Islam and the importance of collective work in facing the 
challenges of colonisation.  
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Al-Rashid combined religious leadership with administrative management as a 
precondition for leading the movement. Emphasising the need for training a generation of 
members on the ‘al-Qaʿida al-Sulbah’ [the solid base] principle was one of the most 
important lessons which he had learnt from the Iraqi experience. The idea was to draw 
upon the same intellectual sources to avoid what had happened in Iraq where members’ 
diverse sources of knowledge had caused major disagreements over methods and 
strategies. The same had happened with the al-Irshad in Kuwait. Al-Rashid argued that the 
foundational generation must be chosen carefully and be well-trained in unifying goals and 
objectives.  One of the main principles instilled in the foundational generation was a notion 
to which Sayyed Qutb had alluded; the sense of isolation or alienation from one’s society, 
al-ʿUzlah al-Shʿuriyyah.214 However, in contrast to Qutb’s notion, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Kuwait did not believe that Kuwaiti society had strayed completely from 
religion, having shunned some aspects like women’s attire, alcohol, interests on loans, et., 
this for al-Rashid signified society’s neglect of the principles of Islam. It was thus essential 
for members to preserve, and remain steadfast within, an environment that was hostile to 
Islamist movements. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait did not adopt the 
revolutionary ideas of Qutb due to its conviction that the Kuwaiti context was not the same 
as the Egyptian one. Yet, some members of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Ismail al-
Shatti, adopted Qutb’s revolutionary ideas for a while before abandoning them later. 
Al-ʿAwa’iq was a continuation of the principles contained in al-Muntalaq for shedding 
light on the organisational, social and intellectual problems that might face the movement 
and how best to tackle them from an intellectual and religious perspective. Al-Rashid 
began by emphasising the importance of commitment to the movement as a strategy for 
overcoming these obstacles. He listed obedience to the leadership as another important 
component based on the organizational principle that ‘no group could survive without 
obedience’. Faith in leadership, the ideology, and group work were the best ways to 
combat all manner of troubles. However, stressing the building of ties between the 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the organization was greatly exaggerated, to the 
extent that members became caught up with the group in all aspects of their lives (work, 
marriages, home, excursions, etc...). In an obvious enforcement of Qutb’s idea of al-ʿUzlah 
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al-Shʿuriyyah, the movement created an environment and a Muslim Brotherhood society in 
which the individual lived out all the ideals of the group but was totally divorced from his 
wider social context.
215
 
The second letter written by al-Rashid following his arrival in Kuwait spoke about the 
obstacles and problems that might face the movement. It was a pre-emptive set of 
instructions to avoid previous problems that had impacted the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
past. The best strategy to avoid recurrence of these setbacks was to design an approach that 
would instil in the young recruits the principles of obedience and commitment to the 
group. Al-Rashid devised organisational rules that served as titles for a number of articles, 
such as “al-Jundiyyah Tariq al-Qiyadah” [Soldiery is the Path to Leadership], to entrench 
the values of loyalty and obedience. These organisational rules were of special relevance 
to the solid base on which the movement was founded in a hostile environment. Soldiery 
meant total obedience, fortitude and endurance. Moreover, the only path to leadership was 
for the member to be a solider for a while, during which time his faith and skills were 
tested. Soldiery also entailed the notion of promotion in rank, since members rose in rank 
according to the time they had served and their abilities. On this basis, members were 
expected to consult the leadership on all matters, including sacrifice, because “sacrificing 
one’s life without permission is a waste”.216 
The rule that keeping secrets from other members led to problems was meant to discourage 
members from complaining secretly to each other by finding venues in which they could 
solve these problems and nip hem in the bud. By way of example al-Rashid cited what had 
happened in Iraq when members began to complain about Zaidan’s methods, and referred 
to this kind of talk among members as “najwa” (a collusive exchange between two 
people). This was a term borrowed from the Qur’an and had a great impact on those of 
great faith.  He created a link between the term in the Qur’an and the organisational rule in 
a bid to integrate religion with rules of exchange. In another letter, al-Rashid emphasised a 
member’s sense of confidence in himself, his thinking, and his membership in the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The notion is reminiscent of that of “God’s chosen people” in Judaism and 
Christianity and also dovetailed with Qutb’s term “al-Istiʿla al-Imani” [Superiority 
through Faith]. 
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Al-Masar focused mainly on the movement’s external and internal politics with special 
emphasis on its educational policies. External politics referred to dealings with the 
government, and other parties and movements. Al-Rashid had a very dim view of other 
political parties and movements especially the Nationalists, and in his vieew the 
government was exploitative and pro-colonialist. His own experiences in Iraq had greatly 
influenced his view of the ‘Other.’ The internal politics of the Muslim Brotherhood was 
inspired by the Communist experience in the Soviet Union and their strategy of building 
the organisation gradually and secretly by laying down roots during the stage of “silent 
establishment” in order to “create the base” and “build the elite”.217 The solid base must 
not engage in any conflict or reveal itself and the movement had to be given time to come 
together in complete secrecy.  
Al-Rashid also argued that the Muslim Brotherhood must not enter the political arena until 
it was sufficiently strong and powerful to establish an Islamic state. This discourse of 
monopolising power had been part of the Iraqi political scene at a time which was fraught 
with coups d’état and the liquidation of all rivals. Achieving these goals in Iraq 
necessitated the adoption of very strict rules for selecting members and forming the solid 
base. Once the first stage had been completed, the movement could afford to ease some of 
the rules for taking on new members and benefiting from their wide expertise. This last 
notion was based on a socialist ideal of making the most of members’ abilities according to 
their field of expertise.
218
 Al-Rashid also focused on the women’s branch of the 
movement, which would train women to help out their husbands by providing them with a 
good home environment. He also referred to the need to recruit members from among 
villagers and tribes.  
Al-Masar was directed at the middle- and upper-leadership as opposed to the previous 
letters which focused on policies, establishment, and obstacles and were directed at new 
members to introduce them to the daʿwah. It outlined the instructions and methods of 
managing the organisation and recommended approaching intelligent and influential 
individuals who would form the solid base. Al-Masar also prepared the upper and middle 
leadership for the shift from secret work to public activities. Al-Rashid noted that the 
period between the two stages was very critical and meant adapting to the tough conditions 
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of making that transition. Going public meant abandoning pure education and tarbiyah in 
order to interact with the rest of society, with all its leanings and trends that needless to say 
differed from those of the Muslim Brotherhood. The foundational generation had been 
raised on the principles of daʿwah and the conflict between good and evil and that it was a 
matter of life or death was drastically different from the values espoused by the rest of 
society. Some members of the Muslim Brotherhood would object to going public and 
would rather stop at tarbiya, so al-Masar put forward the idea of opening gradually 
through a transitional period so that the leadership could comprehend its magnitude and 
successfully tackle the challenges and obstacles that the organization would face during 
the transition. 
The letter “Sinaʿat al-Hayat” [the Making of Life] letter that al-Rashid wrote in the 1990s 
was different from all his previous work. For the first time, he was proposing a renewal of 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s organisational strategies following the greater degree of 
openness that the Muslim Brotherhood was experiencing in several Arab countries. The 
letter explained for the first time how the Muslim Brotherhood should act after assuming 
power as the Sinaʿat al-Hayat, which echoed al-Banna’s “professorship of the world.” 
Both notions rested on an Islamic approach to various aspects of life (the economy, 
literature, art, think tanks, etc.) that were made possible only by educating and preparing a 
generation capable of carrying out these tasks. It would also need to win the trust of the 
public and plan for the future. Al-Rashid called upon more public works and for the first 
time referred to the global nature of the movement and its battle against other international 
organizations, such as the Zionist movement and the World Council of Churches.
219
 
This novel approach by al-Rashid took the movement a step further towards theorizing 
statehood and civilisation and not just the way the organisation should be run. He argued 
that change could only start on a micro-level through preparing leaders capable of 
assuming positions of power at the level of the state or bigger. He was still clearly 
preoccupied with the notion of monopolising power, although to a lesser extent than 
previously. As in his previous letters, he focused on tarbiya and the importance of 
portraying Islam in the best possible light by reviving Islamic art, establishing an Islamic 
economic system and Islamic planning centres. All this would reflect the true spirit of 
Islam and its inherent beauty for all to see and compare with their current way of life.  
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3.5.6 The Challenges Faced by the Muslim Brotherhood 
From the beginning the Kuwaiti Brotherhood sought to establish a strong organization and 
avoid the mistakes of Islamist movements in other Arab countries. The focus was on 
instilling values of loyalty, obedience, and full commitment in the members. Shura was 
adopted on a non-compulsory basis, with powers concentrated in the hands of one leader to 
ensure that affairs ran smoothly. The movement also aimed to establish a strong 
intellectual and organizational approach that would pull the members together through the 
writings of Muhammed Ahmed al-Rashid and, afterwards, the movement’s curriculum 
committee. Yet none of this could prevent the occurrence of some internal conflicts. The 
absence of the culture of civil society institutions and the stringent stipulations of the 
movement with regards to secrecy led to several problems.  
The first of these was a general feeling of unease among members of the lower ranks for 
being excluded from the decision-making process, especially in relation to issues that 
impacted directly on them. During the first preliminary meetings in 1968, Abdullah al-
Nafisi objected to the non-binding nature of Shura, with this issue eventually leading him 
to decide against joining the movement. As mentioned above, with regard to Shura Aman 
had relied on studies that had been prepared by Zaidan and that he himself had published 
in his book The Principles of Daʿwah. Fathi Yakan, the General Observer of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Lebanon, shared Zaidan’s views of the matter.220 Initially, the young age of 
the members meant they had great faith in their leader, so the issue of Shura was not 
problematic. However, as time went by and as members acquired more experience and 
became more exposed to the experiences of Islamist movements in other countries, they 
demanded the matter be opened to fresh debates.   
Soon after this, Nasser had died, and as the Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt were 
released from jail they began to travel far and wide all over the Arab world, creating links 
between various Muslim Brotherhood branches intended to preserve the identity of the 
organisation under one umbrella. One of the most important principles of global Muslim 
Brotherhood was the binding nature of Shura. The question was therefore resolved in 
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Kuwait since the organisation there became increasingly linked with the global Muslim 
Brotherhood in which Kuwait had a representative in the early 1980s.
221
 
The second problem that the Muslim Brotherhood had to face for a long time was related 
to the global nature of the movement. Abdullah al-ʿAqil, whose Muslim Brotherhood 
background had been acquired during his years of study in Cairo, believed in the 
universality of Islam and the globalisation of the Muslim Brotherhood daʿwah. As such, 
the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood should include members from various Arab nationalities, 
especially the Palestinians almost half a million of whom were living in Kuwait at the 
time.
222
 The term “al-Tanzim al-Muwahhad” [the Unified Organisation] was proposed for 
referring to a movement that brought together members of various nationalities. Al-ʿAqil 
recruited new members regardless of their nationalities in a separate organization which he 
named the al-Tanzim al-Muwahhad in the late 1970s.
223
 
Aman, on the other hand, disagreed with al-ʿAqil about the realistic prospects for such a 
unified organisation in light of the social and security concerns unique to each Arab 
context; at this time the Yemeni or Syrian Muslim Brotherhood member, prior to the Hama 
massacre, was leading a relatively free life, while the Iraqi and Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood members were being persecuted both at home and abroad. Moreover, social 
conditions and the economic and social gap between Kuwaitis and foreign workers had 
negatively impacted on the relationship between the two sides. The Kuwaiti movement 
emphasised the existence of such social differences but members of al-Tanzim al-
Muwahhad rejected these claims as racist.
224
 
Due to al-ʿAqil’s good relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, he succeeded 
in persuading them that the Unified Organisation was the true representative of Kuwait in 
the Global Muslim Brotherhood. However, the Kuwaiti branch sent a delegation to Egypt 
to present their point of view to The Global Muslim Brotherhood which was forced to send 
a representative to find a solution to the problem. The representative’s arrival was 
followed shortly after by the arrival of al-Murshed himself (who at that time was ʿUmar al-
Telmisani). This was because of the importance to the Global Muslim Brotherhood of the 
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Kuwaiti branch, based mainly on its publishing of the journal al-Mujtamaʿ [the Society] 
which was the Muslim Brotherhood’s only platform for publishing their views. A 
compromise was reached whereby an office was establishing to bring together the Kuwaiti 
Muslim Brotherhood, al-Tanzim al-Muwahhad, and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood 
in Kuwait which had refused to participate in the Unified Organisation due to the special 
nature of the Palestinian question. Time proved the Kuwaiti movement right, since each 
community was more concerned with its own set of issues while earning their living 
drained all the energy of foreign Arab workers. Eventually, the Kuwaiti branch became the 
only legitimate representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait in the office of the 
Global Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1980s.
225
 
The biggest problem facing the Muslim Brotherhood was the emergence of the Salafi 
movement which began to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood over control of the 
social domain. The Wahhabi branch of Salafia thinking was a familiar presence in Kuwaiti 
society which had elements originating in Najd, the birthplace of the Wahhabi movement. 
The Wahhabi ideology did not spread very much because Kuwait’s shaikhs were more 
influenced by al-Hasa and the reformist trends mentioned above. Also, the Kuwaiti society 
had historically adopted a negative stance toward Wahabism because of the several wars 
between Kuwait and the movement. Therefore, the social domain remained dominated by 
the reformists, secularists and Islamists. The emergence of the Salafis had a bigger impact 
on the Muslim Brotherhood than the secular nationalists had done since Salafis share 
aspects of their own mission (mosques, fatwa, charity, daʿwah, etc.) with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The Salafi trend began with the teachings of ʿAbdulkhaliq and al-Ashqar 
who transmitted the Salafi-Wahhabi mode of thought from the Islamic University in 
Medina in Saʿudi Arabia. Although neither was affiliated with any particular movement or 
party, the Salafi influence was evident in their teachings and this encouraged many young 
men to examine it further. Among these men were Musaʿid al-ʿAbduljadir and Abdullah 
al-Sabt who had a small group that differed from that of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
There were no major disagreements between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis 
between 1965 (when al-Ashqar and ʿAbdulkhaliq arrived) and the early 1970s, simply 
because the Salafi movement did not have any particular leaders (al-Ashqar and 
ʿAbdulkhaliq never identified themselves as Salafis). Most of the shaikhs and Islamist 
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leaders were either from the Muslim Brotherhood or were influenced by them. But the 
arrival of al-Rashid in 1974 changed everything. He began writing articles in al-Mujtamaʿ 
journal in addition to delivering lectures at al-Islah, while his teachings included references 
to many Sufists such as Ibrahim bin Adham and al-Harith al-Muhasabi. Quoting ascetics 
and Sufists did not appeal to ʿAbdulkhaliq who, with his Wahhabi background, had fought 
fiercely against Sufism in the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, Wahhabism had emerged as a 
response to the Wahhabist belief that Sufism tarnished the purity of Islam. In reaction to 
al-Rashid, ʿAbulkhaliq also wrote articles in al-Mujtamaʿ attacking al-Rashid’s Sufist 
references. ʿAbdulkhaliq also delivered a lecture at al-Islah warning against the dangers of 
Sufism. This open form of criticism was the exception rather than the norm among Islamist 
movements whose members preferred to discuss these matters in the framework of a small 
circle of people rather than publicly.  
Al-Rashid’s response reflected Newton’s third law “for every action there is an equal and 
opposite”. He wrote another series of articles in al-Mujtamaʿ defending the Sufist figures 
to whom he had alluded in his previous writings. For almost a month and a half the two 
men argued openly on the pages of al-Mujtamaʿ,thereby creating a great deal of confusion 
among the small Islamist movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. Eventually the 
leadership decided to try and resolve the matter amicably. To summon A meeting was 
summoned by Aman, and was held in his presence, with al-Ashqar as arbiter between the 
two parties. Following several hours of heated debate al-Ashqar finally acknowledged that 
the Sufist figures that al-Rashid had mentioned were among Islam’s most prominent 
symbols of piety and that drawing upon such legacy was very favourable.
226
 
ʿAbdulkhaliq did not take too well to this change of mind, especially from his long-time 
friend who had been with him in Jordan, Medina and Kuwait, and gradually withdrew 
from al-Islah. He attracted a group of young men who found in him a mentor and a leader 
and, for the first time, the Salafi movement emerged as a real entity with a well-educated 
leader.
227
 
This point in the mid-1970s marked the beginning of a ferocious conflict between the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis which reached epic proportions in the mid-1980s as a 
result of Salafi attempts to dominate the social domain, especially among religious Sunnis. 
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Kuwaiti salafis opened the door to the Wahhabi creed and facilitated its penetration of 
Kuwaiti society, by inviting Saʿudi shaikhs to visit Kuwaiti, and publishing books and 
tapes by Salafi figures as Muhammed bin ʿAbdulwahhab, the movement’s founder, and 
other modern figures such as ʿAbdulʿaziz bin Baz and Muhammed bin Othaimeen from 
Saʿudi Arabia and Nassereddin al-Albani from Jordan. The Salafis considered themselves 
the heirs to the Wahhabi movement in Kuwait and were very popular among Najdi and 
tribal Kuwaitis who were a natural extension of the Wahhabi movement. The movement 
had originated in Najd and was later joined by a number of tribes who were known as “the 
brothers of the believers in Allah” or “the Brothers”, although they were different from the 
Muslim Brotherhood. As well as appealing to those two sectors of society the Salafi 
movement competed with the Muslim Brotherhood for control over mosques and various 
other religious platforms (see Chapter IV for a detailed account of these struggles). 
These internal problems affected the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait although without 
leading to the collapse of the movement as happened in several other countries. This may 
have been due to the success of the founders in building a strong organisation on a solid 
base; similarly, the great trust placed in the leadership nipped any criticisms in the bud. 
Because the organisation had been able to establish the solid core it had aspired to from the 
start, its members were highly disciplined and committed to their leadership, despite its 
centralised nature, while their administrative and intellectual skills, following years of 
training, were of the highest calibre. Undoubtedly, drawing from the same resources 
helped to create a harmonious atmosphere among members and the long time they had 
spent together had fostered strong ties between them. 
3.5.7 Shifting to a more Open Era 
At the end of the 1970s, almost ten years after the establishment of the new organization, 
members began to debate whether it was time to increase their public profile by entering a 
phase of more openness. Most of these new ideas were proposed by members who had 
studied abroad, especially in the West, while many members had matured from 
inexperienced young men to fully-integrated members of society with a different outlook 
on virtually everything. And since Kuwait enjoyed a relatively good margin of freedom, 
there seemed no reason to remain underground. However, several members were 
apprehensive about this proposed openness and questioned its nature and its methods. 
Many had been encouraged to join the organization because of its secretive nature and it 
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was therefore paramount for them to protect the movement from government agents, 
infiltrators and moles.
228
 
The debate between opponents and proponents of more openness lasted for quite some 
time but eventually the decision was taken to engage in partial openness by participating in 
professional associations and diwaniyyas.  Involvement in the former succeeded, but the 
movement did not gain success with the latter, as is discussed in later chapters. The 
Muslim Brotherhood also engaged in a restructuring process in order to include a branch 
for women that was linked directly with the movement’s leader, but the most prominent 
change was the establishment of a social work department which recruited members who 
had had long experience in training young men and who were now called upon to spread 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s message among society as a whole. Social work was highly 
specialised with each sector undertaking a specific mission (teachers, politicians, unionists, 
etc.). The Muslim Brotherhood also debated the issue of nominating some of their 
members for the Kuwaiti parliament, and it was decided to go ahead and field candidates, 
despite objections by some senior figures that the movement was not yet ready for political 
life. 
However, the movement’s ultimate mission remained the education and tarbiya of young 
men and women, which made it quite difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood to make the 
transition to a new stage under the same leadership of educators. A fear of politics and a 
preference for education and training led many Muslim Brotherhood members to remain 
attached to the old system. Despite the change of leadership in 1988, when 
ʿAbdulwahidAman handed over the reins to Jasim Muhalhal al-Yasin, one of the members 
of the solid base that had been formed by Aman, the general pace of the movement 
remained more or less the same until the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait which changed the 
history of the region and by default, the Muslim Brotherhood.
229
 
3.6 The Muslim Brotherhood and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait   
On 2August 1991, Iraqi troops launched an army offensive and occupied Kuwait, 
whereupon Iraq’s leader, President Saddam Hussein, proclaimed that Kuwait was now 
‘Governorate 19’ of the Iraqi Republic. The Kuwaiti Emir, shaikh Jaber al-Subah and his 
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Crown Prince shaikh Saʿad al-Subah, took up residence in Taʾif in Saʿudi Arabia. The 
shock of this attack hit the Kuwaiti people very hard; many were abroad on holiday and 
had no means of contacting their families back home, while fear drove many others to flee 
the country.  The Muslim Brotherhood’s first reaction was to call for an emergency 
meeting, at which members of the leadership who were in Kuwait at the time resolved to 
stay in the country and offer support to the Kuwaiti people. The movement was 
geographically restructured to facilitate the delivery of services and aid, and also played a 
major role in offering religious and moral support to anxious Kuwaitis.  
In collaboration with certain Kuwaitis, the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood then established 
“al-Murabitun” [The Steadfast] movement whose objectives were to: 
1. Liberate Kuwait and reinstate its legitimate rulers; 
2. Encourage people to stay in Kuwait; 
3. Offer support to those still left in Kuwait; 
4. Plan Kuwait’s future according to the teachings of Allah.230 
Al-Murabitun’s work was divided between two sections: a military wing, known as the 
“Kuwaiti Popular Resistance,” with a group of Kuwaiti army officers headed by Major 
General Khalid Budai; and a civilian wing, “the Social Solidarity Committee”. Due to the 
dangerous security situation and the possibility of arrest, the two wings were kept 
completely separate through a hierarchical cluster structure. The popular resistance was led 
by non-Brotherhood army officers, while the solidarity committee was managed by the 
Muslim Brotherhood who had extensive experience in that sphere. The literature of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, especially the works written by Qutb during his periods of 
imprisonment in Nasser’s Egypt, had prepared the movement for these tough conditions.231 
Kuwait embraced the Muslim Brotherhood during the occupation because of its highly 
competent organization and spread throughout the whole society. The movement had 
branches all over Kuwait and was very successful at running the country’s affairs with the 
help of various sectors of the community. The first branch of the Solidarity Committee was 
established in Bayan and Mishrif, areas in which many Muslim Brotherhood leaders and 
members lived, and many Kuwaitis volunteered in the Solidarity Committee which was 
directly managed by the organization. The committee’s name was intentional as it avoided 
giving any political or military undertones to its agenda, which was concerned solely with 
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charity and offering social services. Initially the mosques were the springboard for all the 
committee’s activities and resistance movements, since it was natural for people to gather 
there five times a day without arousing suspicion.  The work of the Solidarity Committee 
was divided into various domains: 
1. The Service Sector 
Following the invasion most of the foreign labour force, which had previously held the 
majority of jobs in Kuwait, fled the country The Solidarity Committee invited Kuwaitis to 
operate the necessary basic services and called on people with various skills to help keep 
major facilities operational. For the first time, Kuwaitis had to rely on themselves to do 
various jobs. Some of the facilities and services operated by Kuwaitis were: 
a. Cooperatives and Bakeries 
Cooperatives represented the main source of foodstuffs and other daily needs such as gas. 
Kuwaitis kept the cooperatives running for a while until the Iraqi authorities issued orders 
banning voluntary work. This prompted the Solidarity Committee to reject the orders and 
resort to trickery to avoid being caught. On 22January 1991 the Iraqi authorities began to 
supply goods but only to holders of Iraqi ration cards so as to force Kuwaitis to apply for 
them. The cooperatives responded, before the decision came into effect, by supplying 
sufficient rations to last people for several months. Also, a number of volunteers were 
trained to manage bakeries owned by the Kuwaiti Flour Company. The Iraqi authorities 
tried to fabricate crises such as bread shortages to put an end to civil strife but bakers 
frequently hid bread from the Iraqi army to be distributes later among Kuwaitis.
232
 
b. Waste Collection  
Locals collaborated with the Solidarity Committee to collect waste from residential areas. 
Special cars were used for this purpose until confiscated by the Iraqi authorities; the 
Solidarity Committee then allocated special locations in various areas for the collecting 
and burning of waste. 
c. Managing the Red Crescent Society 
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The Solidarity Committee, in collaboration with members of the Red Crescent Society,
233
 
reopened the Society’s facilities and re-launched their services to offer assistance at 
centres for people with specials needs and the elderly. The Committee also played a major 
role in providing medical supplies for hospitals and health centres, in addition to their 
contribution to the treatment of the injured and passing on secret information. 
2. Humanitarian Efforts 
As a means of divesting the occupation of any legitimacy, one of Kuwait’s most important 
civil disobedience strategies was refusal to work. In an attempt to impose a sense of 
normalcy on the country, the Iraqi authorities had called upon Kuwaiti citizens to return to 
work. Boycotting the new government in this way meant that Kuwaitis lost their main 
source of income, forcing them to seek alternatives. The situation was much easier for 
Kuwaitis abroad as they could rely on aid from other Gulf countries and the government of 
Kuwait in Taʾif. Therefore, one of the Solidarity Committee’s main tasks was to ensure 
that Kuwaiti families who stayed at home were receiving enough money to sustain them. 
Many Kuwaiti merchants and members of the ruling family contributed to providing 
families with money and basic foodstuffs. A list sent by the Committee to the Crown 
Prince Shaikh Sa’ad in Taʾif revealed that more than 50 million Iraqi dinars were 
distributed among Kuwaitis living in thirty residential areas in Kuwait.
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The Solidarity Committee also played a humanitarian role in keeping channels of 
communication open with the Iraqi authorities regarding Kuwaiti prisoners of war who 
were being held for various reasons. Visits were organised to enable families to go to see 
family members in Iraqi prisons in Baʿquba, Ramadi, al-Rashīd and Mosul. The 
Committee also provided the families of POW’s with financial assistance and food, and 
were also successful in securing the release of a number of POW’s before they were 
transferred to Iraq. 
3. Raising Awareness and Providing Social Services 
With the departure of many Arab imams and muezzins after the invasion, a number of 
locals volunteered to perform the calls to prayer and deliver sermons. The Solidarity 
Committee organised a variety of social and religious activities at mosques to provide 
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locals with some form of useful entertainment and a meeting place where they could 
exchange news and information away from the prying eyes of the Iraqi army.  
Following the Occupation a number of fiqh questions were raised pertaining to dealings 
with the Occupation authorities, the legitimacy of resistance, using the property of 
Kuwaitis living abroad at the time, burying the dead, prisoners of war, and other issues. 
The Solidarity Committee formed a religious committee (including Ajil al-Nashmi, 
ʿUmaral-Ashqar, Muhammad Abdulghaffar al-Sharif, Jasim al-Yasin, and others) to issue 
fatwas as appropriate.
235
 
The most difficult questions were those related to whether Allah would sanction killing 
members of the Iraqi army (since killing another Muslim is a great sin), and whether it was 
acceptable for Kuwaitis to leave the country if they had a legitimate reason to do so. 
Fatwas sanctioning resistance and killing the enemy were based on the Qurʾanic verse, 
Indeed, the penalty for those who wage war against Allah and 
His Messenger and strive upon earth [to cause] corruption is 
none but that they be killed or crucified or that their hands 
and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be exiled 
from the land. That is for them a disgrace in this world; and 
for them in the Hereafter is a great punishment (5:33). 
The fatwa warned against carrying out military operations near residential areas in order to 
avoid endangering the lives of locals. Another fatwa was issued allowing those who 
needed to leave the country to do, so while emphasizing the importance of staying put for 
those who had no reason to leave. Due to the suspension of the court system, cases of 
various types were adjudicated by the committee.  
Al-Murabitun issued a magazine to boost morale and encourage people remain steadfast in 
the face of adversity, although the publishers were forced to issue it from London to avoid 
persecution. Despite the Iraqi authorities’ attempts to ban it, the magazine was distributed 
at mosques, and in markets and other public places. The Solidarity Committee also put out 
a DEED (Daily Event Digest) which offered a detailed account of people’s daily lives 
under occupation.  
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3.7 The Post-Invasion Era 
The work of al-Murabitun during the invasion of Kuwait meant that the Muslim 
Brotherhood made huge strides in social integration. All the former barriers (courtesy of 
obsolete theories that described society as ignorant and alienating) between the movement 
and society were effectively removed, thus giving the Muslim Brotherhood far wider 
exposure as people got to know them and their work much better. The organization itself 
also experienced a greater degree of openness by the sheer force of circumstances rather 
than through any previous planning.  Seizing the opportunity to raise the ceiling of their 
ambitions, the Muslim Brotherhood announced the establishment of a political wing, to be 
known as The Islamic Constitutional Movement, ICM. A number of social and youth 
committees were also established as part of their plans to impose a new social reality 
through opening up into society.   
While the post-invasion era was marked by more openness in social and political work, the 
organizational part remained less conspicuous because of their pervasive fear of any 
backlash and in light of the persecution that had been faced by the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, Syria and some Gulf countries. The Muslim Brotherhood also preferred to establish 
a number of fronts under their own supervision and without announcing themselves as an 
organization, regarding this as a transitional step toward a complete declaration of the 
movement. 
The new phase did not fundamentally affect the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood. It 
retained its old divisions into educational, social, political, and women’s sections, although 
all of them were expanded and acquired more formal fronts to attract a bigger number of 
followers. The Muslim Brotherhood did not consider it necessary to restructure the 
movement, especially in light of the huge success they had enjoyed with al-Murabitun and 
the Social Solidarity Committee. 
The real change occurred in the relationship between the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood and 
other branches in Jordan and the Sudan who had supported Saddam Hussein’s occupation 
of Kuwait. The Kuwaiti branch expressed its great dismay at the failure of the Global 
Muslim Brotherhood to adopt a decisive position vis-à-vis the Iraqi occupation of the 
country. Prior to the Iraqi invasion, local Muslim Brotherhood movements had generally 
accepted the guidance and directives of the Global Office but decisions pertaining to 
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certain local issues were left to the discretion of the Muslim Brotherhood in any given 
country.  However, the lack of any clear condemnation of the Iraqi invasion by Egypt, the 
Global Office, and the Sudanese and Jordanian branches angered the Kuwaiti Brotherhood 
which decided to freeze its membership in the Global Office. They also launched a fierce 
attack against the Jordanian and Sudanese branches and a number of Islamic figures who 
had supported the Iraqi invasion, and the Global Office was equally criticized for having 
failed to support Kuwait in its plight.  
After the Kuwaiti government in Taʾif had called upon the United States and western 
countries to intervene to end the Iraqi occupation the Global Office and many Muslim 
Brotherhood branches undoubtedly found themselves in quite an embarrassing position. 
This was because Islamists, and especially the Muslim Brotherhood, had always criticized 
the colonial and imperial ambitions of Western countries.  It was therefore very hard to 
accept the idea of foreign intervention against a fellow Arab country like Iraq even if the 
purpose was to liberate Kuwait. The Global Office had proposed an Arab solution to the 
crisis and the replacing of Western military power with armies from Muslim countries, but 
this idea was rejected by the Kuwaitis who did not think it was particularly viable.  
3.8 Conclusion    
Compared with its neighbours, Kuwait is a young and very small country; this placed it in 
a position to be influenced by, rather than to influence, others in the fields of politics, 
economics and ideas, a fact that had a considerable effect on the Kuwaiti Muslim 
Brotherhood. During the 50 years that followed its establishment, the movement went 
through many changes. Like the mother organization in Egypt, it was quite open during its 
formative stages, but soon fell victim to internal struggles that were actually an extension 
of the same problems that were confronting the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Political 
events in the Arab world also affected the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood and prompted the 
members to resort to secrecy following the persecution of their counterparts in Egypt and 
Iraq, and especially as their new leadership had actually come from Iraq. The movement 
then sought to rebuild the organization through a solid core that could spread the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s message all over Kuwait under the veil of secrecy. Despite the benefits 
gained by the organization from the invasion of Kuwait, which had won them considerable 
popularity and public trust, most of their attempts to work openly ended in failure, since 
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the members were afraid of being infiltrated by the government and other parties. The 
older members had also become used to doing things in the traditional way and were not 
willing to change. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s success in establishing a strong organization led them to aspire 
to control the social domain by expanding their social base and changing some of the 
stereotypes propagated by Nasser and the nationalists in the consciousness of Kuwaitis.  
Some of these stereotypes were tackled by appealing to a youngergeneration of men who 
went on to spread the Muslim Brotherhood’s message among other young men through Al-
Islah, which represented the voice of Islamists in Kuwait. The Muslim Brotherhood also 
succeeded in becoming influential in various social and professional associations, and its 
social activities played a similar role in changing these stereotypes, before it began to 
consider entering the political domain. 
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Chapter IV 
Social Activism 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait was not an anomaly, given the 
history of Islamic reformist movements which had been active for decades in Kuwait. The 
Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood was an extension of the Islamic reformist project that began 
with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashīd Rida. Its pronounced aims 
were to reform society by overcoming the state of intellectual and educational inertia, and 
to open up to other cultures to keep pace with progress in other parts of the world. It also 
aimed to improve the status of women whose lives were governed by very strict and 
traditional modes of thinking. Islamists considered women as part and parcel of any 
attempt to advance society without that advance jeopardising core Islamic values. The 
Islamist project was quite hostile to western ideas which viewed the notion of an Islamic 
civilisation as an oxymoron. It was equally opposed to secularism and its attempts to 
introduce new systems of social values. Thus, Islamist movements, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood, developed in the context of heated debates about intellectual and moral 
frames of reference.  Events in the region had a direct impact on intellectual and political 
life in Kuwait which was too small to be influential but big enough to be influenced by 
events in neighbouring countries.  The reformist Islamic project and later on the Muslim 
Brotherhood succeeded in dominating the social domain, as reformists like Shaikh Yusif 
bin ʿIsa and Shaikh ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid spread their vision of Islamist reform at the 
expense of the traditional Islamists.  
In this context, the ‘social domain’ refers to all matters related to people’s spiritual and 
social lives. The ‘religious establishment’ was represented by religious scholars, jurists, 
teachers, Sufis and others, who were concerned with spreading the teachings of Islam. The 
history of Islam has been rife with examples of the domination of the religious 
establishment over the social domain. For example, jurists laid down the principles of 
jurisprudence on the basis of their own understanding of the Qurʾan and Sunnah which, 
with the consideration of the passing of time and differences between contexts, were the 
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main pillars of the religious establishment and spread throughout the Muslim World. After 
the death of the Prophet, a substantial jurisprudential tradition was amassed, and jurists 
remained the only source of jurisprudence and the legal codes that regulated all aspects of 
a Muslim’s life. Since judges were chosen from among well-known jurists, the judiciary 
was thus put under the control of the religious establishment as well. Mystics and ascetics, 
represented mainly by the Sufis, played a major role in spreading Muslim values and moral 
codes among populations. Mosques occupied a prominent position as beacons of spiritual 
and cultural identities, especially as many Muslims performed all five daily prayers at 
mosques; naturally these were under the control of the religious establishment. No 
authority (legal, military, ruling, etc.) dared to transgress into the social domain, which 
would have rejected them since they lacked the knowledge-base and/or the qualifications 
to take over the social domain. On the contrary, it was often the case that jurists were 
active in politics. In general, any ruling elite needed the legitimacy bestowed upon them by 
religious scholars and jurists in return for the latter holding free rein over the social 
domain.
236
 
In Kuwait, the religious establishment played the same role; however, a new generation of 
Islamists challenged the traditional conservative Islamists who were accustomed to 
controlling the religious establishment. The reformist Islamists found themselves engaged 
in a prolonged competition with the traditional conservatives and eventually the reformists 
won control over the social domain. However, another competitor, the seculars, then 
arrived on the scene with a secular project that threatened the authority of the religious 
establishment over the social domain. The Islamists then found themselves engaged in a 
lengthy and severe fight with the secularists over the social domain. Meanwhile the 
Islamists were also competing with each other over the social domain. In this ‘internal’ 
struggle the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded for a while in dominating the Islamic social 
domain until the emergence of the Salafi movement which, in its turn, vied with the 
Muslim Brotherhood over control of the religious establishment and social domain.  
 
 
                                                     
236
Stéphane Lacroix discusses the notion of the ‘domain’ with reference to Saʿudi Arabian society.  His 
bookcategorises Saʿudi society into political and social domains, with the social domainincluding the cultural 
and religious domains. Stéphane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in 
Contemporary Saʿudi Arabia, trans. George Holoch (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
  128 
4.2 The Muslim Brotherhood: a Continuation of Religious Establishment and Heirs to 
the Islamist project 
The Islamist reformist project in Kuwait was represented by religious figures such as 
shaikh Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi and shaikh ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Rushaid and was initially met 
with fierce resistance from traditional conservative religious forces that had hitherto held 
full sway over the social domain. By the 1930s, the reformist movement, including both 
Islamist and nationalist groups, succeeded with time in imposing its will on the social 
domain while the ruling family retained full authority over the political domain. The ideas 
of the Islamist reformist movement influenced the Muslim Brotherhood through the 
friendship between al-Qinaʿi and ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ. Both the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the reformist movement took their inspiration from the same source; the school of 
Rashīd Rida. While the Islamic figures of the reformist movement, such as al-Qinaʿi, were 
preoccupied with the affairs of daily life, especially jurisprudence, the newly-emerged 
Muslim Brotherhood had the task of spreading the message of Islam (daʿwah). The 
Muslim Brotherhood began by forming the first group of young Muslim Brotherhood 
members at the end of the 1940s and established al-Irshad as the official front for their 
activities. Daʿwah extended to all aspects of social, cultural, religious and intellectual life 
and served to further the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood over the social domain. 
4.3 The Muslim Brotherhood and Social Movement Theory 
Social Movement theory provides useful tools for demonstrating the functions of Islamist 
movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement employed a variety of 
approaches mostly within domains controlled by Islamist movements such as mosques, 
schools, and charity organisations to mobilise the Kuwaiti street. The Muslim Brotherhood 
added new tools inspired by the mother organisation in Egypt (a pyramid organisational 
structure, usra system, etc.). Munson observes that the Muslim Brotherhood used a mix of 
these tools, noting that the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood and the family system 
were crucial elements in the struggle against the secularist cultural invasion. The Kuwaiti 
Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in establishing a set of cultural discourses unique to them 
through these tools and channels. Their efforts transformed Kuwaiti society, which became 
increasingly more pious and religiously committed. Both Bayat and Munson argue that 
existing literature on social movement theory cannot fully explain the Islamist activism in 
Muslim communities, not because Muslim communities are too unique to fit into any 
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framework, but because those theories tend to be more ‘Westocentric’ rather than 
global.
237
 Most of these theories, except for Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), assume 
that social movements emerge in a relatively liberal and democratic political system, while 
this is not the case in many parts of the world including the Muslim World. While 
authoritarianism is rooted in political systems from Morocco to Indonesia, Islamist 
movements are very active on different levels and forms. A new theory is, therefore, 
needed to explain this massive activism under such authoritarian political systems. Bayat 
develops a new way of understanding Islamist activism under what he refers to as the 
theory of ‘imagined solidarity.’ Bayat asserts that Islamist activism is fluid and based on a 
general consensus on major issues such as justice and equality. However, when it comes to 
the details, actors differ from each other in their perceptions of these issues because of 
their different experiences and ways of life.  Because of these differences, Bayat argues 
that there is an ‘imagined solidarity’ among people in general and Islamist activists 
specifically, toward general issues such as the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. Therefore, the 
mechanism of mobilization could take any form, from a spontaneous collective action to 
organized resource mobilization tactics and strategies. This cohesive opinion on particular 
issues unites different social sectors as witnessed during the Islamic revolution in Iran 
where all social sectors united behind Khomeini against the Shah. Bayat’s ‘imagined 
solidarity’ fits the Kuwaiti context during the 1980s and 1990s when the public embraced 
Islamist ideas presented by the Islamists especially the Muslim Brotherhood. An important 
indication of the application of the ‘imagined solidarity’ was the rising popularity of Hijab 
among girls in Kuwait University. Less than 10 girls were wearing the Hijab in the early 
1970s compared to hundreds in the mid- 1980s and thousands ten years later.  
Munson provides a different scope for studying Islamist activism in his study of the 
emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from the 1930s to 1950s. The Muslim 
Brotherhood started out of the sight of the government for internal and external factors 
such as World War II. However, in the aftermath of WWII, the Egyptian government 
during King Farouq’s reign cruelly repressed the Muslim Brotherhood leaders. This 
repression, in contrast to the assumptions of New Social Movement Theory, Collective 
Behaviour, and the other theories, did not stop the activity and mobilization process of this 
movement either nationally or internationally. Munson argues that the secret of this 
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success lies in the integration between the message of the Muslim Brotherhood and its 
organizational structure. The interaction between the message and the structure is 
represented in the movement’s resonance with ordinary people’s beliefs and needs to be 
placed under an Islamist theoretical frame and a pragmatic program. Simple beliefs such as 
expelling Zionists from Palestine, countering the cultural westernization project in Egypt 
and the Muslim World, and reforming or removing the British-controlled government of 
King Farouq were interpreted in an Islamic way. This Islamic labelling of such issues was 
projected upon Islamist projects geared to addressing each problem. For instance, the 
project to counter-attack the cultural project of Westernizing Egypt was carried out by 
launching daʿwah [preaching of Islam] as a medium to propagate the Muslim Brotherhood 
message among people. Munson reveals an interesting confidential report by the US State 
Department by State Department informants from 1954 in Egypt : 
The most interesting part of our conversation dealt with the manner in which the 
Ikhwan [The Muslim Brotherhood] carries on its propaganda work in the rural 
areas. Either in a written document or by word of mouth the Ikhwan’s line on 
current issues is sent to all rural centers where it is explained to four or five fairly 
literate leaders capable of explaining the issues to others and defending it if 
necessary. These leaders, in turn, each contact approximately one hundred fellow 
Ikhwanis and pass on the information. Subsequently it is spread in a less organized 
fashion among the people by both Ikhwanis and non-Ikhwanis. He [the member of 
the Muslim Brotherhood] claimed that this mechanism for spreading information is 
very effective because travellers to rural areas were always in good supply. 
Therefore, the transmission of information presents no problem.
238
 
 
From this document it is evident that daʿwah represents the product of the interaction 
between the message and the structure in what Munson calls ‘the federate structure of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’.  Nonetheless, Munson does not rely only on the interconnection 
between message and structure, he also explains how the Muslim Brotherhood seizes 
opportunities according to the political opportunity structure such as the case when the 
Muslim Brotherhood filled the vacuum after the weakening of the Wafd Party in the mid 
1940s until its collapse in 1952. Although the Muslim Brotherhood did not present itself as 
a political party, it filled a political vacuum and prepared the masses for an inevitable coup 
d’état by the Free Officers in 1952. 
                                                     
238
U.S. Department of State (USDS). 1949. Confidential Central Files, Egypt, 1954, No. 564, Washington, 
DC.  
  131 
Both Bayat and Munson offer interesting insights into Islamist social movement theory. 
However, these need to be tested in relation to other movements across the region and 
developed in order to provide the basics for an Islamist Social Movement Theory. Bayat 
stresses going beyond simple analysis of the text using an anthropological approach to a 
more intricate examination of the circumstances surrounding the text: its production, 
transmission, and reception. This leads to the study of the daily dynamics of the social 
movement to trace the development of strategies, tactics, and even ideas, which result in 
understanding the way an Islamist social movement’s goal progresses from the social to 
the political. The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait has a rich experience different from the 
Egyptian or Iraqi branches of the movement. Different factors influenced the development 
of the movement in Kuwait such as the relationship with the ruling family, the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91. Studying the 
context within which the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait has developed helps also with 
setting basics for Islamist social movement theory. 
Munson argues that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is an Islamist political party that 
emerged in a repressive political environment. In the Kuwaiti context, this view does not 
apply to the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood because the movement never 
witnessed real repression by the ruling family. Although the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Kuwait possesses its own political views and actions, the movement should not be 
considered as only a political party. Between the 1960s and the mid-1980s, most of the 
political literature of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait and Islamists in general discussed 
international and regional political affairs, specifically the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
Western socio-political threat against Islam and Muslim societies. In this literature, 
countering Western hegemony is a manifestation of the real incentive that drives the 
Muslim Brotherhood as a movement to protect the identity of the Muslim World from the 
religio-cultural threat. The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait is a social movement that aims 
to reassert the influence of the religious establishment over the social domain through 
various channels, including politics.  
4.4 Intellectual and Educational Activities of al-Irshad, 1952-1958 
The intellectual issues on which al-Irshad focused its attention were society and 
international politics. Domestically, social issues dominated the discourse of al-Irshad, and 
included the promotion of education, health and hygiene, and the celebration of religious 
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and social events such as Mawlid and Hijri New Year.  Internationally, al-Irshad addressed 
the issues of imperialism, Zionism in Palestine, and Islamist movements in other countries. 
Intellectual activities took different shapes; organizing lectures, publishing al-Irshad 
journal, and educating an unschooled population, thereby increasing the rate of literacy. 
For the members of al-Irshad, Muhammad Salīm designed a special preparatory 
programme that was intellectually and spiritually rigorous. 
During the early 1950s, al-Irshad’s main activity was organizing its twice-weekly lectures, 
generally held on Saturdays and Tuesdays. Muhammad Salīm was in charge of organizing 
the lectures and they were introduced by Muhammad Budai. Many lecturers contributed to 
these weekly events, including Ahmad al-Khamis, Yusifal-Rifaʿi, ʾAli al-Jassar, and 
Ahmad al-Duʿaij from Kuwait; Ahmad al-Sharabasi239 and ʾAli ʿAbdulmunʾim 
ʿAbdulhamid (a teacher at Kuwait’s Religious Academy) from Egypt; and Sulaiman al-
Hamad from Palestine (a Mathematics and English teacher in Kuwait), whose lectures 
focused on the Palestinian cause. Al-Irshad also invited guests from other countries such as 
Muhammadal-Sawwaf (the General Observer of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq), 
Muhammad Bashir al-Ibrahimi (the chief of the Society of Muslim Ulama in Algeria) and 
his colleague in Alfudailal-Wartilani. The weekly lectures attracted many people and 
audience numbers increased from week to week reaching as many as 500 people. In 
addition to the weekly lectures, the members of al-Irshad used to give speeches and 
sermons after regular prayers at various mosques in Kuwait, from the north in al-Jahrah to 
the south in al-Fahahil, and on the Island of Failakah, as well in the city of Kuwait itself. 
In addition, the publishing of al-Irshad journal by al-Irshad was crucial in spreading the 
Islamist ideology in Kuwait. The first edition of al-Irshad journal was in August 1953, and 
according to its founder, ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ, was to be the mouthpiece of al-Irshad 
and its ideological vehicle. Al-Irshad’s Committee for Press and Publication was in charge 
of publishing the journal and other occasional supplements. The themes and topics of the 
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journal varied, covering subjects such as imperialism, Islam in the face of capitalism and 
Marxism, women in Islam, Islamic economy, and other intellectual and social issues. 
Al-Irshad cooperated with Nadi al-Muʿallimin [Teachers Club], which was controlled by 
the Nationalists, by establishing the Society’s Committee for Eliminating Illiteracy, with 
the aim of increasing literacy rates in Kuwait. Muhammad al-ʿAdsani, ʿAbdullah Budai, 
and Mubarak Turki volunteered to teach reading and writing in the afternoons to illiterate 
people, most of whom were poor.  There were two classes, one in the building of al-Irshad 
and the other at the Religious Academy of Kuwait, and both were managed by the Society 
Committee for Eliminating Illiteracy.   
For the members of al-Irshad, Salīm designed a special programme to prepare future 
preachers of Islam from among the members. Salīm explained the programme and its goals 
in al-Barnamaj al-Tawjihi (Guiding Program), which in effect became the manifesto of al-
Irshad.
240
  In the introduction to the prgramme, Salīm set out the main goal of al-Barnamaj 
al-Tawjihi saying that “[it] comes to fulfil the great goal of al-Irshad by preparing the 
members of al-Irshad by polishing their personal characters and improving their 
intellectual and spiritual skills to be able carrying the message of Islam to the world.”241   
Al-Barnamaj al-Tawjihi consisted of various chapters. For example, “Tarikh al-Daʿwah” 
[History of Daʿwah] reviewed the history of the call of Islam in the world, such as Islam in 
China and the Soviet Union, with a focus on modern Islamic thinkers and the movements 
of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, MuhammadʿAbduh, Rashīd Rida, and Sanusī movement; ‘The 
Reality of the Muslim World’ discussed the political, social, and economic situation of the 
Muslim world; “Tarikh al-ʿUthama’” [History of Great People] examined major figures in 
Islam such as the first and the second Caliphs Abu Bakir and ʿUmar binal-Khattab, and 
other figures like Salaḥ al-Dīn. The chapter on ‘social manners’ explained the importance 
matters like the etiquette of eating and dressing; “Akhlaq al-Daʿwah” [Morals of Daʿwah] 
addressed the morals of the daʿiyah (the preacher or carrier of the message) such as 
philanthropic propensity, work ethics, sincerity and honesty, unity and solidarity, 
understanding the problems of society, etc.; and “al-Wajib al-Shahri” [The Monthly Duty] 
focused on spiritual preparation, such as reading a chapter of the Qurʾan every day, 
completing prayers on time and other daily and recurring obligations. In addition, Salīm 
wrote several supplementary pamphlets specifically for the members, informing them of 
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special tasks and teachings, such as how to deal with each other and the relationship 
between the usar (organizational cells).
242
 
4.4.1 Youth and Students Activities 
From the beginning al-Irshad paid special attention to students to whom it devoted a 
separate section – one of the organizations three sections, the others being the financial 
section and the secretariat. From its first edition al-Irshad journal also dedicated a special 
page to students. Al-Irshad succeeded in attracting youth via sports and scouting activities 
and inculcated religious teachings through these activities. The Student Section housed the 
Sports Unit and the Scout Unit. The Sports Unit formed teams in many different sports, 
including football, volleyball, basketball, boxing, etc., which used to train in the fields of 
the Religious Academy of Kuwait and competed with teams from other clubs. Al-Irshad 
also communicated with Kuwaiti students who were studying in Egypt and introduced 
them to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, such as the occasion when al-Mutawwaʿ 
invited Kuwaiti students and Albahi al-Khuli (a prominent Muslim Brotherhood leader in 
Egypt) as a representative of Hasan al-Hudaibi, to a lunch at a restaurant in Giza.
243
 
Al-Irshad’s Scout Unit was a copy of the mother organization in Egypt and aimed to 
prepare boys and young men to fulfil the Scout promise which was altered to match the 
Muslim Brotherhood ideals.
244
 The war against Israel slanted the Scouts of the Muslim 
Brotherhood towards prepare the youth for jihad against Zionism; this led to military-like 
Scouting activities although they did not use any kind of weaponry. Al-Irshad’s Scouts 
were comparable to a military academy where military traditions and values were taught; 
however, these were presented from an Islamic perspective and given the religious term, 
Jihad. The scouts of al-Irshad used to have an annual camp in the desert for two weeks that 
included the members of Muslim Brotherhood or those who they sought to make into 
members of the movement. Scouts also participated in the Scout camps of other Muslim 
Brotherhood branches, such as the one held in Lebanon in 1953 and one that took place in 
Syria in 1954.
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4.4.2 Al-Irshad and Providing Social and Charitable Services 
Prior to the oil boom, Kuwait had lived in difficult conditions, lacking basic services such 
as health services and even clean water. Therefore, al-Irshad worked to provide some 
social services and also presented people’s needs to the government by way of al-Irshad 
journal and through personal relations with government officials. Although al-Irshad did 
not position itself as a social services organization, it worked, as needed, to solve people’s 
everyday problems. For instance, according to al-Irshad journal under the title “Fruits and 
Vegetables of Iraq”, al-Irshad took up people’s request to improve health services and 
provide clean water, fruit, and vegetables: “recently, many diseases spread in Kuwait, 
especially eyes diseases, Tuberculosis, and physiological weakness due to the lack of fruits 
and vegetables that contains needed vitamins to prevent these diseases, and al-Irshad has 
contributed resources to solving this problem.”246 
Giving to charity is an essential part of the Islamic faith and has become a landmark in 
Islamic culture. The third compulsory pillar of Islam is zakat, where every Muslim who is 
financially able must donate 2.5 percent of surplus earnings at the end of the lunar year to 
help others. Voluntary charity, sadaqah, is another form of charitable giving that is 
encouraged in Islam. Zakat and sadaqah can be invested in various ways such as through 
awqaf[Islamic religious endowments], as well as giving money directly to needy people.  
Al-Irshad created a section for charities that worked in Kuwait and abroad. Inside Kuwait, 
a group of al-Irshad members worked on gathering money from people in the streets and 
bazaars and giving it to needy people. They also launched the ‘winter clothes project’ and 
distributed winter clothing to poor people. The activities of the charity section were more 
frequent because, from the late 1940s onwards, people in Kuwait benefited from the oil 
revenues. The most notable charitable activity was supporting expelled Palestinians in 
Palestine and Jordan. The vice-president of al-Irshad, ʿAbdullah al-Mutawwaʿ, headed a 
special committee consisting of senior members of al-Irshad, such as Muhammadal-
ʿAdsani, ʿAbdullah al-Kulaib, ʿAbdulrazzaq al-Saleh, Muhammad Budai, and Ghanim al-
Shahin, all of whom dedicated their work to supporting Palestinians. Sulaiman al-Hamad 
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mentions that he and the committee used to gather money and transport it in person to 
Palestine; the funds were mainly for refugees (camps, food, medications, etc.).
247
 
As already noted, although al-Irshad suffered a period of neglect because of internal 
conflict and external pressure from the Nationalists, the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in 
wielding some influence on the social domain through a number of social media. The al-
Irshad School continued its work even after the al-Irshad Society had closed its doors. The 
Muslim Brotherhood also made up for the lack of properly-trained jurists and religious 
scholars by affording a platform to religious scholars from inside as well as outside 
Kuwait. Shaikh Yusif bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi was honorary president of al-Irshad, thus 
bestowing legitimacy and social value upon it. The relative youth of the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement meant they had little time to train scholars and jurists who could 
deal with social issues, a shortcoming they tackled later on.  
And despite the weakness of the Muslim Brotherhood and of Islamist movements in 
general from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti Muslim 
Brotherhood members exerted some sporadic efforts to keep the movement alive; Aman 
and al-ʿAqil established al-Manar Bookshop, while the Muslim Brotherhood scouting 
movement maintained some of its activities, thanks to ʿIsa Shahin and Salim Turki. More 
importantly, the Muslim Brotherhood collaborated with Islamists from other movements to 
establish The Society for Social Reform, al-Islah, as a reaction to the rise in secularism 
which sought to turn the public against all Islamists and any form of religious behaviour. 
Secularist ideas had spread quite rapidly aided by the economic and political 
circumstances of the time. 
4.5 The Impact of Oil on Changing Kuwaiti Society  
Economic development has the greatest impact on a society’s political, social and cultural 
structure, and in the case of Kuwait, society’s shift from rags to riches was both rapid and 
unexpected. For centuries, Kuwaiti society had been accustomed to a culturally and 
socially static way of life, marked by hardship and a very basic existence, but with little or 
no complaint from a highly religious society that believed firmly in fate, qismah.  Quite 
suddenly, within a brief period of time, a new generation of Kuwaitis was looking forward 
to making a clear break with the past and enjoying a better future. This break with the past 
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was greatly assisted by the economic revolution that arose out of the discovery of oil, and 
was accompanied by great intellectual and cultural changes, including the introduction of 
nationalist and left-wing ideologies that opposed the old systems of government like 
liberal capitalism and theocracies and their concomitant organisations and entities. 
Because of its traditional and tribal nature the political regime in Kuwait did not represent 
either of these systems, but this did not prevent criticism from being levelled against a 
number of political figures who epitomised the tenets of these two ideologies.  
Both urban and Bedouin elements of Kuwaiti society felt the heat of change. Urban 
society, known as the village-city society, had historically existed within the borders of the 
capital and had engaged in trade and pearl diving for a living. Bedouins, on the other hand, 
were associated with land activities such as trade with nearby regions, especially Najd, in 
addition to raising livestock.  They were often mobile, constantly on the move in search of 
grazing grounds and fresh sources of water.  Kuwaiti society, thus, comprised two distinct 
modes of living; the village-city and the desert, otherwise known as ‘society within the 
walls and outside the walls’. Notwithstanding those differences, Kuwait society was not 
completely divided along the middle, since social ties and trade between the two groups 
were very common, with differences being mostly of a cultural and political nature.  
The discovery of oil transformed the Kuwaiti economy which had hitherto relied on sea-
related and land activities such as ship-building, fishing, pearl diving, transporting goods, 
trading in dates, and other somewhat old-fashioned modes.  Oil necessitated a shift to more 
complex economic activities, such as imports and exports, construction work, and local 
and foreign investments. Oil-related activities naturally prospered with the arrival of 
American and British oil companies that had been granted concessions to drill in Kuwait, 
and the demand for an experienced labour force increased. Western engineers and experts 
settled in the district of al-Ahmadi, close to the major oil fields in the south. The economic 
boom soon attracted labour force from Arab countries such as Palestine and Egypt, and 
Asian countries like Iran, Pakistan and India. With the increase in income per capita, 
Kuwaitis abandoned what they considered menial jobs and relied increasingly on the Arab 
and Asian labour force. Although there are no official figures on the size of the economic 
activity at that time, it is estimated that the oil sector represented more than 60% of 
Kuwait's GDP in the 1960s.
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Emirate governed by an al-Subah with the support of merchants and traders, into a rentier 
state under the total political and economic control of the ruling family who tried to forge a 
reality where success and progress were closely associated with the ruling family. 
Although various ideologies competed with the ruling family in forging this new identity, 
they stood very little chance of succeeding in the face of the promise of a previously 
unimaginable luxurious lifestyle that only the ruling family and their control of the oil 
could provide.  
Kuwait’s simple and hard-working society was transformed into a greedy consumerist one 
while people from various backgrounds and cultures gradually meshed with the local 
community.  Travelling was suddenly an affordable pastime and studying abroad became 
the norm. Kuwaitis were exposed to new cultures, leading to a conflict between modernity 
and tradition, between a generation of parents who had had to struggle to make a living 
and their children, born into money, who wanted to enjoy the same lifestyle as some more 
advanced Arab and Western countries. The old city wall of Kuwait was demolished 
allowing those inside the wall to abandon their old decrepit neighbourhoods such as al-
Qibla, al-Sharq and al-Mirqab and move to the more affluent, modern, cleaner, and 
architecturally pleasant areas located outside the wall.  Bedouins also chose to leave their 
tents and settle in these modern areas.
249
 The transfer into more modern living spaces 
brought the Bedouins and city-dwellers culturally closer but did not lead to full integration;  
most city-dwellers from al-Sharq ended up living in the areas parallel to the coast line 
(from al-Dasmah to al-Salmiyya). A huge number of Kuwaitis of Najdi origin moved to 
areas like ʿAbdullah al-Salim, al-Shamiyyah, al-Nuzha and al-Faiha. Some tribes gathered 
in certain areas; al-Reshaida and Mutair were concentrated mainly in al-Farwaniyyah and 
the surrounding areas, while al-ʿAjman tribe chose the southern areas of Kuwait close to 
al-Ahmadi where they had originally lived. This demographic distribution persists till 
today, although the increase in numbers and the establishment of new residential areas 
allowed for more integration.  
Modern state institutions also benefited greatly from oil money, especially educational 
establishments. Following the establishment of the Department of Education in 1936 and 
after appointing teachers from Palestine and Egypt, education was further expanded for 
both boys and girls. Al-Shuwaikh Secondary School for boys was established in 1953 
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followed by al-Murqab Secondary School for girls in 1955. Both prepared students to 
transfer from the primary and middle levels which were the main focus of Qurʾanic 
schools and the more advanced schools of al-ʾAhmadiyya and al-Mubarakiyyah Schools 
for boys, and al-Noor School for girls. With the end of the British mandate in 1961, the 
Department of Education became the Ministry of Education in 1962.  Shuwaikh Secondary 
school evolved into the country’s first university, with the establishment of Kuwait 
University in 1966. A quick review of figures reveals the rapid pace of educational reform 
in Kuwait; the number of students rose from 4520 boys and 1772 girls in 1950 to 21764 
and 12661 in 1958, an annual increase of almost 20 percent.
250
 
Financial institutions witnessed similar leaps; the Department of Finance was established 
in 1935, the Department of Work in 1945, the Departments of Passport and Investigations 
in 1948 and 1949 respectively, and many other departments which later became ministries 
following Kuwait’s independence. Undoubtedly, the most tangible progress was made in 
the field of construction; multi-storey buildings began to appear in addition to new 
residential areas into which Kuwaitis moved after abandoning their mud homes and tents.  
Oil revenues were fundamental in improving health services in Kuwait, which led to 
significant population growth; from 168,793 in 1965 to 307,755 in 1975.  Such an increase 
in less than a decade transformed the structure of society into a community of young 
people where almost 40 percent of the population was under the age of 18.  The number of 
foreigners also surged from 298,546 to 687,082 during the same period. 
251
 
New classes and allegiances emerged in light of these new social and economic realities. 
An elitist class of educated Kuwaitis, who could be considered as the new intelligentsia, 
had returned with new ideas and trends from their college days in Cairo, Beirut and the 
United Kingdom; the working class remained small in both size and influence; a middle 
class that had shifted its domain of interest from handcrafts to office work soon became the 
largest class in Kuwait; and finally there was a class of merchants closely linked with the 
ruling family in addition to the traditional class of merchants and traders who had 
benefited from government contracts but were prompted to cement their relationship with 
the ruling family to safeguard their economic interests. This division may give the 
impression that there were very clear-cut boundaries between classes but it was sometimes 
the case that an individual would belong to more than one class or was able to climb the 
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social ladder in a small community where various individuals were linked to each other 
through blood, marriage, or place of living. 
Despite the multiplicity of Islamic, leftist, liberal, economic and socio-political ideas and 
schools of thought in Kuwait, it was Arab Nationalism that captured the hearts of the street 
in the 1950s and 1960s. The Egyptian president Jamal ʿAbdulnasser epitomised the calls 
for a secularist brand of Arab nationalism. The Arab Baʿthist party had a decent number of 
followers, especially as its main thrust did not initially conflict with Nasserite Pan-
Arabism. However Nasser’s endorsement of the Rogers Plan to tackle the Arab-Israeli 
conflict divided the nationalists in Kuwait, with the Baʿthists declaring their opposition to 
the plan; this led to the biggest split in the history of the Arab nationalists in Kuwait. The 
defeat of 1967 also put another nail in the coffin of Arab nationalism. 
The rapid changes in society were signalled by the shift from old mud houses to new 
concrete buildings outside the old wall, a very exciting prospect for many Kuwaitis.  
Women’s fashion saw Kuwaitis giving up the traditional ʿabayah and head cover, 
considered by many a symbol of patriarchy and backwardness, in favour of westernised 
clothing under the influence of female Arab teachers who were seen as role models for 
Kuwaiti women.
252
 The traditional clothes of the 1950s rapidly gave way to the more 
modern fashions of 1960s.  The hairstyles and short skirts of the West and other Arab 
countries like Egypt and Lebanon also became very popular in Kuwait. Thus, these social 
changes were very rapid, having begun with an incident when, in response to the rejection 
of their applications to study abroad, a group of Kuwaiti girls burned their ʿabayahs and 
head coverings.    
This era was also marked by cultural developments guided by secularists who strove to 
spread their influence in the social domain and who become the intellectual and cultural 
reference for all Kuwaitis. Theatre performances flourished, especially with the arrival of 
Zaki Tulaimat,
253
  and many young Kuwaitis joined this budding artistic movement. Some 
young men and women turned to acting in Gulf television drama series and plays. Other 
forms of art such as painting prospered with the increase in the number of museums and 
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exhibition spaces like the Kuwait National Museum and Tariq Rajab Museum. The 
government established the National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters, which remains 
a secularist institution until this day. Secularist influence was also very evident in theatre 
and television where the budding artistic movement reflected the values of modernism and 
openness, in addition to glorifying Pan-Arabism. Kuwaiti art presented its vision for 
dealing with the transitional period the country was experiencing, which coincided with 
increased wealth and cultural openness. The latter was reflected in enthusiastic efforts to 
rid the country of traditions that encouraged backwardness and regression, especially in 
relation to the treatment of women who were being encouraged to break free from the 
control of men and seek education and independence.  
According to Aman, Islamist movements considered all these changes a huge threat to 
social values derived from Islam. They had also lost their historic role in guiding the social 
and cultural domains. Several members of the Muslim Brotherhood moved to establish the 
al-Islah as a response to what they perceived as secularist infringement upon the social 
domain. They challenged figures like Zaki Tulaimat, whom they accused of belonging to 
the Egyptian Freemasonry movement, as well as other icons of the artistic and cultural 
movement for their role in these changes.
254
 
4.6 Forming the Social Reform Society (al-Islah) in 1963 and the New Organization of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in 1968 as a Cultural Reaction to the Loss of the Social 
Domain 
Islamists frowned upon these social and political changes particularly those related to 
women’s westernised attire, and viewed these changes as a conspiracy against social and 
religious values.  Proponents of Islamist movements were shocked by the speed of social 
change and several rushed to hold meetings to address these urgent issues. A number of 
Muslim Brotherhood figures, headed by ʿAbdullah al-ʿAli al-Mutawwaʿ, and several 
supporters of the group held a meeting on 8 June 1963 at Fahd al-Khalid’s diwaniyya to 
“establish an Islamic entity in this wonderful country to defend religious and social 
values.”255 Three days later, the Social Reform Society (Jamʿiyyat al-Islah al-Ijtimaʿi) was 
born, a clear indication that the meeting had been held to garner support for the 
establishment of such a society.  
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The Society for Social Reform, or al-Islah, seemed like a natural extension of al-Irshad,   
and although reform followed in the footsteps of al-Irshad, there were several differences 
between the two. A close reading of their aims and objectives sheds light on their 
priorities. According to the basic laws of the al-Irshad, the society aimed to, 
1. Offer clear, concise and simple overview of the basic tenets of Islam in a manner 
appropriate to the spirit of the modern age. 
2. Free the mind and human reason from the shackles of ignorance. 
3. Protect today’s youth from intellectual and moral decline. 
4. Raise the standards of living of Muslims. 
5. Nurture the spiritual life of the individual. 
6. Achieve social justice for all citizens and contribute to social welfare. 
7. Fully support Arab unity and work towards achieving an Islamic University in 
collaboration with Islamic groups in Muslim countries. 
256
 
On the other hand, al-Islah defined its aims and objectives as, 
1. Combating social vices and immoral activities such as prostitution, drinking, 
gambling and usury. 
2. Guiding youth onto the path of righteousness and teaching them useful pastimes.  
3. Offering curricula to educational and media departments to encourage the 
dissemination of material that represents Islamic shariʿa.  
4. Finding solutions to some of the challenging dilemmas facing Muslim societies. 
5. Safeguarding religion and spreading virtue among members of society to protect its 
mores and values. 
6. Uniting the Umma under the principles of Islam and adopting such principles as a 
holistic way of life.
257
 
Al-Irshad favoured spreading the message of Islam and its compatibility with modern 
times against the Western ideologies that were penetrating Muslim society and 
conservative and backward practice of Islam (Articles 1, 2, 6 and 7). Al-Islah on the other 
hand, opted to focus on combating social vice and immorality and protecting society 
(Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5). The aims and objectives came as a response to the challenges 
facing the Islamist movement in Kuwait at that time; the end of the 1940s onwards was a 
time of great conflict with imported Western ideas which gravely defied Islamic thought, 
the latter being often described as backward, oppressive and not suitable for the needs of 
the modern age. The conflict at the end of 1950s and early 1960s revolved around social 
thought, especially concerning the role of women in society and gender relations in the 
public domain. Islamists felt that society during the 1950s was under attack from ‘immoral 
seculars’, hence the urgent need to protect society. 
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Combating the rise of secularism in the social domain took many forms and focused on 
several issues such as banning alcohol, mixed-gender education at the University of 
Kuwait, applying shariʿa and amending Article 2 of the Constitution (which will be 
explored in detail in the chapter on political movements). Al-Islah attracted all those who 
supported Islamist movements and hosted many programmes and activities, such as 
lectures by prominent Islamists (Hasan Ayyub, Hasan Tannun, ʿAbdulrahman 
ʿAbdulkhaliq and ʿUmar Al-Ashqar). Prior to the establishment of the 1968 Muslim 
Brotherhood (which was more organised and focused on educational activities), it was also 
a focal point for ad hoc activities. Thus Islamist movements began to come together to face 
up to the threat of secularism in a new battle over the hearts and minds of Kuwaitis. 
4.6.1 Al-Islah and Banning Alcohol in 1964 
The sale and consumption of alcohol were permitted in Kuwait but in a conservative 
society that frowned upon the consumption of alcohol it was on a limited scale.  But as 
society became more liberal in the 1950s and 1960s and with the arrival of Christian 
foreigners, alcohol gained widespread acceptance. Gray Mackenzie and Co. Ltd 
monopolised the sale of alcohol and, in order to spare the Kuwaiti government any 
embarrassment, claimed that Westerners and Indians were its target customers. In practice, 
consumers included many Kuwaitis. Following Kuwait’s independence on 19June 1961, 
thousands of Kuwait citizens, backed by Islamists, petitioned the government to ban the 
sale of alcohol but to no avail. Al-Raʾi al-ʿAam newspaper criticised Gray Mackenzie for 
monopolising the sale of alcohol in a country which supposedly subscribed to the notion of 
a free economy.
258
 
The turning point came following legal consultation with the lawyer Hasan ʿAshmawi,259 
vice-president of the Fatwa and Legislations committee. Yusif Rifai, who was Minister of 
Post, Telegraph and Telephone Services, worked closely with ʿAshmawi and conveyed his 
recommendations to the Islamist movement. The two men drafted a law that would ban the 
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import, consumption or sale of alcohol. Another milestone appeared in the form of Kuwaiti 
Airlines when, on 2 May 1964, six Kuwaiti MPs proposed to ban the serving of alcohol on 
the national airline and to confiscate and destroy all the alcohol in Kuwait. Ahmad al-
Khatib, representing the secularists, argued that Kuwaiti Airlines stood to lose some of its 
customers if the ban was introduced and requested more time to examine the matter. Other 
secularist members claimed that banning alcohol would increase demand and could prompt 
young men to drink perfume or home-made alcohol, both highly poisonous.
260
 The law 
was unanimously passed and referred to the Emir for ratification. Secularists attempted to 
lobby the Emir to reject the draft law, while Islamists faced the challenging task of having 
to mobilise inside and outside the parliament. In the end, their efforts were rewarded and 
the law passed, with only one MP voting against it. Most members could not openly 
oppose the law because Islam’s stand regarding alcohol is clear and there was no denying 
its negative impact on people’s lives.261  Islamists made the most of these facts to pressure 
MPs to back the draft law.
262
 
4.6.2 The New Muslim Brotherhood Organization and the Battle of Mixed-Gender 
Education 
The issue of mixed-gender education at the University of Kuwait sparked very heated 
debates between secularists and Islamists and formed the core of the struggle over the 
social domain for more than five decades. The dispute began when the University of 
Kuwait was established in October 1966. Both the ruling family and the left-wing 
intelligentsia were very keen to establish a national university to train highly-qualified 
Kuwaitis for the new job opportunities arising in the newly-established state. Society 
viewed the university as the centre of values that could greatly shape and influence social 
principles in general. As such, it was important for all schools of thought at the time to 
control the intellectual and cultural directions of the university. Teaching began in 
November 1966 in the Colleges of Science and Arts, and the Women’s College. A few 
months later, in April 1967, two more colleges were added – Law and Shariʿa, Business, 
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and Political Science. The College of Medicine was established in July 1973, and the 
College of Engineering and Petroleum Studies in December 1974.
263
 
Students’ movements were already active prior to the establishment of the university. 
Young Kuwaiti students had begun to hold a number of cultural and intellectual activities 
at Al-Shuwaikh Secondary School in 1957, and had also established the Union for 
Secondary School Students. Because of the lack of universities, the Ministry of Education 
and Higher Education used to send students to study abroad, chiefly in Baghdad, Lebanon 
and the United Kingdom, but the biggest cluster of Kuwaiti students was in Egypt where, 
with support from the Kuwaiti Ministry of Education, they established a centre called 
“Bait al-Kuwait” (the House of Kuwait) in 1945.264 The centre was located in Zamalik in 
the former home of Fuʾad Sultan Pasha and the opening was attended by the philosopher 
and Islamic scholar Ahmed Amin, who deputised for the Egyptian Minister of Education. 
The centre moved to al-Duqqi in 1958 and was reopened by the Egyptian President Jamal 
ʿAbdul Nasser himself in the presence of the Shaikh ʿAbdullah Jabir al-Subah. In addition 
to being a meeting place for Kuwaiti students, the centre was a hub of intellectual and 
cultural activities. Ideologically, it was controlled by nationalists who supported most of 
the Arab causes at the time. Kuwaiti students in Baghdad were greatly influenced by 
nationalist and Baʿthist ideologies that created a common denominator between them and 
Kuwaitis in Egypt. Kuwaiti students called for the establishment of a national union for 
students studying abroad, and on 24 December 1964, the National Union of Kuwaiti 
Students (NUKS) was founded with its headquarters in Cairo.
265
 
Following the establishment of Kuwait University in 1966, a number of Kuwaiti students 
also decided to form a students’ union at the university, and the NUKS-KU was 
established on 14 January 1969 with support from Kuwaiti students’ unions in various 
Arab countries.  The board of directors consisted of ʿAbdullah al-Nafisi (president), Yusif 
al-Jasim (vice-president), Muhammad Al-Subaʿi (secretary general), Shaikha Al-Nibari 
(treasurer), and ʿAdnan Hussein, Faisal Al-Dawud, Fatima Shubaiki, Tamadur al-Nisif and 
Munir al-Fuzan (members).
266
  Mixed-gender education was one of the first demands made 
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by the Union; customarily males and females were taught in separate buildings. The Union 
which was dominated by nationalist and left-wing elements, called for equality and for 
abandoning regressive and ultra-conservative modes of thinking. They argued that women 
were no different from men and deserved respect, freedom of movement and the right to 
make their own decisions, and that there was nothing better than a university context in 
which to instil those values. The Union organised a strike in 1969, along with a series of 
sit-ins, petitions, and newspaper articles for the purpose of pressuring the University 
administration to put an end to gender segregation. 
The Union’s magazine al-ʾIthad, observed that, 
Since women are expected to share responsibilities at home 
with men, it is only natural that they also share education 
with them as well. Preventing them from do so is a stark 
infringement on their natural right to equality and justice 
without discrimination on the basis of sex, language or 
religion.
267
 
The magazine also called for a forward move in society’s treatment of women by seeking 
inspiration from Western countries, 
The Kuwaiti society’s traditional values were derived from 
within Kuwaiti society, not imported from abroad...These 
have placed great restrictions on women’s freedoms who 
were treated as inferior creatures...The economic boom of the 
mid-1950s created a desperate need to revolutionise our value 
systems more suited for these great advances...Kuwait 
women have demanded that old traditional values be replaced 
with new ones.
268
 
Islamist movements perceived these calls for mixed-gender education as a secularist assault 
on the moral fibre of society, and especially on young people. They reacted very strongly 
to what they described as attempts to westernise young people and lead them astray. Al-
Islah drafted a memorandum entitled “On Kuwait University”, which they presented at the 
beginning of the academic year 1970/1971 to the crown prince and prime minster Shaikh 
Jabir al-ʾAhmad al-Subah, the Cabinet and Members of Parliament. The Society accused 
secularists of attempting to corrupt students at Kuwait University and warned the 
university against the danger of this ‘conspiracy.” Al-Islah argued that, 
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The aim behind establishing the University of Kuwait was to 
teach and educate a generation of Kuwaitis more superior to 
the generation that lost Jerusalem. A generation armed with 
values, virtue and morality. The founders did not dream that 
one day the university would adopt policies aimed at tearing 
at the moral fibre of society because they knew that society 
needed education not dancing, factories not clubs. Kuwaitis 
could split the atom if they wished and excel in medicine, 
engineering, etc. without mixed-gender education. There is 
no scientific link scientific progress, dancing and mixed-
gender education.
269
 
The memorandum criticised secularist ideas, especially those pertaining to the liberation of 
women and the nature of the relationship between the sexes. It also criticised activities held 
by the Students’ Union, such as mixed-gender trips, plays and parties. The memorandum 
called on the government to take all the necessary steps to put an end to attempts to corrupt 
society at the hands of the Union which  
... seeks to lure society away from Islam [and] intentionally 
or unintentionally [to] sour the relationship between society 
and the university [as well as to] lead Kuwaitis into the trap 
of mixed-gender activities and dancing which crush young 
people’s talents, motivation and good qualities and eventually 
lead them down the path of drugs.
270
 
The struggle between the two sides over control of the social domain through the issue of 
co-education escalated with time and remained open on the pages of magazines and 
newspapers. The Society levelled very harsh criticisms against ʿAbdulfattah Ismail, 
Director of the University, following a masquerade party held to celebrate the start of the 
academic year 1971-1972.  Al-Mujtamaʿ journal expressed its dismay that such a party had 
been organised, and targeted the heard of the university who had attended what they 
described as “the party of sins.”271Al-Raʾi al-ʿAam reacted equally strongly to these 
accusations on 12 November 1971 and demanded the government launch an immediate 
investigation into these claims and put an end to what they described as “the sword wielded 
in the name of religion.”272 Meeting on Sunday 13 November 1971 to discuss the 
accusations levelled against the Director, the University Council reached three decisions, 
1. They fully supported the Director of the University. 
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2. The Council expressed its condemnation of the attacks against the university. 
3. The University would file a defamation suit against Al-Mujtamaʿ Journal.273 
 
Meanwhile the Union had issued an invitation to students through al-ʾIthad magazine and 
al-Ṭalīʾa newspaper to attend a symposium about co-education on 13 November 1971; this 
coincided with the religiously-significant last ten days of Ramadan. The Islamists viewed 
the timing as a blatant provocation of Muslim sentiments during the holy month and as an 
attempt to corrupt society, both morally and intellectually. The scene was thus set for a 
clash between the two sides. 
The Muslim Brotherhood decided to attend the symposium and called upon its members to 
be present, and Shiʿa Muslims rallied with the Muslim Brotherhood to defend conservative 
values against the secularists. Islamists filled up the hall and as soon as proceedings started, 
they began chanting slogans and demanding to be given the floor to express their views. 
They objected to a number of speakers (Khalid Fahad, Fatimah Hussein, ʿAbdulʿaziz al-
Sultan and Saʿad ʿAbdulrahman) who hailed from the same school of thought. The Islamist 
audience demanded to be allowed to participate and voice their opinion on the matter of co-
education, and after a heated exchange, the organisers agreed to allow a representative 
from the Islamists to take part. The very tense atmosphere and the incessant interruptions 
from the two sides eventually prompted the organisers to cancel the symposium and switch 
off the microphones. In the ensuing tussle, both parties physically assaulted each other. 
But the battle was not over yet. Newspapers supporting co-education fiercely attacked the 
Islamists. Front page headlines in al-Raʾi al-ʿAam read “The Battle of Kuwait 
University...Proponents of the Reform Society interrupts the discussions. Police 
intervention leads to injuries including 3 girls.”274 Ajial newspaper’s front page read 
“Beating instead of dialogue at university...Guardianship under duress” and “A dangerous 
precedent by the Reformists to terrorise the opposition.”275 The most fervent attack was by 
al-ʾIthad magazine whose headline for Issue no. 48 was “Monkeys invade the 
university”.276 Islamists responded on the pages of al-Mujtamaʿ with a report entitled 
“Proponents of loose morality incite sedition by monopolising the platform.”277 As the 
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dispute played itself out on the pages of newspapers and magazines, both the government 
and society were stunned by what happened. On 14 November 1971, a day after the 
symposium, the government issued a number of decisions, 
1. Al-Mujtamaʿ Journal would be suspended for three months from 15 November 
1971.  
2. The university council was entrusted with taking the appropriate measures to 
address the situation on the basis of the educational and scientific mission for which 
the university had been established. 
3. A fact-finding committee headed by the minister of education and the president of 
the university would be formed, and its final report filed as soon as possible.278 
These decisions reflected the government’s desire to contain the situation before it got out 
of control. They also contained an implicit criticism of the Islamists and a warning to the 
university’s administration. The decision to suspend al-Mujtamaʿ Journal stemmed from 
wide-spread anger over the inflammatory manner in which they had portrayed gender 
relationships on campus.  The implied warning to the university administration was carried 
in the emphasis on its ‘educational and scientific mission’ and the clear message that it 
should focus on education, not extra-curricular activities and programmes.  
However, the government’s dismay intensified further following a speech by the MP 
Muhammad al-Wasmi on the nature of mixed-gender education, 
One day I saw a group of cars driving alone and when I asked, I 
was told it was mixed-gender university trip. I followed them to 
Nuwaisib and what I saw there was both sad and regrettable; boys 
and girls walking away in couples to secluded areas. I asked the 
driver and he told me it was quite normal.
279
 
 
The President of al-Islah wrote a letter to the Minister of Education and the President of the 
University Council, Jasim al-Marzuq on 1 April 1972 demanding an end to mixed-gender 
university trips. The response was immediate, with the minister informing the university 
administration that mixed-gender activities were no longer allowed, clearly indicating that 
the government was perturbed by such activities. 
The dispute then spilled into the corridors of the parliament. Secularist MPs put a lot of 
pressure on the Islamists by drafting stricter legislations that targeting al-Mujtamaʿ Journal, 
the Islamists, and al-Islah. However, the government did not wish to aggravate the situation 
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further and refused to issue more than the three decisions it had made earlier. The 
Secularists began to feel that the government was turning a blind eye to the Islamists, 
especially when both the government and the Parliament voted against listing the campus 
violence on the agenda for the parliamentary session on 16 November 1971, and with 
pressure from the secularists mounting, the Minister of Education was forced to clarify the 
government’s position on the subject.  MPs seized the opportunity to voice their views on 
this sensitive topic with more than 30 out of 50 MPs expressing their wish to speak. As 
expected, the parliament was highly polarised, from the extreme left to the far right, 
respectively. Thus, ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Musaʿid, editor-in-chief of al-Raʾi al-ʿAam newspaper, 
demanded that the Interior Ministry should investigate the activities of al-Islah, arguing 
that it represented a danger to the state, and accused the ministry of colluding with the 
Society by supporting it morally and financially, while the MP Ibrahim Khuraibit warned 
the government about a war on Islam and implied that secularists were acting on behalf of 
Zionists who wished to destroy Islam.
280
 
However, while awaiting the fact-finding committee’s final report, the government insisted 
on its earlier position and the decisions it had made with regard to suspending the magazine 
and respecting the university’s measures while emphasising its educational and scientific 
mission. The committee, headed by the Education Minister, presented its report to the 
Cabinet on 2 December 1971, and it was published in the newspapers on 8 December 1971. 
The speed with which the report had been prepared reflected the government’s desire to 
resolve the matter as quickly as possible before the situation worsened. 
The report concluded that while both sides were responsible for the fracas, Islamists were 
mostly to blame for planning to disturb the gathering in an undemocratic manner. The 
University Council, which had formed the fact-finding committee, recommended referring 
the matter to the parliament, arguing that it would be unwise to drag students through the 
courts.
281
 The government and the parliament worked together to put a speedy end to the 
whole matter, and despite objections from secularist MPs, the parliament voted on 28 
December 1971 to hold both parties responsible and to punish the Islamists by suspending 
al-Mujtamaʿ magazine for three months.282 
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Mixed-gender education was duly implemented at Kuwait University, especially following 
the university’s decision to adopt a system of credit-hours, which would have made it too 
costly to offer the same courses in separate rooms for boys and girls. The number of female 
students was increasing because while most male students made use of the availability of 
scholarships for study abroad, many Kuwaiti families did not allow their daughters to study 
outside Kuwait.  Moreover, the university argued that, as long as students adhered to social 
codes and values, there was no reason why mixed-gender education would not work. The 
Faculty of Business Studies was the first to implement the co-education policy and other 
faculties soon followed suit. 
Islamists persisted in criticising the policy in newspapers, under headlines such as “Co-
Education...how we implement what the West has proved was a bad idea”,283 and “Mixed-
Gender Education in Business School”.284 The writer of the former article wondered, “How 
long are we going to follow in the footsteps of the West and adopt their mistaken policies, 
sins and moral decay?”285 The writer of the second article stated that co-education was a 
form of corruption and would benefit only the enemies of the state who were doing their 
best to tear at the moral fibre of young people. Islamist MPs and those close to them 
launched a fierce campaign against the government following its decision to implement the 
co-education policy. MP Sayyid Yusif al-Rifaʿi, proponent of the Islamists in the 
parliament, argued that,   
The soldiers of destruction and social corruption have begun an 
assault on Kuwait and their Freemasonry, Zionist and Crusader 
schemes aim to transform Kuwait into Beirut and Lebanon after 
Beirut and the American University of Beirut’s role in the 
region have been exposed.  They usually start with transplanting 
new values for old ones to cultivate a sick society.  We can find 
these forms of invasion and corruption everywhere, fully 
supported and encouraged by the government; hotels, alcohol, 
dancing, night-life, entertainment seasons, corrupt media and 
co-education.
286
 
However, the government had already made its decision and persisted in defending it 
against the onslaught of Islamists. In November 1973 the Ministry of Education issued a 
statement responding to Islamist accusations, saying that the university was a place of 
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learning under the supervision of teachers and social workers who would not allow any 
immoral behaviour.
287
 The Education Minister also defended the government’s decision 
during a parliamentary session,  
The system at Kuwait University is not an American system.
288
 
It can trace its origins to education at al-Azhar in Egypt and has 
nothing to do with co-education or the US. It is a system that 
could be applied anywhere. Attacking Kuwait University in this 
manner is inappropriate and unacceptable. I have before me a 
leaflet describing the university in terms that would put a night-
club in Paris to shame. This tarnishes the reputation of our 
daughters who are honourable and chaste. We have more than 
300 Kuwaiti girls studying in mixed-gender universities abroad 
and none have been criticised the way the Faculty of Business 
Studies has been. I hope we can exercise good judgement and 
wisdom in handling the matter.
289
 
This was the government’s position vis-à-vis co-education and it prompted the Islamists to 
retreat somewhat and adopt a more mellow tone. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular 
reduced the level of their activities regarding the issue, having handled it so badly that they 
ended up losing part of the popular support they had enjoyed and some of their credibility. 
Instead they shifted their focus to daʿwah to encourage young university students to join 
them (in addition to seeking to take over the students’ union).  
The end of the 1970s and the 1980s represented a period of relative calm in terms of the 
issue of co-education as the Islamists became increasingly interested in other issues, such 
as the growing influence of Shiʿas in Kuwait following the 1979 Iranian revolution. 
Islamists collaborated with the governments of the Gulf state to prevent the revolution from 
reaching the Gulf. Jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was another major 
concern at the time, and Islamist energies were directed towards these two causes, against 
the backdrop of the Iraq-Iran war which cast its shadow on an apprehensive society. Sunni 
Muslims demanded that the Kuwaiti government support Iraq amid criticisms from Shiʿa 
Muslims, resulting in polarisation along sectarian lines. The Shiʿas felt they were treated as 
second-class citizens and that their loyalty was brought into question, thereby preventing 
them from occupying sensitive posts in the interior and defence ministries and in the 
national oil company.  
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Kuwait also witnessed a number of unprecedented incidents, such as the bombing of a cafe 
in 1983, and the seven concurrent explosions on 13 December 1983 that targeted the 
American and French Embassies, a residential complex for Americans, a number of US 
companies, the airport control tower, oil interests in al-Shuʿaibah Port, and the control 
centre at the Ministry of Electricity and Water.  In 1985 there was an assassination attempt 
against Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Subah, and in 1988 a Kuwaiti commercial flight was 
hijacked (another flight had been hijacked in 1986). Because of their links with the Iranian 
government, the Shiʿa Iraqi Daʿwah Party and Hizbullah were blamed for these incidents. 
Many saw the violent acts as a clear message to the Kuwaiti government that it should end 
its support for Iraq in its war against Iran. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 
was without a doubt the biggest event in the country’s history. 
The events that followed the liberation of Kuwait on 26 February 1991 had preoccupied the 
Islamists but as their power to influence increased (they had won an unprecedented number 
of seats in the 1992 parliamentary elections), attention once again shifted to issues like co-
education at Kuwait University. This time the Islamists succeeded in reaching an 
agreement with the government of Shaikh Saʿad al-ʿAbdullah al-Subah on a formula that 
would ban co-education in general. The government’s only condition was that an exception 
be made in the case of private schools, which would be covered in law by a somewhat 
vague article that explicitly banned mixed-gender education at the university and at the 
Public Authority for Applied Education and Training (PAAET).
290
 The articles of the law 
were as follows, 
Article (1) The government shall undertake during a period that 
shall not exceed five years from the day this law became valid to 
provide facilities and buildings at the colleges, centres and 
institutes of Kuwait University and schools of Public Authority 
for Applied Education and Training to prevent gender 
interaction by providing female students with special buildings, 
teaching halls, laboratories, libraries, and other services. All new 
buildings must conform to this law. 
Article (2) Kuwait University and the Public Authority for 
Applied Education and Training shall amend their regulations 
and the conditions that school uniforms, student conduct and 
activities must meet in order to conform with Islamic Shariʿa. 
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Article (3) The Ministry of Education shall issue resolutions that 
regulate the work of private schools in a manner that conforms 
with the general objectives of education in the State of Kuwait 
and Islamic values. 
Article (4) The Minister of Education and the Minister of Higher 
Education shall present an annual report outlining all the 
measures taken to implement this law. 
Article (5) All ministries concerned shall implement the articles 
of this law which shall become effective on the day of its 
publication in the official gazette.
291
 
Thus, the Islamists collaborated with the government in the absence of any real opposition 
from secularist Pan-Arabists who had been greatly weakened by the Iraqi invasion. 
Although. Naturally, none joined the Islamists many of them had sided with the 
government, while others had joined the Liberals with few remaining loyal to Pan-
Arabism.   
The conflict between Islamists and secularists extended beyond voting on the law banning 
co-education in 1996 because the secularists, who exercised total control over the 
university’s administration,  kept delaying implementation of the law since, according to 
them, it was not intended to be applied.
292
 Anwar al-Nuri, the university’s first General 
Secretary, remarked that “the law banning co-education is similar to passing a law that sets 
the speed limit at 60 km/hour on a highway! Do they expect anyone to implement such a 
law? Everyone knows it is impossible, just like the law banning co-education.”293 The 
university refused to implement the law using a variety of pretexts (e.g., the cost was too 
high, it was very difficult to find qualified lecturers, etc.). The Islamists pointed out that 
Kuwait was a rich country and the university was not short of money to provide buildings 
and new lecturers; also the university was legally obliged to respect the decisions of the 
parliament. The university did take some insignificant steps by providing segregated 
cafeterias and a few classrooms. However, the situation remains unresolved. 
 
                                                     
291
 GCC Legal Network, “Law Number 24 for 1996 on Organizing Higher Education in Kuwait University, 
Public Authority for Applied Education & Training, and Private Schools.” www.gcc-
legal.org/MojPortalPublic/LawAsPDF.aspx?opt&country=1&LawID=3682   Last modified 23 April 2013. 
(accessed 30 June 2013). 
292
Anwaral-Nuri, “Mudhakkarat Anwaral-Nuri,”AafaqMagazine, 21 April 2013. 
293
Ibid. 
  155 
4.6.3 The Islamist-Secularist Conflict over the Islamic Economic System and Usury 
The economy was yet another field of struggle between Islamists and secularists. And 
although the economy is linked with both the political and social domains, the issues 
surrounding it in Kuwait took on a more socio-religious dimension. Islamists had declared 
from the outset that they were opposed to the capitalist system which, they argued, relied 
on usury (riba), a practice forbidden by Shariʿa. Liberal secularists defended the capitalist 
system’s reliance on interest since many of them belonged to the merchant class in Kuwait.  
They raised doubts that the Islamic economic system was capable of standing up to the 
power of international capitalism; they were also worried that Islamists might gain some 
leeway with the economy and pull the rug from under the feet of the Kuwaiti merchant 
class that historically had exercised total control over the economy. Before the discovery of 
oil, the merchant class had been more powerful than the ruling family but their influence 
had diminished dramatically once oil revenues had begun to flow. Oil had transformed 
Kuwait from a country with a very basic economy into a rentier state that brought all 
classes under the control of the ruling family.  Having already lost a lot with the discovery 
of oil, the merchant class did not wish to relinquish what was left of its influence to the 
Islamists. 
While an Islamic economic system initially seemed a far-fetched notion, a number of 
thinkers including ʿIsa ʿAbduh, and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadir, explored the possibility at 
length in their writings. Al-Sadir, a turbaned Shiʿa Imam, published his book ‘Iqtisaduna’ 
[Our Economy] in 1961 as part of a series of Islamic studies re-examining Islamic 
civilisation in light of contemporary challenges. Al-Sadir had already published 
Falsafatuna [Our Philosophy], a book in which he outlined the pillars of Islamic 
civilisation and responded to secularist attacks on Islamic thought. He had planned to 
produce a third book entitled Mujtamaʿuna [Our Society] which would have explored 
Islamic view of social life,
294
 but this was never published. In Iqtisaduna, al-Sadir 
criticised Marxist historical materialism and capitalism for their inability to regulate 
society’s economic life. He compared these two systems with the Islamic economic system, 
remarking that this was a very basic attempt to explore the idea of an economic system 
based on the teachings of Islam with its rich philosophical heritage.
295
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ʿIsa ʿAbduh, who had studied economics in the West in the 1930s began, during his stay in 
Manchester, to write about why Islam had forbidden usury. His ideas developed over time 
and he eventually called for the establishment of a network of Islamic financial 
institutions;
296
 these would consist of a number of banks in many Muslim countries and 
would provide banking services without recourse to either direct or indirect usury.
297
 ʿIsa 
ʿAbduh researched the issue at length in the 1940s and 1950s and began delivering lectures 
on related matters in a number of Egyptian and other Arab countries from the end of the 
1950s and during the 1960s.  He contributed to the establishment of the first Islamic bank 
in the Egyptian city of Mit Ghamr and helped draw up its financial and banking rules. 
Between 1960 and 1967, ʿAbduh presented a number of television shows which played a 
role in disseminating information about Islamic banking to a wider sector of society in the 
Arab world. The Society for Social Reform invited ʿAbduh to deliver a series of lecture on 
Islamic Banking in 1965.
298
 
Following the establishment of al-Manar Islamic library in 1960 by a number of Muslim 
Brotherhood figures (ʿAbdulwahid Aman, ʿAbdullah al-ʿAqil) to spread Islamic thought, a 
number of serials directed at young people were published by the library. Series issued 
included “Towards a Just Islamic Law”, “Towards an Ideal Islamic Education”, “Towards 
a Stable Islamic Society”, and “Overview of Destructive Movements”, in addition to 
“Towards an Ideal Islamic Economy”. Al-Manar wrote to a number of Muslim scholars 
asking them to contribute to these serial publications, and Al-Sadir and ʿAbduh were 
among those who wrote articles for the Islamic Economy series.   
These publications soon turned into the nucleus for an Islamic Banking Corporation. In 
1968, Abullah Al-Mutawwaʿ, ʿAbdullah al-ʿAqil, ʿAbdulwahid Aman, Jamal al-Dīn 
ʿAtiyyah, Humam al-Hashimi, Nizar Siraji, Ismaʾil Raʾfat, Muḥib al-Mihjari, Muhiī al-Dīn 
ʿAtiyyah, and ʿIsaʿAbduh, who became president of the group, met to form “The 
Preparatory Committee for the Kuwait Finance House”. The committee invited Ahmed 
Irshad to talk about his experience as the founder of the first bank to operate without usury 
in Karachi, Pakistan. Irshad spoke about his experiences and the obstacles he had faced, 
which had eventually led to the bank closing down. The committee, and ʿAbduh in 
particular, began to formulate the details of a comprehensive project based on a close 
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examination of the Kuwaiti market and existing banking laws. Al-Sadir published a study 
entitled “Non-Usury Islamic Banking”299 which also served to support the project of an 
Islamic bank.  
Two years later a memorandum entitled “Kuwait Finance House” was issued to introduce 
the company. Various officials rejected the idea which they saw as being incompatible with 
international interest-based banking systems.
300
 However, the bank was finally established 
in 1977 with the support of ʿAbdulrahman al-ʿAtiqi, the Minister of Finance (and a former 
member of al-Irshad).
301
 Al-ʿAtiqi presented the project to the Crown Prince Shaikh Jabir 
al-Ahmad al-Subah, while the parliament was in recess so as to avoid a confrontation with 
secularist MPs. The Emir issued Decree No.72 for the year 1977 approving the 
establishment of the Kuwait Finance House (KFH), or Baituk [your home], as the bank 
liked to be called. The government owned 49 percent of the shares, the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Justice each owned 20 percent and the Ministry of Awqaf and 
Religious Affairs owned nine percent. The remaining shares were sold on the stock 
exchange.
302
 
Because the KFH did not impose interest on loans as other banks did, it had to formulate 
other methods, such as mudarabah,
303
murabahah, 
304
 and musharakah,
305
 to make profits 
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and manage investments in a manner that did not contradict Islamic teachings. The decree 
issued by the Emir bestowed upon the KFH a unique legal status that allowed it to diversify 
its activities. The new bank was not subject to the laws governing the operations of other 
banks under central bank supervision, which clearly reflected the high level of government 
support enjoyed by the KFH; while its individual legal status allowed it to enter the 
commercial sector, something that other banks were not permitted to do. Since the KFH 
was able to engage in selling and buying like any other company, it invested in a number of 
sectors especially property development. In the mid-1980s, almost 60 percent of its 
investments were in the Kuwaiti property market, but due to pressure from various parties, 
it had to lower its property portfolio to around 35 percent.
306
 The KFH also invested 
abroad, especially in Muslim countries, and set up branches in Turkey, Bahrain and 
Malaysia. It is now Kuwait’s second biggest bank after the Kuwaiti National Bank which is 
owned by the merchant class. 
The writings of early thinkers like ʿAbduh and al-Sadir on Islamic finance aimed to 
introduce society to the values of Islam’s economic system and to encourage people to 
abandon practices forbidden by Islam. They also aimed to effect change in the political 
domain to challenge western capitalist hegemony over the economy, believing that imperial 
powers were exercising too much control over Muslim countries through this approach. 
The new Islamic economic mode succeeded in the social domain more than the political 
one. From its establishment in 1977 until the late 1990s the KFH went through various 
phases of social change; the first was the birth of the idea itself and the second was the 
dissemination of the idea.  
During the first phase, the bank was keen to distinguish itself from other traditional banks. 
The KFH’s first board of directors was headed by Ahmad al-Yasin, a former member of al-
Islah, and the bank gave preference to employees who were members of Islamist 
movements (Muslim Brotherhood and others).  The first branch had special sections for 
men and women, while the Bank’s uniforms were chosen to reflect the spirit of Islam 
(women were expected to be veiled). Smoking was prohibited. The Islamic identity of the 
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bank could be discerned in the choice of furniture, the use of Islamic calligraphy and art, 
and the prayer rooms that were provided for both employees and customers. The logo of 
the bank combined tradition with modernity as evidenced by the image of the mosque 
minaret and oil well. 
From the outset the KFH aimed to attract customers with Islamist leanings; it also targeted 
some of the major Kuwaiti tribes by opening branches in Jahraʾ, al-Raqqah and al-Fuḥaiḥīl 
in addition to the main branch in Kuwait City.
307
 The response was excellent, with 150 
customers flocking to open an account on the first day of business. At the start of the 21st 
century the percentage of Kuwaitis with an account at the bank (90 percent of whose 
employees were Kuwaitis), was nearly 40 percent.
308
In  other words, if one assumed that 
the number of Kuwaitis working in the public sector was one million (i.e., 25 percent of the 
population, of whom 40 percent are below 20 years of age) the number of accounts at KFH 
would be around 100,000, in addition to the estimated two million other accounts. In 2003, 
deposits were estimated at around KD1.8 billon
309
 (approximately US$6 billion), a figure 
that represented some 15 percent of the total bank deposits in Kuwait.
310
 The following 
graph illustrates deposits between the yeas 1978-2001. 
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Consumer Deposits in the Kuwait Finance House, 1978-2001 
 
 
To ensure that all financial and banking dealings conformed with shariʿa, the KFH 
established the Fatwa and Shariʿa Supervisory Department to devise financial and 
investment methods through examining fiqh and shariʿa and transforming Islamic 
teachings into modern tools and contracts. This department was also entrusted with 
adopting tools from international systems and adapting them to shariʿa. All contracts and 
investments had to be approved by the Supervisory Department which possessed powers 
of veto over the decisions of the Board of Directors and the Executive Director of the 
bank.  
The presence of a number of renowned religious scholars in the Supervisory Department 
lent it greater legitimacy in Kuwaiti society. Promoting the services of the KFH usually 
began by emphasising the differences between it and other Kuwaiti banks which relied on 
the forbidden system of usury. Through its subsidiary, the Property Development 
Company, the KFH invested in a series of residential buildings designed to reflect Islamic 
architecture. The architectural plan for the apartments created special areas for families 
and single people. The floor plan itself was Islamic; the kitchen was placed near the 
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bedrooms away from the reception area or the living room used to receive guests so that 
the wife would not have to encounter her husband’s friends. Al-Muthanna commercial and 
residential centre in heart of the capital, which is owned by the Property Development 
Company, is considered an Islamic complex suitable for families. Shops adhere to the rules 
and regulations of the company such as the ban on the use of mannequins which some 
argue are forbidden in Islam.
311
 
These efforts popularised the notion of an Islamic economic system among Kuwaitis. The 
KFH’s slogan was “Security and Reassurance” which it used in the face of wide-spread 
scepticism that it could succeed in its mission. The bank’s huge profits served to increase 
its trustworthiness prompting devout clients and society at large to believe Allah was 
blessing their efforts.
312
 
The bank then began to employ Kuwaitis who were not devout Muslims or tribal members. 
The number of non-devout Muslims increased, tempted by high profits and excellent 
salaries. People joked that an Islamic bank was employing people who drank alcohol.
313
 
Many clients were also non-devout Muslims. This emphasised the extent to which the 
KFH succeeded in bringing about social change in the minds of Kuwaitis. As members of 
a conservative society, many Kuwaitis were very keen on halal investments after decades 
of being forced to seek the services of interest-based banks. 
The economic activities of the KFH have undoubtedly had a great influence on Kuwaiti 
society, as an example of how the many ideas and principles advocated by the Islamist 
movement were transformed into a reality. Gender segregation at the university and in the 
workplace, was widely acceptable, despite secularist scepticism, and did not pose any 
hindrance to progress. Islamic economic systems, Islamic entertainment and books, 
Islamic knowledge and other products benefited from the success of the KFH in a very 
technocratic and hostile environment. It became easier for the Islamist movement to 
propose initiatives on the basis of the success of the KFH and over time it increasingly 
gained popularity in the social domain. 
Islamic banks such as KHF and the Dubai Islamic Bank promoted the notion that anyone 
contributing to the success of these Islamic establishments would gain rewards in the 
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afterlife, especially as they were standing up to the forbidden practice of usury and 
capitalism. This link between the value of work and the spiritual life is similar to Max 
Weber’s exploration of the Protestant ethic with its emphasis on the value of work and 
how that contributed to the prosperity of  Europe and the US.  The Dubai Islamic Bank 
remarked in one of its leaflets that, “Work is a religious exercise just like Jihad on the 
battlefield. Both lead to the spread of Islamic principles and moral virtues in the soul of a 
Muslim... and indeed the world around him.”314 
The establishment of the KFH and its success certainly owed a lot to government support. 
The proposal to establish the KFH had been presented to the government several times 
after it was first drafted at the end of the 1960s but it was vetoed every time. It had also 
been deemed in violation of the banking laws of Kuwait which were based on international 
financial institutions where profit was always based on accrued interest, while the 
traditional banks, unlike the KFH, were not permitted to engage in direct commercial 
transactions.  Technocratic government administrations such as the Ministries of Finance 
and Trade, and the Central Bank of Kuwait, which had more affinities with the liberals and 
secularists than with Islamists, were not convinced the project could succeed.
315
 But the 
project was destined to see the light at the hands of a merchant who wished to find an 
alternative to traditional banks. Said Lutah, a well-known merchant from Dubai, had 
secured oral approval from the Ruler of Dubai, Shaikh Rashid Said al-Maktum, to seek a 
substitute for the conventional bank, and embarked on his quest in the early 1970s. After 
reading some of al-Sadir’s and ʿAbduh’s writings, and following several trips to Greater 
Syria and Egypt to meet a number of Shariʿa scholars, Lutah could find no one better than 
ʿAbduh, who persuaded him to establish an Islamic bank. In establishing the Dubai Islamic 
Bank (DIB) ʿAbduh applied the findings of the preparatory committee’s study for the KFH 
project, and Lutah convinced Shaikh Rashid of the importance of the project and won his 
full support in overcoming legal obstacles. Shaikh Rashid opened the bank in 1975 as the 
first Islamic bank in the region and in the wider Arab world.
316
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The success of DIB prompted the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance, ʿAbdulrahman al-ʿAtiqi, to 
present the KFH proposal to the Crown Prince and Prime Minister Shaikh Jaber al-ʾAhmad 
Al-Subah. The KFH was established with a royal decree and a special law, despite 
objections from government technocrats and secularists who saw the project as a direct 
interference in the Kuwaiti economy by a government-Islamist alliance. The government 
owned 49 percent of the shares which bestowed legitimacy upon the bank, and despite the 
decrease in government shares over the years, members of the ruling family continued to 
support it by retaining its services for various property and investment deals. They also 
owned big shares in the KFH, although this support came at a price, since the government 
exercised control over the names that could be appointed to the bank’s board of directors 
and leadership positions. Despite the widespread misconception that the Muslim 
Brotherhood controlled the KFH, in reality they represented only ten percent of the 
individuals in leadership positions over the years. It was the presence of Muslim 
Brotherhood figures in middle-management that entrenched the perception that they ran 
the KFH.
317
 
The Islamist movement succeeded in penetrating into the Kuwaiti economic stronghold 
through an alliance between the government and the Islamists by way of the KFH. With 
the success of the KFH, the Islamist movement went on to establish a number of 
successful Islamic corporations and institutions. Shariʿa scholars played an important role 
in supporting and developing the idea of Islamic institutions through research, conference 
papers, symposiums, and lectures. The same scholars who issued fatwas to people 
inquiring about personal and public matters, advised Muslims to leave traditional banks 
and companies and move to Islamic banks, thus cementing the Islamists’ power in both the 
social and the economic domains despite the fierce objections of secularists. Even some 
traditional merchants began investing in Islamic companies in an important development 
that signalled the deterioration of secularist influence.
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4.7 The Rise in Popularity in the 1980s and the Competition between Salafis and the 
Muslim Brotherhood over the Social Domain 
As the end of the 1970s approached, the Islamist movement became well-entrenched with 
the success of Islamic institutions like the Society for Social Reform, the KFH, and other 
smaller projects (al-Manar bookshop, al-Mujtamaʿ Journal). Meanwhile, the 1967 defeat 
and the loss of Palestine followed by Jamal ʿAbdulnasser’s death had considerably 
weakened secularist nationalism. The alliance between the government and Islamists on a 
number of political and social projects boosted the status of the Islamists as that of the 
secularists gradually disappeared. The year 1979 proved to be a turning point in the region; 
following a series of protests against the Shah of Iran by various political and social 
powers headed by Islamic parties, the Shah was forced to relinquish his post on 16 January 
1979, after which the opposition seized control.  
On the first day of February, Khomeini arrived in Tehran on a flight from Paris and in 
December 1979, following a referendum on the constitution and a fierce struggle between 
various powers, the Islamists took over and Khomeini was declared the Supreme Leader of 
Iran. The Iranian Revolution, with its distinctive Shiʿa identity, created ripples in the 
region especially following its attempts to export the revolution to other countries. When 
Saddam Hussein succeeded Ahmed Hasan al-Bakir as Iraqi president in July 1979, he 
plotted a coup against Iran’s new rulers with the help of several Iranian officers who 
opposed Khomeini, but the plot was uncovered and Saddam was forced to wage a war 
against Iran to stem the tide of Shiʿa politics. 
Thus began the Iraq-Iran war which lasted eight years and was the fiercest and most brutal 
conflict in the history of the region. Kuwait and other Gulf states supported the Iraqi 
regime in its war against Iran out of fear that the revolution would bring down their 
monarchies. Khomeini had been calling for the overthrow of all monarchies and 
oppressive regimes and for them to be replaced with an Islamic system of government, and 
his incitements and Shiʿa ideology were viewed as a huge threat to the Gulf’s Sunni 
monarchical regimes. The alliance between Islamists and the government was further 
cemented by regional developments; Islamists launched a fierce attack against Shiʿas by 
casting doubts on their loyalty in the aftermath of the explosions carried out by Hizbullah 
against Kuwaiti and foreign interests and even the Emir himself. Salafis drew upon 
Wahhabist literature, especially accounts of the early Wahhabist struggles against Shiʿas in 
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1801, when Saʿud bin ʿAbdulaziz attacked Karbala and destroyed a number of Shiʿa trends 
and fads such as the dome constructed over the tomb of al-Hussein bin Ali.
319
 The Salafis 
also employed fatwas issued by Saʿudi Salafis declaring Shiʿa practices un-Islamic. Some 
scholars have argued that Sunni and Shiʿa beliefs can never be reconciled.320 These fatwas 
were certainly instrumental in deepening the Sunni-Shiʿa rift in Kuwait.    
Other political developments in the region also contributed to the spread of the Islamist 
movement in the 1980s.  Juhaiman al-ʿUtaibi’s movement which flourished at the end of 
the 1970s was constantly persecuted by the Saʿudi government especially after the 
movement had vandalised a number of shops in the mid-1970s that were displaying 
mannequins in Medina. The Saʿudi authorities tried to rein in al-ʿUtaybi’s Salafi thinking,  
but he surprised everyone by breaking into the Grand Mosque in Mecca  on 20 November 
1979 and declaring that Muhammad ʿAbdullah al-Qahtani was the Guided One (al-
Mahdi).
321
 
Juhaiman and his followers were arrested and executed following a trial by shariʿa judges 
representing the official religious establishment. The incident left an indelible mark on the 
Islamists’ psyche as it represented the first clash between Islamists and the government of 
a Gulf state. It also made Gulf governments aware of the need to contain Islamists by 
supporting state-backed Islamism against anti-government Islamists. Breaking into the 
Grand Mosque coincided with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December 1979 to 
support the pro-Soviet Afghan government against armed rebels. Backed by the anti-
Communist West, the Islamists declared Jihad against the Soviet troops. Afghanistan 
became the ideal place in which to channel the energies of unwanted Islamists who 
became known as ‘Arab Afghanis.’322 Pakistan took on the task of training Afghanis and 
Arab Afghanis while the Gulf States, chiefly Saʿudi Arabia, provided financial support and 
the US provided logistical support, especially in the form of Stinger missiles which later 
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tipped the balance against the Soviet aircraft. The war in Afghanistan took up all the time 
and attention of many Islamist movements and channelled their energies to the cause by 
intensifying Islamist calls for donations and volunteers. 
These regional changes boosted the role of Islamists in the region who were widely viewed 
as a shield against the spread of Shiʿa Islam and the Iranian revolution. They were also 
instrumental in stemming the tide of Islamists who did not belong to any specific group, 
and the secularists who wished to overthrow all monarchies. The Islamist movements 
made the most of simple media such as books, leaflets, posters and newspaper articles to 
spread their message. But the greatest tool at their disposal was the cassette tape (known as 
the Islamic tape) which was widely used to reach as many young people as possible. 
Friday sermons and religious lessons would be taped and sold at bookshops. The low cost 
of the tapes and wide availability of tape players meant the messages were accessible to 
almost everyone. Preachers simplified their sermons and lessons and made them less 
cumbersome so they could reach a wider audience. Orators like Ahmed al-Qattan were 
highly skilled at inflaming people’s passions and encouraging them to join the Jihad 
movement in Afghanistan and to resist Iran and the Shiʿas. The Islamic tape was more 
capable of tapping into the audience’s hearts and minds than books, because the preachers 
often used local dialects to get closer to their listeners. Bookshops and record shops played 
an important role in marketing these tapes to enthusiastic young Muslims who began to 
adopt the ideas and the oratorical skills of the preachers.  
Islamic tapes were not restricted to sermons and lessons but extended to the Islamic art of 
Anashid [Islamic chants]. The Muslim Brotherhood was very keen from the outset to 
utilise the power of art in the service of its ideas. Anashid were different from songs 
because the latter were usually associated with entertainment, music, and sometimes 
forbidden pleasures. Anashid, on the other hand, had been known throughout Islamic 
history especially in Sufi traditions where the praises of Allah and his prophets are sung as 
part of spiritual sessions. The Islamist movement, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, 
revived the art and developed it further, using modern technology to include new topics 
like political issues, Anashid about fighting colonial powers, liberating Palestine and Jihad. 
Al-Banna himself was very interested in Anashid as part of the activities of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Scout movement, in which a famous nashid was al-Kataʾib [the 
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Militias].
323
 The margin of freedoms and wealth in Kuwait allowed al-Anashid to be 
produced and distributed widely, and they became particularly popular during the 1980s to 
match the momentum of Jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the outbreak 
of the first Palestinian intifada [uprising] in 1987. Anashid then took on a more patriotic 
tone during and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and throughout the 1990s. 
4.8 The Spread of Islamic Charitable Work 
Charity work is one of the main features of Islamic efforts and has historically been 
associated with Islam as one of the most important channels for winning Allah’s rewards. 
People would usually give their donations to religious scholars and trustees of charity 
organizations associated with mosques, who would then pass them on to those in need. 
Charity work developed over time, with endowment becoming one of its major features. 
Endowment was usually sourced from property (orchards, farms, private residences, wells, 
etc.) and was used to feed the poor, maintain mosques and teach children how to read the 
Qur’an. Judicial authorities were responsible for regulating and managing endowments. As 
old as Islam itself, endowments represent a unique model which combines social services 
with religious charity. Charity work and endowments developed throughout history to 
include the health sector (such as hospitals and centres), and education (libraries, 
universities, and educational institutions during Abbasid rule), while the Mamluks and 
Ottomans expanded endowments to include religious and life studies and mosques in 
Mecca, Jerusalem and al-Medina.  
As forms of charity, endowments were administered by civil society (mostly religious 
institutions) rather than by political authorities. In modern times, colonial powers chose to 
undermine religious institutions, accusing them of funding resistance movements. 
Targeting endowments was widely perceived as the best method for weakening religious 
establishment. The French colonial powers in Greater Syria issued special regulations to 
put an end to endowments, while the French in Algeria appropriated endowments and 
distributed them among the French. The British did the same and placed endowments 
under foreign administration. After the Arab countries had won back their independence, 
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secularist governments followed the European model of weakening religious 
establishments, so that special ministries were established to regulate waqf and 
endowments.
324
 
In Kuwait, the first endowment was bin Bahar mosque in 1695. Endowments have 
continued since, starting with mosques built by Kuwaiti citizens and charity work to feed 
and clothe the poor. Other examples included the “dinner endowment”, Eid al-Adha 
endowment, school and university scholarships, printing books, and publishing copies of 
the Qur’an. A number of private foundations (Mabarrat) managed, developed and 
distributed endowments in Kuwait and continued to do so even after the establishment of a 
government department for endowments that later became a Ministry for Waqf and 
Religious Affairs. These Mabarrat succeeded in remaining relatively autonomous, unlike 
those in many other Arab countries.
325
 
The Islamic reformist movement took a great interest in charity work, establishing the 
Arab Charity Society in 1913 as noted in a previous chapter. The movement also 
established a special department for religious guidance in the field of social charity work 
in Kuwait and abroad.  Al-Islah also  invested heavily in charity, especially ones from oil 
revenues, and the Kuwaiti government invested heavily in the service sector so that most 
Kuwaitis began to enjoy the fruits of oil revenues, thereby leaving very few in need of 
charity. This meant that most endowments were spent abroad or given to some members of 
the foreign labour force in Kuwait.  
In the 1980s, government support for charity work in Kuwait and abroad (especially in 
Afghanistan) gave it a further boost. Endowments extended to cover almost every aspect 
of life except for Jihad, from which many charity organisations, especially Muslim 
Brotherhood ones, steered clear. Because most Kuwaitis were well-off, most charity 
money went to spiritual and religious development. Charity organisations funded lessons 
for memorising the Qur’an, courses at Kuwaiti mosques, and religious cassette tapes which 
were given away free of charge. They also sponsored hajj and ʿumra trips for young 
Kuwaitis. Charity organisations played a role in supporting the activities of the KFH by 
opening all their accounts there, so that donations worth tens of millions of Kuwaiti dinars 
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were deposited at the bank. They also benefited greatly from the experience of the KFH 
concerning the best (Islamic) methods for investing the charity money. Both the KFH and 
charity organisation thus collaborated to achieve the same goals; i.e., to spread 
conservative values and support the role of Islam in society.
326
 
In her study on the renewal of Awqaf in Kuwait, Kristin Diwan examines the role of 
charity organisations in supporting political activities and the impact of charities on voting 
for the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi candidates. This may apply to countries like Egypt, 
Greater Syria, Iraq, and pre-oil Gulf states, but cannot be generalised to cover post-oil Gulf 
societies. The fact that the government takes care of citizens throughout their lives means 
that the impact of charity is negligible. The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait saw their 
mission as supporting Islamic work all over the world and this trumped political reforms in 
Kuwait, since charity work associated with the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be tied to 
political manoeuvres and short-term electoral gains. Those responsible for charity work 
were very well aware of the dangers of conflating charity with political activities, so a 
decision was made to distance charity work from Kuwaiti political life. It was the fact that 
the Islamist movement’s political participation expanded at around the same time as 
charity work that led many to the misconception that the two were related. So although 
both contribute to the propagation of conservative values and the spread of the message of 
Islam, they are not organically linked. 
4.9 Competing with Salafis over the Social Domain 
The Salafi movement did not enjoy any real influence due to the attacks launched by the 
Wahhabi movement with support from the Saʿudi government between 1926 and 1930. 
The strength of the anti-Wahabbi al-Hasa school and its sway over Kuwaitis meant that 
Salafis did not get far. But Kuwaitis of Najdi decent were sympathetic to the Wahhabi 
ideology and the founder of Saʿudi Arabia, ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Saʿud. During the second half 
of the 1960s, a number of young men, influenced by the Wahhabi Salafi sect, began to 
gather at mosques in various areas of Kuwait (Kaifan, al-Qadsiyyah and al-Fayhaʾ) to 
attend religious lessons given by independent shaikhs such as Hasan Ayyub and Hasan 
Tannun. With the arrival of ʿUmar al-Ashqar and ʿAbdulrahman ʿAbdulkhaliq, both of 
whom had been influenced by the Salafi Wahhabi ideology in addition to the Muslim 
                                                     
326
 Kristin Diwan, “Islamic Finance beyond the State: The Renewal of Awqaf,” (MPSA Annual Conference, 
Chicago, March 31-April 3, 2011), 9-10. 
  170 
Brotherhood, from Saʿudi Arabia in the summer of 1965, the scene was set for the rise of 
Salafis. Although they were initially very similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis 
gradually began to distinguish themselves by meeting separately and organising their own 
programmes which were not different from those of the Muslim Brotherhood (Qur’an 
readings, praying at the mosque and reading Islamic books).  
Compared to the Muslim Brotherhood, these Salafi groups were small and quite limited. 
The Muslim Brotherhood had been well established since 1968 with its own organisation, 
the Society for Social Reform, and it had maintained a presence in Kuwaiti society since 
the end of the 1940s while the Salafis did not appear until the end of the 1960s. 
The Salafi group remained small until Muhammad Ahmed al-Rashad had a major 
disagreement with ʿAbdulrahman ʿAbdulkhaliq in 1974. The incident led to the gradual 
departure of ʿAbdulkhaliq to the Salafi camp which lacked any religious or intellectual 
leadership, so that ʿAbdulkhaliq seemed the perfect candidate to lead the group. As a 
result, major intellectual disagreements emerged between the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Salafis who did not appreciate any aspect of the Sufi heritage that the Muslim Brotherhood 
seemed to be quite fond of in their educating and training of young people. The rift 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis grew even wider with time until the end 
of the 1970s when a number of regional events such as the breaking into the Grand 
Mosque, the success of the Iranian revolution and the declaration of Jihad in Afghanistan 
against the Soviets gave Islamists and especially the Salafis a big push forward. After the 
incident with the Juhaiman Salafi group, the Gulf States were careful to contain all other 
Salafis to prevent a recurrence of any attempts to overthrow their ruling families.  
With the rise of Iran’s sectarian ambitions and the threat of exporting the Iranian 
revolution to the Gulf States, the Islamist movement, especially the Salafis, seemed the 
best weapon against the spread of Shiʿa ideology. The Muslim Brotherhood eyed the 
Islamic revolution with great respect despite their apprehensions about Iranian influence, 
while the Salafis had no qualms about branding the Iranian regime blasphemous especially 
since history and Salafi tradition supported this divide with the Shiʿa sect. The 
governments of the Gulf States used the Islamists, especially the Salafis, to agitate the 
masses to support Jihad in Afghanistan since he Salafi Wahhabi ideology was represented 
by a number of Afghani factions and a significant number of Arabs in Afghanistan 
subscribed to the Salafi school of thought. 
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The Kuwaiti government had a vested interest in supporting the Salafi movement in order 
to create a split in society by not allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to steer the hearts and 
minds of Sunni Muslims.
327
 The government therefore backed Salafi efforts to establish 
their own organisation and al-Islah for the Revival of Islamic Heritage came into being in 
1981.
328
  Among those who established what came to be known as the Revival of Heritage 
were ʿAbdullah al-Sabt, Tariq al-ʿIsa, Khalid Sultan bin ʿIsa, Dakhil al-Jassar and 
ʿAbdulrahman ʿAbdulkhaliq.  Shaikh Fahad al-Ahmad al-Subah, the youngest brother of 
the then Emir of Kuwait, was one of the founders and supporters of the Society.  The 
Salafi momentum increased with their clear-cut positions vis-à-vis regional and local 
issues when compared with the Muslim brotherhood with their less extreme views.  
Salafis were also more inclined to be strict with regard to certain aspects such as the 
general appearance of individuals. They adhered strictly to the growing of beards, wearing 
short clothes, and using a miswak for cleaning teeth, and wearing a headdress without ʾIgal 
in a fashion similar to that of Saʿudi Salafis, as well as other individual fashions that 
distinguished Salafis from other members of society.  Salafi women also had their own 
style of dress to distinguish them from Muslim Brotherhood women, and wore a black 
niqab that covered the whole face in addition to the black ʿabayya to hide the whole body. 
Muslim Brotherhood women wore a black ʿabayya with white head cover with the face 
left bare. Salafis criticised the Muslim Brotherhood for subscribing to the fiqh opinion that 
women were allowed to expose their faces, while Saʿudi jurists such as bin Baz and bin 
ʿOthaimin issued fatwas against women revealing their faces, a view opposed by the 
Syrian Salafi Shaikh Nasser al-Din al-Albani. 
In addition to the differences in the domain of fiqh, major disagreements between Salafis 
and the Muslim Brotherhood were intellectual and doctrinal. From the end of the 1970s 
until the first decade of the new millennium, most of the heated debates and conflicts 
between the two groups centred on these issues. The most important among these debates 
was the disagreement between al-Rashid and ʿAbdulkhaliq over the relationship with the 
‘Other’, such as Sufi traditions. Al-Rashid was much more forgiving while ʿAbdulkhaliq 
refused to deal with this tradition, considering it impure and a hodge-podge of true Shariʿa 
and heresy so that the best thing would be to reject it altogether, just to be on the safe side. 
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Salafis also disagreed with the Muslim Brotherhood over the relationship with Shiʿas, as 
mentioned above, as well as other trends within the Islamist movement. Salafis were much 
more intolerant of the ‘Other.’ Kuwaiti Salafis had a great affinity with Wahhabis and their 
brutal rejection of the ‘Other’ without allowing room for compromise. As far as they were 
concerned, any creed or thought that was not Salafi contradicted the teachings of Islam.
329
 
And although they classified other Islamist movements on the basis of how closely related 
they were to Salafi thought, all Islamists were harshly criticised by Salafis, including 
movements such as al-Tahrir, al-Tabligh, Sufis close to Sayyid Yusif al-Rifai and other 
groups interested in religious scholarships such as the Shaikh Hasan Hītu group. This 
Salafi attitude prompted them to criticise a saying of Rashīd Rida’s that was later adopted 
by the Muslim Brotherhood as one of their guiding principles in dealing with others; “We 
shall cooperate on those issues over which we agree and excuse each other over things we 
disagree about”, because even when Salafis agreed to cooperate with Others on issues they 
approved of, they failed to justify or understand differences, especially when those were 
related to fiqh or doctrine.  Salafis sought to purge Islam from heresy and fads as a first 
step towards spreading the message of true Islam. Thus, Salafis found themselves in direct 
conflict with almost all Islamic groups to the extent that their struggle against other 
Islamists became more notorious than their conflict with secularists, with their fiercest 
clashes being with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
In addition to criticising the Muslim Brotherhood for their so-called tolerance of Sufi 
heresy, Salafis levelled other intellectual and fiqh criticisms against the group. They 
argued, for instance, that the lack of a clear doctrinal vision among members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood made it easier for other suspect approaches like Sufis and Muʿtazila 
and other controversial doctrinal issues like Tawassul (pleading) and Tafwīd (delegating) 
to lead them astray.  Salafis drew upon the writings of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb to 
wage these accusations, which proved to be particularly popular among the Salafis in 
Saʿudi Arabia from where Kuwaiti Salafis drew their inspiration. These condemnations 
affected the status of the Muslim Brotherhood who lost many supporters, especially tribal 
members who were more inclined towards Salafi ideology.  
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More importantly, casting such doubts started to affect members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood themselves who experienced certain doubts about their belief systems. A 
prominent Muslim Brotherhood figure, Jasim Muhalhal al-Yasin, wrote a short paper to 
elaborate on the Muslim Brotherhood intellectual tradition and to refute Salafi claims. Al-
Yasin is widely considered a leading Muslim Brotherhood intellectual and religious 
scholar. As a mature charismatic figure, he was different from the first generation of very 
young Muslim Brotherhood members in Kuwait whose leader ʿAbdulwahid Aman was as 
old as their fathers. Al-Yasin had received his religious education at al-Imam Muhammad 
bin Saʾud Islamic University, graduating with a BA and an MA degree in Shariʿa studies 
in 1980 and 1986 respectively. He was very close to ʿAbdulrahman ʿAbdulkhaliq, the 
Salafi Shaikh in Kuwait, and attended many of his lessons. Because of this Salafi 
educational background, Al-Yasin was widely respected by the Salafis. Moreover, his 
education was reflected in the paper he wrote to refute Salafi claims. 
A pamphlet entitled “Lilduʾat Faqat: Daʿwat al-Ikhwan Haqaʾiq... 
Shubuhat…Tamaniyyat” [For Preachers Only: The Muslim Brotherhood; Facts, 
Misconceptions and Hopes] clearly indicated from the title that its intended audience was 
the members of Islamist movements, since the misconceptions raised by Salafis impacted 
on Islamists more than the rest of society who had a different set of issues. Al-Yasin 
emphasised in the pamphlet that the Muslim Brotherhood’s doctrine was not different from 
Salafis in being inspired by the traditions of the orthodox Sunna.  In a section entitled “The 
Doctrinal Approach of the Muslim Brotherhood”330 he quoted extensively from the 
writings and lectures of al-Banna to demonstrate that the Muslim Brotherhood were 
essentially Salafis.
331
 Al-Banna remarked in the sixth principle out of the Twenty that “no 
one is infallible except for the Prophet (pbuh) and that the Muslim Brotherhood embrace 
all the intellectual legacy of the Salaf if it does not contradict the teachings of the Qur’ran 
and the Prophet (pbuh).”332 In explaining this principle, Al-Yasin included Shaikh Saʾīd 
Hawwa’s comments on al-Banna’s statement. Hawwa remarked that no source was 
infallible except for the Qur’an and Sunna. Otherwise, one had to exercise caution in 
adopting the views of others, such as Imams, preachers, scholars, etc. 
333
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Al-Yasin also elaborated on the statements of al-Banna that concurred with Salafi thought 
to stress the Salafi nature of the Muslim Brotherhood from a doctrinal perspective, in 
addition to other literature that confirmed the Salafi dimension of Muslim Brotherhood 
thinking. Al-Yasin explained in detail the great care the Muslim Brotherhood took in 
indoctrinating their young cadres. The Salafis had also raised the issue of the names and 
qualities of Allah and al-Yasin once again emphasised that the Muslim Brotherhood were 
in agreement with the Salafis on that front. He quoted al-Banna who argued that it was 
forbidden to describe Allah with adjectives or qualities not mentioned in the Qur’an or 
Hadith even if such descriptions denoted perfection. Thus, it was haram to say ‘the 
engineer of the universe’ or ‘the general manager of human affairs’ as absolute terms to 
describe Allah, but it was acceptable to use them in the context of a general conversation 
in order to explain the power of Allah to simple people. Indeed, it would be preferable to 
avoid them altogether. Al-Banna further commented that it was best to follow the opinion 
of the Salaf in refraining from such terms in any context.
334
 
After stressing the Salafi nature of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Yasin explained the phrase 
“and we excuse each other over things we disagree about” by quoting al-Banna’s division 
of people on the basis of their perception of the Muslim Brotherhood, and not their 
intellectual or doctrinal affiliations. 
When speaking about other Islamists, al-Banna emphasised the spirit of tolerance between 
them, despite intellectual differences. He commented that the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
position regarding Islamists, irrespective of their intellectual traditions, was one of respect, 
love, cooperation, loyalty and brotherhood. Al-Banna also pointed out that the Muslim 
Brotherhood always stove to bridge the gap between various Islamist movements in the 
spirit of cooperation and love, and further acknowledged that it would be impossible to 
attain consensus in matters related to religion and indeed this would go against the very 
nature of religion. Thus, al-Banna continued, the Muslim Brotherhood movement found it 
completely understandable that others would disagree with them on some minor matters 
and that this should by no means be seen as an obstacle to good relations with others. He 
remarked that even Prophet Muhammad’s Companions disagreed over some fatwas with 
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that being a cause of resentment, disunity or hate, and reminded Muslims of the debate 
regarding ʿAsr prayer among members of Bani Quraida tribe.335 
Although al-Yasin laid much emphasis on the Muslim Brotherhood’s spirit of tolerance of 
those who disagreed with them on some branches of Shariʿa, he devoted considerable 
space to a number of issues that Salafis had raised, such the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
treatment of Sufi traditions. As al-Yasin argued, al-Banna did not approve of all Sufi 
practices but had criticised some of them despite his great admiration for that tradition, as 
evident in the third of the Twenty Principles. Al-Banna remarked that, 
True faith, true worship of Allah and Jihad possess a light that 
Allah throws into the heart and mind of anyone He wishes to but 
inspiration, thoughts, visions and dreams are not 
incontrovertible evidence and should never be taken into 
consideration if they conflict with religious tenets.
336
 
In the 13th Principle he commented that, 
The love and respect we have for the pious and their great deeds 
are a form of a worship ...The miracles they perform may be 
acceptable but under very strict shariʿa conditions ... Having 
said that, I do believe that they cannot do themselves much harm 
or good without Allah’s will, let alone be able to benefit 
others.
337
 
In this instance, al-Yasin focused on the statements that reflected al-Banna’s criticisms of 
Sufi practices without mentioning them explicitly, evidence that the Brotherhood did not 
wholly embrace Sufism. 
In the same paper, al-Yasin remarked that Salafism should be viewed as a general 
approach to which any Muslim could subscribe, and described himself as a Salafi. In this 
sense, Salafism ceases to be a group or a party that one could belong to but rather a way of 
thinking which no group is entitled to monopolise or exclude others from. Al-Yasin 
comments,  
Salafism is not a group in the same sense as the Muslim 
Brotherhood is a group. Salafism represents a certain 
understanding of Islam among many other perspectives which 
had deviated from the true way. This kind of understanding 
exists when an Islamic state becomes a reality. Indeed, the norm 
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is for all preachers to adopt Salafism as a theoretical and 
practical mode. Thus, Salafism is not a group or a party.
338
 
With this perspective on the matter, al-Yasin was said to be sending a clear message to the 
Salafis that they did not possess some inalienable right to monopolise Salafism and doubt 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s commitment to Salafi thought. Nor, since the Salafi approach 
was not possessed exclusively by one group in particular, did Salafis have the right to level 
criticisms against others because they did not have the right to classify and evaluate other 
groups. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in bypassing the doubts cast on the 
legitimacy of the movement and the soundness of its doctrines and approaches. This had 
the effect of boosting morale and enhancing the Muslim Brotherhood’s belief in what they 
represented and what they stood for, in addition to reining in the Salafi momentum that 
had been slowly spreading among members of the Kuwaiti society. 
Kuwaiti Salafis did not find this response very convincing but it did help alleviate some of 
their criticism. The pamphlet did not put an end to the bickering between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Salafis, nor did it prevent disagreements between them from 
deepening over all aspects of intellectual, political, and activist life. The differences 
between the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood became glaringly obvious, starting with 
the institutions that represented them and the magazines in which each one of them set out 
to publish their views.
339
 But the fiercest competition was over the social domain, 
especially control of mosques which were considered the most important locations for 
Sunni Islamist movements to maximise their outreach to the average and the more pious 
Muslims. Imams or whoever happens to wield a great deal of influence in mosques can 
make the most of mosques to win over the sympathies and support of those who perform 
prayers. Such support could with time turn into moral and financial help or even joining 
the movement. 
Mosques were also at the heart of the operations of the Islamist movements, such as 
attracting young people and introducing them to the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood or 
the Salafis. Upon joining the group, young people used mosques as a launching pad to 
attract peers to their movement. Because of the important role of mosques, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Salafis were locked in a fierce struggle to control as many mosques as 
possible in Kuwait, either by securing the appointment of an Imam sympathetic to one 
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group’s cause, or by increasing their presence in mosques and thus forcing the hand of the 
other side. In the context of this race over mosques, no technique or method was spared; 
both sides tried to cast doubt on the educational and doctrinal soundness of the other side’s 
approach. While the Salafis criticised the Muslim Brotherhood for what they perceived as 
their lax approach to religion and indifference to ‘purifying it from impurities’, the Muslim 
Brotherhood criticised the Salafis for their training strategies which were based on 
destructive criticism without due attention given to moral training and tolerance of others. 
Clashes intensified in the 1980s due to the relatively youthful age of the two groups and 
their reliance on enthusiastic young people; this exacerbated the tensions and conflict 
between the two sides for control of the Sunni social domain they shared. With the rise of 
the Salafis the Muslim Brotherhood had lost their monopoly as the sole Islamist 
movement.  
4.10 The Iraqi Invasion and the Social Domain 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a turning point in changing the social landscape of the 
Kuwaiti society which, overnight, found itself catapulted from a state of complacency and 
great material comfort to one of crisis and fear. The predicament and the tough 
circumstances the Kuwaitis had to endure brought them all closer, and overshadowed any 
ideological differences they might have had prior to the invasion. The common fate that 
awaited them required them to be united in their social and political efforts to liberate the 
country, provide basic services to Kuwaitis inside, and communicate with the government 
of Kuwait abroad. Movements worked closely together to provide basis services to the 
community through committees established for that purpose. The work of these Islamist 
movements (Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis and Shiʿas) was largely focused on ensuring that 
the service sector remained operational, in addition to some pockets of resistance that 
functioned in their areas of influence.  
The critical security situation did not allow for any attempts to exercise control over the 
social domain, but the work done by these movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood 
which was the most organised and wide-spread in Kuwait, naturally increased their 
popularity among Kuwaitis. Despite the short span of the occupation which lasted around 
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seven months, it had a great impact on society and changed its view of Islamist movements 
which now entered a new era marked by less conflict.
340
 
The post-liberation phase followed by state-building enabled the Islamists to become more 
politically engaged, especially as the invasion had allowed them to become more 
integrated with the society as it got to know them better. The Muslim Brotherhood had the 
lion’s share of post-invasion progress, when the movement announced the establishment of 
a new political entity called “The Islamic Constitutional Movement” (ICM), the first of its 
kind in Kuwait and the Gulf. The Muslim Brotherhood were given a free hand at the 
Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs and were also permitted to set up a number of 
organisations such as the General Secretary of Awqaf. The Muslim Brotherhood expanded 
other social organisations like the Committees of Good Companionship, Social Work 
committees and others that helped them cement their status as a formal movement.  
Their aim was to make the most of the post-liberation momentum in Kuwait and abroad. 
They were also very keen on becoming more integrated into society and spreading their 
message to all sectors and classes of the Kuwaiti society. But the Muslim Brotherhood was 
unable to break away from the organizational mould of secrecy that had been their mantra 
for a very long time. This prompted some of their new sympathisers to abandon the 
Brotherhood because they felt they were mere tools in the hands of the upper leadership 
with no decision-making powers. This meant that the Muslim Brotherhood had really not 
changed much, apart from having acquired some new privileges and rights. 
4.11 Conclusion 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait succeeded in reinstating the influence of Islamist 
movements on the social domain after decades of domination by the secularists. This could 
not have been achieved without the Muslim Brotherhood’s alliance with the government 
with the explicit aim of reducing the influence of the secularists on both the social and 
political domain. Various events in the region also contributed to the spread of Muslim 
Brotherhood ideas, especially when popular discourse found itself in harmony with 
government discourse. Islamist movements, chiefly the Muslim Brotherhood, were caught 
up in fierce intellectual clashes with the secularists but succeeded in imposing their 
ideology on the social domain and rolling back the influence of secularists.  
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But the biggest threat to Muslim Brotherhood authority and influence came from a totally 
unexpected source; the Salafis. The Salafi movement emerged as a major contender in the 
battle for the hearts and minds of Sunni Muslims in Kuwait. Indeed, it could be argued that 
the biggest problem the Muslim Brotherhood faced in the social domain was the Salafis, 
rather than any other movement or party. The Salafis themselves had their own set of 
issues and problems due to internal conflict over a number of issues. This led to deep 
divisions within the Salafi movement which found itself splitting into various groups such 
as the Jihadist Salafis who believed that all political regimes in Muslim countries were 
heretical, including the ruling families of the Gulf states and another Salafi group which 
issued fatwas that it was forbidden to criticise leaders in any way. Between the extreme 
views of these two groups, a number of other Salafi movements emerged, further 
complicating the scene. Undoubtedly, the Salafis’ internal politics were much worse than 
any conflict they had with the Muslim Brotherhood but the scope of this thesis does not 
allow for further elaboration.  
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Chapter V 
Islamists and Politics 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
For the Kuwaiti Islamists in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, politics 
takes priority only after social activism. In fact, the reason for entering politics was to 
spread the Islamist influence throughout the social domain. The Muslim Brotherhood 
participated in parliament in order to introduce laws and legislation on the basis of Islamic 
Shariʿa and to minimize the influence of the secularists who had already introduced much 
legislation that violated Islamic teachings. The Muslim Brotherhood in coalition with other 
Islamists and tribal forces succeeded in passing much Islamic legislation such as the law 
banning the consumption and selling of alcohol, the decree establishing the Kuwaiti Zakat 
House, and the Personal Status law.  
5.2 Historical Background 
Politically speaking, the discovery of oil came at a very opportune time for both the ruling 
family and the people, who were suffering from economic hardships and deep political 
problems. The introduction of Japanese cultured pearls in the late 1920s had all but ruined 
the lives of those dependent on pearl diving, while small maritime transportation 
businesses were undermined by modern cargo ships, WWI having ended with Britain 
gaining full control over the region’s trade routes in order to protect its own interests. The 
1930s was a period of vigorous political activism demanding democratic changes but was 
met by fierce repression from the ruling family. The mid-1940s and onwards witnessed a 
great deal of international stability following the Allied victory and the reinvigoration of 
industries, especially the oil industry. Oil-exporting countries, including Kuwait, witnessed 
a great economic revival. Both the ruling family and the people of Kuwait breathed a sigh 
of relief when the economic wheel rolled on at new and unprecedented speeds.  
Political life shook off its inertia with the arrival of Shaikh ʿAbdullah al-Salim, but the 
honeymoon came to an abrupt end after an event held by the Nationalist Cultural Club to 
  181 
celebrate the withdrawal of British troops from Port Said after the Suez Crisis. The event 
took a surprising turn when Jasim al-Qatami, a prominent Nationalist leader, harshly 
criticized the tribal system of government in Kuwait in front of important members of the 
ruling family, including Abdullah al-Jabir. The backlash from the al-Subah ruling family 
was quite severe and many civil society organisations and media outlets were shut down as 
the al-Subah tightened their hold on every aspect of economic and political life. The 
indications of Kuwaiti independence from Great Britain, and Shaikh ʿAbdullah al-Salim’s 
need for popular support to ensure that the process would go smoothly, compelled him to 
ease the pressure on the Nationalists in order to win their support for his efforts to secure 
Kuwait’s independence.  
Independence from Great Britain on 19 June 1961 brought with it the promise of a new, 
modern, and stable state, but was not without detractors; for example, the Iraqi president 
ʿAbdulkarīm Qasim had demanded that Kuwait be annexed to Iraq. The Soviet Union’s 
support for this demand made it harder for Kuwait to secure international recognition and 
join the United Nations. Qasim’s threat to annex Kuwait by force was especially 
problematic in a country that lacked a democratic system that would reflect the views and 
aspirations of the average Kuwaiti, but various political movements in Iraq expressed their 
unconditional support for the ruling family against Qasim’s threats. These were also 
rejected by Britain, which dispatched a military force to thwart Iraq’s ambitions in 
Kuwait.
341
 The newly-independent state of Kuwait soon won international recognition and 
joined the Arab league and the United Nations.
342
 A grateful ʿAbdullah al-Salim returned 
the favour and ordered the establishment of an elected legislative council after Qasim had 
withdrawn his claims, and Kuwait was granted much-coveted membership in the UN. A 
new constitution was drafted to regulate the relationship between the ruling family and the 
people of Kuwait and this set the stage for the modern state. 
Throughout the modern history of Kuwait, the country’s traditional political establishment 
prove that it has been always very powerful and that it became even more powerful with 
the rise of the petro-dollar. ʿAbdullah al-Salim worked hard to rein in the traditionalists 
through the new constitution. With the progress made by Kuwait in civil services and 
education came a corresponding improvement in political life, assisted by developments in 
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the region and by ʿAbdullah al-Salim’s sound treatment of the Kuwaitis who had 
supported him by adding legitimacy to his rule before the international community. The 
parliament and the constitution were established under unique circumstances that had been 
difficult to attain for more than six months by any national political powers, as evidenced 
by the parliament of 1938. The ruling family had responded very negatively to the 
establishment of a parliament, believing that it would reduce their supremacy and increase 
the power of the people. Thus the new parliament was a great advance in the Kuwaiti 
system of government but it was not enough, especially given the influence of tribal 
affiliation, boosted even further by oil money, and Kuwait’s transformation into a rentier, 
almost communist state that provided all its citizens’ needs from birth to death. Traditional 
seats of power remained firmly in place, due to the economic developments that prioritised 
welfare over citizenship and entrenched the value of state generosity rather than people’s 
rights.
343
 
Despite their calls for political reform, the reformist Islamists, represented by Yusif bin 
ʿIsa, did not profess any political antagonism towards the ruling family. Yet, as previously 
mentioned, when the ruling family came into conflict with movements calling for political 
reforms, the Islamist movement did not wish to jeopardise its influence over the social 
domain by appearing hostile to the ruling family, especially as its objective was social 
rather than political reform. Thus in any conflict between social and political reform, the 
former would take precedence at the expense of the latter. This idea passed on from Yusif 
bin ʿIsa to the Muslim Brotherhood through ʿIsa’s student ʿAbdulaziz al-Ali al-Mutawwaʿ. 
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Society for Social Reform focused on reforming the 
social domain alongside some tentative, sporadic political activities because the memory 
of the clash between the reformists and ruling family was still fresh in everyone’s minds. 
5.3 Political Activities of al-Irshad 
Although al-Irshad emphasized an avoidance of politics, as stated in the introduction of al-
Barnamaj al-Tawjihi, it interacted indirectly with the local political currents. An example 
of such indirect interaction was the personal relationship of senior members with the al-
Subah ruling family. ʿAbdulaziz al-Mutawwaʿ had a close relationship with ʿAbdullah al-
Jabir al-Subah, brother of the former Emir and cousin of the current Emir at that time, who 
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attended some lectures at al-Irshad. Al-Mutawwaʿ also become close to the Emir 
ʿAbdullah al-Salim, for whom he acted as an adviser. Other members of al-Irshad such as 
ʿAbdulraḥman al-ʿAtiqi and Ali al-Jassar, also had unique relationships with the ruling 
family. Al-ʿAtiqi was the personal adviser of the Emir, while al-Jassar was the wedding 
cleric for many members of the ruling family. However, some members of al-Irshad took 
an opposing view of the ruling family; Mohammad al-ʿAdsani was one member who 
adopted a radical method of dealing with the government and the ruling family.
344
 These 
contradictory views and acts between the two strongest figures in al-Irshad led to a huge 
conflict within the society and as a result, weakened its future.  
In dealing with the wrongdoings of the government, ʿAbdulaziz al-Mutawwaʿ followed the 
quietest methods of his teacher Yusif bin ʿIsa by providing advice to the ruler and 
abandoning all violence or harsh criticism.  In 1953, when anti-government brochures that 
were directly and harshly critical of the government were being distributed in the streets, 
ʿAbdulaziz al-Mutawwaʿ wrote in the al-Irshad journal that “honest work which pleases 
Allah should serve the country by working under the sun, not by distributing brochures in 
the darkness of night, and the rulers of this country are not isolated from the people but are 
of them and love to hear from any honest citizen to change the wrong do the right 
thing.”345 
However, this quietist attitude did not prevent him from indirectly criticizing the 
government. For instance, al-Irshad censured the government’s policies on the 
immigration of foreign labour in Kuwait, and ʿAbduaziz al-Mutawwaʿ wrote an article in 
al-Irshad journal entitled “The Immunity of the Nation,” decrying the uncontrolled 
increase of foreign workers, both blue-collar and white collar, and the negative social 
effects on youth, noting that:  
The microbes of moral depravation are spreading their poison in 
the body of the nation to weaken its immunity with this influx of 
different backgrounds of people into the society. You can see 
the result of this uncontrolled influx on the beach with naked 
bodies and on the streets with those beautiful foreign girls 
begging for money! Where the morality police to confront what 
are is going on here and there? Why are our borders open for 
this corruption? This is a fact on the ground and we want a swift 
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reaction and effective treatment of this disease before it becomes 
uncontrollable.
346
 
In another article al-Mutawwaʿ attacked the government for allowing women immigrants 
with no profession or qualifications to enter Kuwait, by which he meant the danger of 
prostitution which not only destroyed the nation’s youth but also distorted the society’s 
Arab and Islamic identity. Al-Mutawwaʿ also presented the numbers of immigrants and 
their countries of origin; there were “...40,000 Iraqis, 12,000 Syrians, 3500 Jordanians and 
Palestinians, 2400 non-Muslim Indians, 1500 Pakistanis, and an unknown number of 
Iranians because of the absence of a governmental Census Bureau.”347 
Al-Irshad was also disparaging about a number of the government’s educational policies, 
such as allowing co-education in a Kuwaiti school in Bombay.
348
 In addition, an article in 
al-Irshad journal on “Girls and Sports” asserted that Islam was not a backward religion; 
however, Islam did not permit girls to show certain parts of their bodies such as their 
thighs, chest, and the private parts (which in Islam constitute the area between the navel 
and the knees), according to the saying of the Prophet that “man should not look at man’s 
private parts neither woman look at private parts of woman.”349Therefore, according to the 
article, the Department of Education should prevent girls from wearing short skirts or 
shorts in front of their male counterparts.
350
 
Last but not least, al-Irshad raised several issues such as unemployment in Kuwait, the 
necessity of establishing a Ministry of Awqaf, and the lack of basic infrastructural needs 
and services (water, electricity, paved roads, etc.). It also commented on internal and 
external political issues such as the article by al-Mutawwaʿ concerning municipal elections 
and the open letter addressed to King Saʿud in the introduction to al-Irshad Journal’s 
edition entitled “Ya Hukkamana” [O Ye, Our Rulers]. 351 
5.3.1 The Relationship of al-Irshad with other Social and Political Constituents 
Al-Irshad followed an open-minded policy toward other societal constituents and was 
influenced by the progressive school of Rashid Rida, who had a marked influence on 
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Hassan al-Banna and on religious reformists and al-Irshad in Kuwait. ʿAbdulʿaziz al-
Mutawwaʿ always repeated Rida’s famous saying: “let us work on what we agree upon, 
and let us excuse each other for what we disagree on.”352 He practised this axiom 
faithfully, exercising his tolerant stance in his interactions with different ideological and 
religious groups such as the Shiʿa and Hizb al-Tahrir.  
Many Shiʿi Kuwaitis participated in activities held in al-Irshad and some of them, such as 
ʿAbdullah al-Khars and Sayyid Hussain ʿAbdulsamad, wrote numerous articles in al-
Irshad journal. In return, members of the Shiʿa community invited some leading figures 
from al-Irshad to lecture in their Hussainiyya. With regard to Hizb al-Tahrir, although it 
was in confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood at that time, al-Irshad maintained a 
volatile relationship with Hizb al-Tahrir but never reached the conflict point, as occurred 
in other countries. Indeed, some members of al-Irshad, like Sayyid Yusif al-Rifaʿi and 
Rashid al-Farhan, actually joined Hizb al-Tahrir; this bridged the gap between the two 
Sunni Islamist groups and improved relations between them. 
However, the relationship with the Nationalists was weak even before the clash that 
occurred in Egypt between the Muslim Brotherhood and President Nasser. Sayyid Yusif 
al-Rifaʿi, Khalid al-Masʿud, and ʿAbdulraḥman al-ʿAtiqi, who were all members of al-
Irshad, arranged a meeting with Mohammad al-Barrak, President of the National Cultural 
Club, and his vice-President Ahmad al-Khatib, along with other leading members Jassim 
al-Qatami and Ahmad al-Munayyis. Nevertheless, the Nationalists remained hesitant about 
establishing any connection with al-Irshad, and when al-Khatib became the Club’s 
President he refused to have any connection with al-Irshad because of the radical 
divergence between his Communist ideas and the Islamic ideology of al-Irshad. 
Al-Irshad’s political positions were in practice meant to serve their agenda in the social 
domain, of which the Islamists saw themselves as guardians. There were demands to ban 
foreign women from migrating to Kuwait as well as mixed gender education in order to 
protect society, especially young people, from moral corruption. Since demands for basic 
services were also considered part of their remit within the social domain, al-Irshad was 
thus a purely social organisation even in its political demands. Al-Irshad’s position vis-à-
vis politics and the ruling family was met with great dismay by Muhammad al-ʿAdsani and 
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Najib Juwaifil, with several young ʾIrshad members being incited by Juwaifil against the 
leadership of al-Mutawwaʿ; this, as discussed above was to culminate in a period of 
internal strife.  
The clashes between the revolutionary wing (influenced by the National Bloc) and the 
pacifist wing (of Yusif bin ʿIsa) affected al-Irshad. This conflict was undoubtedly a natural 
outcome of the divergent and varied ideas circulating among al-Irshad members. In the 
end, no party could claim complete victory, which further weakened al-Irshad and lent 
more legitimacy to the secularists. Media pressure was also compounded by security 
pressures in Egypt and Iraq. Islamists in Kuwait shared the plight of the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement in other countries. And although Islamists in general and the 
Muslim Brotherhood members in particular were never targeted by the security apparatus, 
they nonetheless suffered from social and media isolation. 
However, this pressure on the Islamists did not stop them from participating in politics. 
Yusif al-Rifaʿi, an Islamist candidate ran unsuccessfully for the Constituent Assembly 
elections of 1962, but in the first parliamentary elections held in 1963 he did secure a seat, 
for reasons probably unrelated to his Islamic affiliation, such as being a descendant of the 
Prophet, since the Shiite vote contributed to his win. Neither did ʿAbduallah al-Ali or 
Ahmad Bzeiʾ al-Yasin, the two other candidates fielded by the Islamists that year, win 
seats in 1963.  In fact the Islamists lacked any prominent political figures who could 
represent them in parliament. Nor can Muhammad al-ʿAdsani, who won a seat in 1963, 
1967 and 1981 and later (1981-1984)  became Speaker of the House, be regarded as an 
example of Muslim Brotherhood electoral success, since he had renounced much of his 
Muslim Brotherhood ideology, especially the political aspects. His status as an 
independent national figure can be attributed to his family name and his opposition to 
many government policies, especially the rigging of elections in 1967.  
5.4 Al-Islah in the Political Domain 
Both Ghabrah and Tahhan argue that al-Islah was an early participant in the political 
domain as a means towards serving its social goals. For instance, al-Islah had triggered the 
battle against the selling and consumption of alcohol in Kuwait, issuing statements and 
organising lectures about the damaging effects of alcohol on society and the importance of 
drafting legislation that would ban alcohol in Kuwait completely. The existence of a civil 
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society institution like al-Islah was instrumental in opening a wider debate about the issue, 
especially within the parliament. Alcohol had been legal in Kuwait prior to 1964, with the 
British company Gray, MacKenzie & Co. holding a decades-old monopoly on the alcohol 
trade, while Christians were issued with ration cards permitting them to purchase 
liquor.
353
Al-Raʾi al-ʿAam newspaper mocked Gray, Mackenzie & Co’s monopoly by 
referring to the company as “Shaikh Mackenzie’s” company (due to its policy of selling 
alcohol at very high prices). The ban on alcohol was gradual, and followed some heated 
debates within society and in parliament.  Initially, in accordance with Penal Code No. 16 
for 1960, the ban applied only to trading in alcohol and penalties were applied to the act of 
importing and selling alcohol but not to its consumption.  However, in 1964, Article 206 
was added to Law No 46 for 1964 banning the consumption of alcohol in any public place. 
Article 206 was further amended in 1983 (under Law No. 9) to include tougher penalties 
for both traders and consumers.
354
 
The other issue adopted by al-Islah was Article 2 of the Kuwaiti Constitution which 
stipulated that “Islamic Shariʿa is a main source of legislation”. The Society demanded that 
this article be amended to read “Islamic Shariʿa is the main source”, and this has remained 
a bone of contention between Islamists and secularists. The Constituent Assembly records 
reveal the many heated debates surrounding the amendment of Article 2 of the 
Constitution.  MP Khalifa al-Jeri, who petitioned the 19th session of the Constituent 
Assembly on 11 September 1962 to amend Article 2, is recorded as saying that “Kuwait is 
a Muslim country and there is no source but Islam. This amendment would guarantee that 
we adhere to our religious values, achieve social justice and protect freedoms according to 
Allah’s teachings.” A number of MPs supported the proposal (including Ahmad Khalid al-
Fawzan, Naif al-Dabbus, Saʿud ʿAbdulrazzaq, and Mubarak al-Hasawi).355 
However, other MPs, opposed the suggested legislation for several reasons. For instance, 
Ahmad al-Khatib, the vice-president of the Constituent Assembly, enquired about the 
meaning of the proposed re-wording of the text and whether it would be applied literally 
(e.g., to the as chopping off of thieves’ hands and demanding an eye for an eye); and if that 
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was indeed the case, what would be the fate of banks, companies, and the rest of the 
economic structure whose local and international dealings were not based on Shariʿa law? 
Humud Zaid al-Khalid then enquired about hereditary rule which, he noted, contradicted 
Islamic Shariʿa. This issue in particular struck a chord with the ruling family despite the 
falsehood of the whole premise. The Assembly then sought the advice of the Egyptian 
constitutional expert ʿUthman Khalil ʿUthman, who was of the opinion that amending the 
text of the article and introducing the definite article “the” would make it virtually 
impossible to draw upon other sources. He added that the article of the law in its current 
format gave prominence to Shariʿa without restricting the legislator to one source only, 
especially in drafting laws best suited for new realities on the ground. In response to a 
question from al-Khatib as to whether rewording the text would mean the literal adherence 
to Shariʿa or simply that Kuwait, as a Muslim country, must remain true to the spirit of 
Islam, ʾUthman answered that the definite article “the” would make it legally binding to 
adhere to Shariʿa and nothing else, but that the current text allowed for several sources, 
including Shariʿa.356 Although the article was not amended, the issue was destined to 
resurface several times over the next few decades in 1973, 1975, 1980, 1981, 1992, 1997 
and 1998.
357
 
5.5 The 1968 Organisation and Politics 
To begin with the 1968 Organisation did not have any political presence, let alone political 
goals, due to the relatively young age of its members and the desire of its founders to steer 
clear of politics. But these wishes were short-lived; the nexus between social issues and 
politics meant the movement could not turn inwards to focus on capacity building and re-
establishing their dominion on the social domain. Very early on the Muslim Brotherhood 
found itself embroiled in political struggles despite all attempts to avoid political 
engagement. The Muslim Brotherhood supported al-Islah in its various political 
campaigns, especially the Islamisation of the constitution by amending Article 2, in 
addition to other moral issues. 
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5.5.1 Islamising Kuwait University and Teachers Association 
The Muslim Brotherhood also sought to change reality from the bottom up, starting with 
the University of Kuwait which they considered as the ‘locus of moral depravity’.  
Because the National Union of Kuwaiti Students (NUKS) was widely perceived as 
influential in student life, the Muslim Brotherhood invested a lot of time and effort to 
control it. This put them in direct conflict with the secularists who at the time dominated 
the Union. It was only after the mixed-gender education incident of 1973 that the Muslim 
Brotherhood realised the importance of the NUKS and the ferocity of the battle with the 
secularists over controlling it. This prompted them to regroup and collaborate with those 
who shared their line of thought on the issue. In 1977, al-Iʾtilafiyyah [Coalition List] 
appeared, which consisted of the Muslim Brotherhood and other sympathetic groups at the 
university. The NUKS list from the Faculty of Law, the Moderates list from the Faculty of 
Business, and the Independent list were thus unified under one list to represent the 
Islamists in the NUKS elections at the University of Kuwait branch.  
Al-Iʾtilafiyyah declared that it represented “every Muslim who loves and respects Allah’s 
laws, every citizen who wishes the best for his country and every student who aspires to a 
better university.”358 Thus, the list identified itself as both nationalist and Islamist. Al-
Iʾtilafiyyah contested the 1978 elections which were rigged and therefore led to wide-
spread protests. Security forces had to intervene and NUKS was suspended for a whole 
year. A new round of elections was held in 1979 and secured a landslide victory for the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Wasatal-Dimoqrati [The Democratic Centre List], which 
represented the secularists, came third in what was perceived as huge blow, especially 
since the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood had come first, while the Shiites came second.
359
 
Al-Iʾtilafiyyah has since dominated the leadership of the Student Union at the University 
of Kuwait.  In 1981 the Muslim Brotherhood also succeeded in dominating foreign 
branches of NUKS in the UK and the USA.  Capitalising on their success, the Muslim 
Brotherhood used the Union as a platform for spreading the ideas of the Muslim 
Brotherhood among students in Kuwait and abroad, and sought to Islamize the student 
community by focusing on raising religious consciousness. This was done through the 
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work of the Committee for Religious Awareness which organised religious lessons, Qur’an 
contests and ʿUmra trips to Mecca. Al-Iʾtilafiyyah also pressed officials, especially within 
the university administration, to meet their demands for special places of worship and 
prayers and for imposing the ban on mixed-gender education. These efforts to change the 
social reality at the University of Kuwait coincided with their work to serve the student 
community, and had the effect of making the al-Iʾtilafiyyah and its Islamist ideas much 
more popular among students as well as among Kuwaitis in general. Al-Iʾtilafiyyah also 
succeeded in changing the identity of NUKS by amending parts of the Union’s constitution 
to reflect the thinking of its new Islamist leadership. A paragraph in the preamble was 
changed from, 
We , the university students of Kuwait, being fully aware of the 
importance of union work and its role in securing a better future 
for our people and nation for the purpose of defending human 
causes, have decided to establish the National Union for the 
Students of Kuwait a pioneer project and beacon of hope for the 
future.
360
 
To, 
We, the students of Kuwait, having attended the 8th Convention 
of the National Union for the Students of Kuwait and being fully 
aware of the importance of union work and its role in securing a 
better future for our people and nation on the basis of the 
principles of Islam, have decided to safeguard the National 
Union for the Students of Kuwait as a pioneer project and 
beacon of hope for the future.
361
 
The amendments were introduced during the Eighth Convention of the Union held in 1981 
to debate ways of re-imagining the Union and the nature of its role within a mainly Islamic 
identity. Article 2 of the Constitution was amended and the word ‘democracy’ was 
replaced with ‘shura’ (the Islamic notion of consultation). Two articles (6 and 7) were also 
added to the constitution, Article 6 says: 
As a student organisation that operates according to the 
principles of shura, the Union aims to: (1) Be fully committed to 
the principle of shura; and (2) Work towards implementing 
shura in all walks of life in Kuwait.
362
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And Article 7 says, 
The Union as an Islamist organisation aims at: (1) Raising 
religious awareness; (2) Exposing the plans of the enemies of 
Islam;  (3) Unifying and supporting Muslim student movements; 
and (4)  Boosting ties with Gulf, Arab, Muslim and international 
student organisations.
363
 
Al-Iʾtilafiyyah succeeded in islamising the student community and fought many battles 
against the university administration over several issues, such as mixed-gender education 
as outlined in the previous chapter. One of the main causes of controversy was a course 
entitled “Islamic Education” which the Faculty of Law and Shariʿa decided to suspend in 
February 1981 for two semesters because of disagreements over the course content. The 
university supported the Faculty’s decision, thereby prompting an angry response from the 
Union’s new leadership which objected vehemently to the decision.364 The Union also 
objected to the manner in which the university’s administration had dealt with the matter 
since the Department of Shariʿa had not been notified of the Faculty’s decision even 
though it was the department that usually offered the course.
365
  Their stand revealed there 
had been prior coordination between the Union and the Department of Shariʿa professors, 
and the confrontation between the Union and the university eventually culminated in a 
student strike.  
The Union issued a statement explaining that it could not find any proper justification for 
suspending the Islamic Education course on the pretext that it needed extensive 
modifications, since the same did not seem to apply to hundreds of other courses at the 
university.
366
Al-Wasat al-Dimoqrati and several nationalist professors condemned the 
Union’s handling of the whole issue and demanded that students comply with the 
university’s scientific decisions. The standoff lasted for two weeks during which time the 
Union insisted on the student strike. Finally, the Crown Prince and Prime Minister Shaikh 
Saʿad al-ʿAbdullah met Union members and promised to form a committee to examine the 
matter. The Islamic Education course was offered that same semester with a few minor 
changes to the syllabus.  This small victory for the Islamists demonstrated the importance 
of retaining full control over NUKS in order to continue the process of Islamising the 
University and to stem the tide of secularists. 
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The success of the Muslim Brotherhood in gaining control of student unions in Kuwait and 
abroad encouraged them to try their luck at professional associations and syndicates which 
traditionally were nationalist strongholds. The Muslim Brotherhood battled with 
nationalists in several professional associations and unions and managed to control some 
of them, with The Teachers’ Association367 being one of those in which the Muslim 
Brotherhood gained a foothold. Having always considered education and the educational 
system at the heart of any social order, the Muslim Brotherhood viewed education as 
inseparable from their religious mission, and therefore competed strongly with secularists 
in their attempts to control the Teachers’ Association.  In 1976, the Association’s board of 
directors was dissolved, following the board’s harsh criticism of the government for 
dissolving the parliament, and was replaced by a government-appointed board headed by 
ʿAbdullah al-ʿUbaid. 
When four years were up, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to support the group that had 
run the Association between 1976 and 1981. The Muslim Brotherhood therefore 
collaborated with the Salafis and al-ʿUbaid’s group to ensure that Shiites and Nationalists 
did not win any seats. In this they were partly successful and, a new board was formed in 
1982, with al-ʿUbaid as its president. The 1984 elections saw major victory for the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Salafis, and al-ʿUbaid group against their Shiite and nationalist rivals. 
For the first time  Islamists were the majority on the board of directors, with Faisal al-
Jaber, Bader Burḥama and Jamal al-Kandari representing the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Bader al-Shamroukh, Salem al-Muhanna and Faisal al-Yaqut representing the Salafis, in 
addition to al-ʾUbaid as president for a third term.  
Despite the disagreements between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, they 
managed, albeit reluctantly, to work together especially in the face of their common 
enemy, the Nationalists and the Shiites. However, in contesting the 1986 and 1988 
elections the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis excluded the al-ʿUbaid group and 
divided the seats among themselves. They concerned themselves with a number of issues 
related to Islam that directly affected teachers’ lives, but due to irreconcilable differences 
the fragile alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis did not last long. 
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TheMuslim Brotherhood therefore decided to run without Salafi support and in 1990 they 
won the majority of seats, especially with the help of female teachers who were extremely 
organised. The Iraqi invasion temporarily halted the Association’s activities but soon the 
Muslim Brotherhood resumed its activities and succeeded in winning all the seats.
368
 
5.5.2 The Battle over the Constitution and Legislations  
With the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in taking over the Teachers Association in 
addition to other professional associations, the movement entered the political domain 
through the parliament. Although ʿAbdullah al-Mutawwaʿ contested the al-Salmiyya seat 
in 1963 and Mishari al-Khashram the Faiha’ seat in 1967, they ran as independents rather 
than a party list and failed to win any seats. The new Muslim Brotherhood movement did 
not participate in parliamentary elections until 1981 but habitually supported Islamists or 
pro-Islamists such as Yusifal-Rifaʿi and ʿAbbas Mnawir and others who were sympathetic 
to the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic causes in the parliament, such as the banning of 
alcohol in Kuwait and the mixed-gender education debate. The 1976 parliament having 
been unconstitutionally dissolved, the government decided in 1981 to hold parliamentary 
elections according to new electoral district divisions. Under the new system, each of the 
25 constituencies would be represented by two MPs. The Muslim Brotherhood debated 
whether to field their own candidates or restrict their efforts to supporting Islamists and 
those close to them. Those who favoured direct participation argued that the Muslim 
Brotherhood should be in parliament at the heart of legislative power in order to introduce 
laws and legislations on the basis of Islamic Shariʿa. They remarked that the secularists 
had already introduced much legislation that violated Islamic teachings and had refused to 
amend Article 2 of the Constitution. Those opposed to contesting the elections were of the 
opinion that Islamists would not be able to form a majority in the parliament, due to the 
new electoral system that meant in effect that they would succeed in passing many laws 
that required a majority. They also felt it was still too early for them to become more 
politically active because they were not yet ready for an experiment that would require a 
lot of time, effort and manpower.  
The experiences of other Muslim Brotherhood organisations in countries like Iraq where 
they clashed with the government, also served to turn Kuwaiti Brotherhood members away 
from politics. However, the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait sent delegations to Muslim 
                                                     
368
Jamal al-Kandari, interview. 
  194 
Brotherhood branches in other countries, and eventually decided to heed the advice of the 
Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood because of the similar nature of the ruling systems in their 
respective countries. Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members advised them to take part in 
the elections but to avoid any ministerial posts since these were usually of no consequence 
and consisted mainly of carrying out orders that could breach Islamic teachings. The 
Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood eventually fielded three candidates: ʿAbdullah al-ʿAtiqi in 
al-Khalidiyya constituency, Humud al-Rumi in al-Faiha and al-Nuzha, and ʿ an al-Shahin 
in al-Rawda. Both al-Rumi and al-Shahin won seats but al-ʿAtiqi lost by a small margin. 
Through their MPs, the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in putting a lot of pressure on the 
Government in parliament to meet their demands regarding several laws and articles. For 
instance,  Article 4 of the Nationality Law, which opened the door to giving the Kuwaiti 
passport and nationality to anyone regardless of his/her religion, was opposed by Islamists 
who pushed for the Article to be amended to propose that only Muslims could become 
Kuwaiti nationals. Article 4 was duly altered to read, 
A decree, upon the recommendation of the Minister of Home Affairs, may be 
issued granting the Kuwaiti nationality to anyone who has reached the age of 
majority if the following conditions are met: 
1. If the applicant has been a resident of Kuwait for at least twenty 
consecutive years or at least 15 years if he is an Arab from 
another Arab country. Any periods of time spent abroad on 
official business shall not prejudice his application for 
nationality but periods spent abroad on unofficial business shall 
be subtracted from the required period of stay. 
2. The applicant shall be employed in legitimate business, be in 
possession of good record and must not have been charged with 
any felony. 
3. The applicant must know Arabic. 
4. The applicant must possess skills that are needed by the State of 
Kuwait. 
5. The applicant shall be a Muslim by birth or have officially 
converted to Islam at least five years before being granted the 
Kuwaiti nationality. His nationality shall be revoked in cases 
where he renounces Islam. This shall apply to all his family 
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members who acquire the nationality through their relation with 
him.
369
 
This amendment was perceived as an important step towards preserving the Islamic 
identity of Kuwaiti society and combatting attempts to westernise it.   
In addition the Islamists in the Parliament worked on passing new Islamic laws. Drawn 
exclusively from Islamic Shariʿa, the new Personal Status law came into effect in October 
1984. This law covered all aspects of family law such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
etc. Many saw the 60-page code as a guarantee that social affairs would remain governed 
by Islamic teachings. Moreover, a decree establishing the Kuwaiti Zakat House followed 
the submission of two proposals by two independent MPs – both of whom were merchants 
– Jassim al-Khurafi and Mishari al-ʿAnjari. Their proposals were merged and referred to 
the Ministry of Awqaf, which prepared a study and presented it to the parliament for 
approval. Law No. 5 for 1982 was issued on 16 January 1982.
370
 Zakat House was 
financially and administratively independent but came under the jurisdiction of the Minster 
of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, who was also president of the board of directors at Zakat 
House. Despite being a government-controlled entity, Zakat House played a substantial 
role in spreading the values of charity and zakat. 
5.5.3 The Relationship with the Government 
Not far from Ghabrah’s argument, the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the government was harmonious and mutually beneficial since both made gains at the 
expense of nationalists and secularists who were hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the government. The government supported the Muslim Brotherhood’s demands for 
various services and legislation that protected society from moral decay through the calls 
for banning alcohol, and protected the Muslim Brotherhood’s members from prosecution 
in the co-education symposium incident at the University of Kuwait. The government also 
issued an Emiri decree establishing the Kuwait Finance House (KFH) despite objections 
from technocrats and secularists, and in addition backed a number of proposals for Shariʿa-
inspired laws in the 1981 parliament.  
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In return, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists refrained from echoing the demands 
of Nationalists for greater political freedoms and reforms, and also refused to discuss the 
election rigging incident of 1967 and the unconstitutional dissolution of the 1976 
parliament. The division of power was clear; Islamists were interested in wielding more 
influence in the social domain through their work at mosques, schools and the university 
and succeeded in controlling many of those at the expense of the Secularists. The 
government, on the other hand, was more concerned with reducing the influence of 
Nationalists by encouraging tribes and Islamists to enter the political domain and to side 
with the government against the Nationalists.  
The honeymoon was soon over and the collaboration between the two sides faced some 
serious, though not fatal, challenges. The Muslim Brotherhood continued to participate in 
parliamentary elections and gradually increased the number of its candidates in various 
constituencies. Other Islamists with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood also won seats. 
A serious standoff ensued between the parliament and the government when the former 
demanded that the Central Bank be placed under the jurisdiction of the parliament. Hamad 
al-Juʿanhad been selected to head the investigation committee into the stock market crisis 
(Souq al-Manakh Crisis) which had badly shaken the Kuwaiti economy.
371
 When al-Juʿan 
asked for the minutes of the meeting of the Central Bank’s board of directors, along with 
other documents, the government refused to comply with his request; a series of 
interrogations was therefore begun that was meant to put the government under pressure. 
The matter was referred to the Constitutional Court which ruled that the parliament was 
within its legal rights to monitor the activities of the Central Bank. On 3 July 1986, the 
parliament was unconstitutionally dissolved and several articles in the Constitution were 
suspended leaving the country in the middle of a political crisis alongside the economic 
crisis with which it was already struggling. Throughout 1989 and 1990, MPs from the 
1985 parliament sought to revive parliamentary life and enforce the 1962 constitution by 
holding extensive meetings known as‘Monday Diwaniyyas.’ Twenty-six MPs, in addition 
to prominent figures from civil society, condemned the unconstitutional dissolution of the 
parliament.  
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The Muslim Brotherhood sided with the opposition against the government, especially 
with regard to the dismal manner in which the government had handled the stock market 
crisis. Mubarak al-Duwaila and ʿAbdullah al-Nafisi conducted separate enquiries that were 
later presented to two ministers from the ruling family. Al-Duwaila, al-Juʿan and Ahmad 
al-Rubʿi participated in the cross-examining of Shaikh Salman al-Subah, the Minister of 
Justice and Legal Affairs, while al-Nafisi, together with Jasim al-Qatami and Mishari al-
ʿUsaimi, interrogated Shaikh Ali al-Khalifa al-Subah, the Minster of Oil and Industry.372  
The Muslim Brotherhood attended the famous ‘Monday Diwaniyyas’ in response to the 
general mood which was highly critical of the government’s performance and its failure to 
bring corrupt officials and those responsible for the economic crisis to justice.  
Following the dissolution of the parliament, a number of political parties stepped up their 
efforts to reinstate parliamentary life according to the 1962 Constitution; and nationalist, 
secularist and merchant powers mobilised to achieve this aim. Ahmad al-Khatib, 
representing 32 MPs, presented a petition to the Emir demanding the reinstatement of the 
parliament and the Constitution. The Emiri Court rejected the petition on the pretext that it 
did not follow the proper channels of reference.
373
  Political efforts faltered between 1986 
and 1988. On 22 February 1988, MP Humud al-Rumi was entrusted with the task of 
presenting a petition with the same demands, only for that to be rejected as well.
374
 
Following these rejections, the conflict escalated when the opposition encouraged people 
to sign a popular petition. More than 20,000 signatures were collected, chiefly through the 
efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood-led University Union.
375
 Popular movements had 
gained momentum in 1986 with a greater focus on tribal areas.  The ‘45 Committee’ was 
formed to represent the interests and demands of merchants, Islamists, and secularists from 
both Shiite and Sunni backgrounds.
376
 When the Committee’s request to meet the Emir 
was rejected, it supported the opposition which held public meetings in the diwaniyyas of 
Jasim al-Qatami, Mishari al-ʿAnjari, Muhammad al-Marshad and Faisal al-Saniʿ.377 
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Meetings were also held at tribal diwaniyyas such as the diwaniyyas of Ahmadal-Shriʿan in 
al-Jahra and ʿAbbas Mnawir in Farawaniyya. A meeting was scheduled at the diwaniyya of 
Saʿad Tami in al-Riqqa but was cancelled because of security concerns.378 Following a 
series of confrontations between security forces and the opposition, the latter called for a 
truce while the government decided to launch a national dialogue. The Crown Prince and 
Prime Minister Shaikh Saʿad met the chief editors of Kuwaiti newspapers on 29 January 
1990 to present the government’s views of the events at the ‘Monday Diwaniyyas,’379 
while a second meeting was held with the Islamic delegation representing Islamists who 
did not belong to any groups like the Salafis or the Muslim Brotherhood.
380
 This meeting 
was also attended by representatives from charity organisations dominated by Islamists, 
such as Yusif al-Hajji from the ʿAbdullah Al-Nuri Charity Society, Ahmad al-Jasser and 
Ahmad Bezeʿ al-Yasin from al-Najat Society (both organisations were closely affiliated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood), ʿAbdullah al-ʿAtiqifrom al-Islah, and ʿUmar al-Ghrair 
from the Teachers’ Professional Association (both controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood). 
Salafis were represented by Sultan bin ʿIsa and Rashid al-Misabbahi from the Society for 
the Revival of Islamic Heritage. The Islamic delegation issued a statement following the 
meeting in which they stressed the importance of national dialogue and the urgent need to 
reinstate parliamentary life in accordance with the 1962 Constitution and without changing 
election laws. The statement mentioned that there was a proposal to amend the 
Constitution which the delegation insisted should only be done by the parliament in a 
manner that did not violate the Constitution.
381
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The meeting with the Islamic delegation was followed by a number of meetings with MPs 
from the 1985 parliament who reiterated their demands.
382
 But the government eventually 
decided to replace the parliament with the National Council, only half of which was 
elected (50 seats) while the rest of the seats were filled by government appointments.
383
 
The opposition responded by calling for a boycott of the National Council elections that 
were held in June 1990.
384
 The turnout was very low and none of the major parties 
participated. More than 194 prominent figures signed a petition known as the ‘ʿAbdulʿaziz 
al-Saqir Petition,’ which emphasised the sense of hope and expectation that had prevailed 
before the government had decided to establish the National Council and ignore public 
demands for reinstating the old parliament. The petition noted that the relationship 
between the ruling family and the people was one that had been inspired by the spirit of 
democracy since the establishment of Kuwait,
385
 and renewed the opposition’s demands 
that the 1962 Constitution must be reinstated and that any changes to the parliamentary 
process should also be done according to the constitution.
386
 Signatories announced they 
were boycotting the National Council elections.
387
 The petition reflected the demands 
made by the MPs of the 1985 parliament. The political crisis persisted until 2 August 1990 
when the Iraqi invasion created more urgent and pressing realities. 
Signatories on the 1985 parliament statement included Brotherhood MPs (Humud al-
Rumi, Mubarak al-Duwaila), while members of the Muslim Brotherhood who also signed 
the petition included Mubarak al-Duwaila, Adil al-Subiḥ, Bashir al-Rashidi, Muhammad 
al-Muqatiʾ, Faisal al-Khatrash, Bader al-Sumait, and ʿAbdulmuḥsin al-Khurafi, as well as 
ʿAbdullah al-Nafisi, and Jamal al-Shihab.388 Despite the participation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in these opposition efforts, a number of their leaders did not sign some of 
these petitions; chief amongst them was ʿAbdullah al-Ali al-Mutawwaʿ who sent 
ʿAbdullah al-ʿAtiqi to represent him as part of the Islamic delegation. Al-Mutawwaʿs good 
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relationship with the ruling family, especially Shaikh Saʿad was the reason why he did not 
sign the petition, although he attended many opposition meetings.  
The political crisis had placed the Muslim Brotherhood in an untenable position. On the 
one hand they enjoyed excellent relations with the government, but on the other, they were 
careful not to alienate the population, who had been angered by the government’s decision 
to dissolve the parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in the opposition 
occurred only through politicians and some members of professional association, with the 
result that the movement was accused of double standards, over their insistence on 
maintaining good relations with the government while engaging opposition efforts. These 
accusations undoubtedly affected their popularity. 
5.6 The Muslim Brotherhood during the Iraqi Invasion 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait put the constitutional crisis on the backburner as Kuwaitis 
struggled to deal with the unprecedented reality of the occupation. The Muslim 
Brotherhood reacted quickly by re-grouping and reformulating their objectives to suit the 
needs of the times, and played a central role in providing basic services to local 
communities, especially through mosques. The Muslim Brotherhood’s social role during 
the invasion was outlined in the previous chapter. In the political domain, the Muslim 
Brotherhood was instrumental in maintaining links between the political leadership in Taif 
and Kuwaitis inside Kuwait through the correspondence carried by various Muslim 
Brotherhood members (Ismail al-Shatti, for example, represented Kuwaitis inside at the 
Jeddah conference). The Muslim Brotherhood had access to satellite services, which they 
used for communicating with the government. Their most important contribution during 
the invasion was organising the Jeddah conference and reconciling the opposition with the 
government in order to reach a consensus and put up a united front before the international 
media. 
5.6.1 The Jeddah Conference 
The Iraqi president Saddam Hussain claimed that Kuwait’s ruling family, Al-Subah, 
lacked any legitimacy and that its decision to dissolve the parliament and suspend 
democratic institutions had been done to hide other serious issues, such as the 
disagreements over the Iraqi-Kuwaiti borders and the joint oil fields between Kuwait and 
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Iraq, and Iraq’s attempts to drive up oil prices by reducing OPEC production in order to 
prop up its ailing economy, drained by years of war with Iran. Saddam Hussain had also 
requested that Gulf States cancel Iraqi debts in return for preventing the Iranian Revolution 
from spilling into their countries. Irrespective of the reason, Saddam Hussein used 
democracy as a pretext to occupy Kuwait, prompting the French president François 
Mitterrand to question the legitimacy of al-Subah family among Kuwaitis.
389
 
In light of these serious allegations, the Kuwaiti government rushed to hold a conference to 
assert popular support for al-Subah family, and Shaikh Saʿad invited representatives from 
all political and social forces to attend the conference. Opposition groups seized the 
opportunity to bargain with the Taif government for the return of the parliament, the 
reinstatement of the 1962 Constitution and the formation of a national unity government. 
The second point was the bone of contention that almost caused the Jeddah conference to 
fail. The Muslim Brotherhood acted as mediators between the two stubborn sides, with al-
Mutawwaʿ playing a central role in thawing the ice between them. The Taif government 
agreed to the opposition’s demands for the revival of the 1962 constitution. Another debate 
ensued over who would deliver a speech in the name of the Kuwaiti people, with one side 
favouring the Speaker of the dissolved parliament, Ahmad Saʿdun, and the other proposing 
Yusif al-Hajji. Eventually neither was chosen and ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Saqir was selected to 
deliver the speech.
390
 The Conference was held between 13 and 15 October 1990 under the 
slogan “Liberation: Our slogan, our path, our aim.”391 
The Muslim Brotherhood represented by ʿAbdullah Al-Mutawwaʿ was instrumental in 
managing and organising the conference. Al-Mutawwaʿ made a few modifications to al-
Saqir’s speech by adding the word shura next to democracy and a number of phrases to 
emphasise the Muslim aspect of Kuwaiti identity. Among the phrases he added were the 
following: 
...The second pillar I would like to emphasise is Islam. The new 
Kuwaiti order must focus on Islamic education, moral codes and 
social practices to raise a generation of pious and committed 
young people who believe in the greatness of Islam and its 
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causes. They must also be aware of Islam’s spirit of tolerance 
and fully versed in its teachings, ready to defend it and 
encourage others to embrace Islam without prejudice or bias.
392
 
Al-Saqir agreed to the changes and included them in the speech he gave after the Emir of 
Kuwait, Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Subah, and the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, 
shaikh Saʿad al-Subah had delivered their own speeches. Al-Shatti participated in the 
Jeddah conference with a speech on behalf of the Kuwaiti people under occupation (having 
carried the speech across the Kuwaiti-Saʿudi borders). The conference succeeded in 
stressing the legitimacy of al-Subah rule, the importance of the 1962 Constitution and the 
democratic process, which left the media with a very positive impression of the Taif 
government. It also served to emphasise the Islamic aspect of Kuwait identity.  
The Muslim Brotherhood played a pivotal role in mediating between the opposition and 
the government and made very positive contributions to the organisation of the conference 
and its themes, as evidenced by al-Saqir’s speech and the final statement. The government 
also relied on them and other political parties to present the Kuwaiti point of view to the 
rest of the world. Sixteen delegations were formed and dispatched to various countries.  
Tariq Suwaidan, a Muslim Brotherhood member, was on the delegations sent to the United 
States, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela and Ecuador. Suwaidan also headed the 
International Committee for Kuwaiti Solidarity, which was established by Brotherhood 
members studying abroad, mainly in the United States.
393
 Yusif al-Hajji was in the 
delegation dispatched to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, Austria, and Poland. Bader al-Sumait was in the delegation to China, South 
Korea, Japan, North Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. ʿAbdullah al-
Mutawwaʿ joined the delegation to the Gulf States, while Nasser al-Saniʿ, Ismail al-Shatti 
and Ahmad al-Qattan went to countries of North Africa. Mubarak Duwaila represented the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the delegation to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, and 
Sudan while ʿAbdulwahab al-Huti joined the Kuwaiti delegation to Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia, Uganda, Djibouti and Tanzania.
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The UK and Ireland branch of the Kuwaiti Students Union led by the Muslim Brotherhood 
launched the “Free Kuwait” campaign. They were the first to issue a statement 
condemning the Iraqi invasion and later ensured that Kuwaiti students in the UK continued 
to receive government funds; these were handled by Shaikh Khalid al-Subah who 
distributed them to students all over the UK.
395
 
During January and February, the Muslim Brotherhood became increasingly confident that 
Kuwait would soon be liberated, which prompted them to prepare for the regaining of 
independence. Several meetings were held to determine the aims and objectives of the 
post-independence period, chiefly how to capitalise on the increasing popularity of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in light of their exemplary aid and relief efforts during the invasion.  
The Muslim Brotherhood remained wary of coming out into the open, although this 
seemed on the face of it an ideal time to do so. It was, decided therefore to establish a 
number of fronts for the Muslim Brotherhood, in addition to the Society for Social 
Reform.  
5.7 The Liberation and the Establishment of the Islamic Constitutional Movement 
(ICM) 
The first entity to be founded was the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), to 
represent the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. Brown assert that the 
name of the movement reflected the Muslim Brotherhood’s commitment to the 
Constitution and its Islamic identity, a controversial contention since Article 2 of the 
Constitution did not specify Islamic Shariʿa as the main source of legislation.396 However, 
the Muslim Brotherhood had, revealed in a statement during the invasion that ICM would 
strive to amend the second article of the Constitution. The establishment of the ICM was 
an unprecedented step in the political history of Kuwait, since while most social and 
political movements were known to the Kuwaiti society, there had been very little political 
institutionalisation. Other political movements followed suit, thus imposing a new reality 
in Kuwaiti political life, especially since this shift was spearheaded by the Muslim 
Brotherhood which enjoyed good relations with the government.
397
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The establishment of ICM was announced during a press conference one month after the 
liberation of Kuwait, on 31 March 1991 at the Fatima mosque in the Bayan Area, which 
had been the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood during the invasion.
398
 During the 
press conference, ICM outlined its principles and objectives in a memorandum entitled 
“The Islamic Constitutional Strategy for Rebuilding Kuwait”; this was to include 
establishing the rule of just law in the country; equality between citizens; adopting the 
shura principle in accordance with Islamic teachings; calling for more political 
participation; and amending the Kuwaiti constitution to reflect the noble principles of 
Islam.
399
 ICM also contributed to the drafting of a paper entitled “Future Vision for 
Rebuilding Kuwait” which was signed by a number of prominent Kuwaiti figures, mainly 
Shiite and Sunni Islamists.
400
 The paper remarked that the great sacrifices of the Kuwaiti 
people would go down in history as befitted their courage, resilience and commitment in 
resisting occupation. The paper commented on the tremendous spirit of cooperation and 
solidarity among Kuwaitis during the long months of occupation, and concluded that faith 
in Allah had helped people to pull through and remain steadfast in the face of adversity; 
this demonstrated the importance both of absolute faith in Allah and His abilities, and the 
application of Islamic Shariʿa and the 1962 Constitution.401 
As Brown argues, most of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political literature and the outlets 
they contributed to, such as the statement read out by al-Saqir at the Jeddah conference and 
the ICM memorandums on “The Islamic Constitutional Strategy for Rebuilding Kuwait”, 
and the “Future Vision for Rebuilding Kuwait”, stressed the importance of adopting 
Shariʿa law as a source of legislation while maintaining the political gains of the 1962 
constitution and working to increase them through a new law for political parties. In 
addition to their social projects the Muslim Brotherhood was now making huge leaps in 
the political domain. They called for the separation between the posts of Crown Prince and 
Prime Minister, and for more media and political freedoms, in addition to the reinstatement 
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of the 1962 Constitution. The Muslim Brotherhood had emerged as important political 
player in Kuwaiti life and as an important constituent of the opposition. The latter, 
however, began to falter and disintegrate, due to major ideological differences between its 
Islamist and secularist constituents. The government also played an important role in 
fostering disagreements among opposition parties by supporting some and antagonising 
others. The first of these clashes occurred very soon after the liberation of Kuwait and was 
again centred on amending Article 2 of the Constitution and mixed-gender education at the 
University.  
5.7.1 Post-Liberation Islamists’ Issues in Parliament  
The amending of Article 2 of the Constitution was the Muslim Brotherhood’s top priority 
in parliament. Following the original debate in the 1962 National Assembly the subject 
had been broached many times over the decades with special attention given to debate in 
the 1981 and 1992 National Assemblies. According to Article 174 of the Constitution, 
which outlines how amendments are to be made: 
The Emir and a third of the members of the National Assembly 
may propose amendments to the Constitution by amending, 
adding or revoking articles. If the Emir and the majority of the 
members of the National Assembly vote to discuss amendments, 
the assembly shall debate each article separately. Amendments 
shall be approved by two thirds of the votes and require the 
Emir’s ratification to come into effect with the exceptions of 
Articles 65 and 66 of the Constitution. If the Assembly votes 
against discussing the amendments, a whole year shall pass 
before the same proposal is submitted again. No changes shall 
be made to the Constitution until five years have passed from 
the day the Constitution came into effect.
402
 
There were two attempts to amend Article 2. The first was in 1981 when 26 MPs 
submitted an amendment proposal which was rejected by the Emir in accordance with 
Article 174 of the Constitution granting him the right to reject any attempts to debate the 
issue – an absolute right that could not be vetoed. A similar proposal was signed in 1984 
by 46 MPs but the proposal was rendered moot by the dissolution of parliament. 
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The proposal to amend Article 2 submitted by the 1981 National Assembly contained the 
proposed text of the article as amended, and postulated that “Islam is the religion of the 
state and Islamic Shariʿa is the source of legislation,”403 instead of “Islam is the religion of 
the state and Islamic Shariʿa is the main source of legislation.”404 The proposal explained 
that although the original article encouraged legislatures to rely on Islamic Shariʿa as a 
source of legislation, as evidenced by the statement: “The article of constitution urges the 
legislators to rely on Islamic Shariʿa whenever possible and makes this an explicit 
request,”405 it was not sufficiently binding406 and thus “it became imperative to make 
Shariʿa law the only source rather than one of the sources and to forbid any legislation that 
violates Shariʿa.”407 
The proposal was thus intended to confirm Islam as a legal and social guide. The proposal 
refuted all claims made by secularists that these changes would annul all legislation not 
drawn from Shariʿa, that they posed a threat to the monarchical form of government in 
Kuwait, or that they created a conflict with international economic and financial laws in 
light of Kuwait’s commitment to several international agreements. The response to the first 
claim was that these changes would not in any way hinder the resorting to general laws or 
legislation as long as they did not breach Shariʿa laws.408  The response to the second 
claim was that the changes did not allude to the monarchical system which had been 
decided by shura and popular consensus.
409
 As for the third claim, the proposal argued that 
these could be considered necessary laws to ensure the smooth running of daily life.
410
 
In July 1994, 39 members from the 1992 National Council submitted yet another proposal 
for amending Article 2 of the Constitution, and once again the Emir rejected it, thereby 
marking an end to all attempts to amend the article.
411
 Some half-hearted attempts were 
made subsequently, but were not actively pursue by the Islamists who had become firmly 
convinced the ruling family was not interested in amending the Article. However, Shaikh 
Jabir al-Subah was eager to please the Islamists as he had been back in 1981 when he 
allowed several items of Islamic legislation to be formally codified.  He therefore issued 
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Decree Number 139 for the year 1991 for establishing the Higher Advisory Council to 
Work towards Applying Islamic Shariʿa. This body was entrusted with the task of 
examining how various pieces of legislation could be islamised, and under the leadership 
of Shaikh Khalid al-Mathkur, it presented a number of studies and reports to the 
parliament, some of which were duly adopted. The Islamists may have failed to amend 
Article 2 of the Constitution but they did succeed in Islamising many laws and regulations. 
They also became increasingly convinced that amending Article 2 did not mean that 
society would, by default, become more Islamic. Egypt served as a perfect example of a 
country which had amended an article 2 to make Shariʿa the source of legislation without 
that leading to the application of Islamic teachings across the board.  
The second issue which preoccupied the Islamists was that of mixed-gender education at 
the University of Kuwait.
412
 After years of struggle, they succeeded in forcing the hand of 
the University and its secularist administration, who were obliged to conform to 
parliamentary legislation that had been adopted in cooperation with the government. The 
ICM, represented by Jamal al-Kandari, headed negotiations with the government and the 
Crown Prince and Prime Minister, shaikh Saʿad al-Subah. Once the Islamists realised they 
were not going to win the battle to amend Article 2, they decided to focus their energies on 
trying to make other laws more Islamic. The debate over mixed-gender education was part 
of their battle to ensure that these laws were implemented.  
The relationship between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood following Kuwait’s 
liberation from the Iraqi occupation remained warm and amiable despite the Emir’s 
rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood’s proposal for amending Article 2 of the 
Constitution. A number of laws presented by the Islamists were approved by the 
government, which also offered alternatives to projects that it did not approve; hence the 
establishment of the Higher Advisory Council to Work towards Applying Islamic Shariʿa. 
With help from the government, the Islamists also succeeded in increasing their influence 
in the social domain and became increasingly powerful in the political domain at the 
expense of secularists.  
Nevertheless, this close relationship came at a price, with the Islamists remaining silent 
amid calls for investigating the government’s responsibility in the events that had 
culminated in the invasion. Many called for the government to be held accountable for 
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mishandling the earlier signs of the impending crisis with Iraq in the summer of 1990, but 
instead of the judiciary being entrusted with the task, a parliamentary fact-finding 
committee was set up to investigate the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The government formed 
the committee in coordination with the Islamists, and a ballot was held on 8 December 
1992 to select the members of the committee. Saleh al-Fudalah was elected president, 
Ahmad Baqir was secretary general, and the members included Ismail Al-Shatti, Khalid al-
ʿAdwa, Fahad al-Meeʿ, Talal al-ʿAyyar, Yaqub Hayati and ʿAbdullah al-Naibari. Al-Shatti 
and al-ʿAyyar resigned on 16 November 1993 and 30 November respectively and were 
replaced by Mubarak al-Duwaila and Khalaf Dmaithir al-ʿAnizi. The list of members 
reflects the level of government-Islamist coordination. The committee which began its 
work on 10 December 1992 and finished on 14 August 1995, met 96 times, with the 
military, political and financial aspects of the invasion being discussed during these 
meetings. However, despite the detailed report that outlined the events leading up to the 
invasion and the ensuing occupation, its causes, major events and outcomes, no party was 
singled out for any recriminations. The only person to be held politically accountable was 
Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Subah, who had been Kuwait’s foreign minister on the eve of 
the invasion; he was ousted from the Cabinet between 1992 and 1996 but was later 
reinstated.  
Notwithstanding the good relations between the Islamists and the government during the 
1990s, a few skirmishes did occur between them, especially over the issue of granting 
women the right to vote and to run as candidates. Article 1 of Kuwait’s Election Law states 
that only Kuwaiti males over the age of 21 are eligible to vote.
413
 Attempts to grant women 
access to political participation had begun in 1971, when MP Salem al-Marzuq submitted a 
draft law that would grant women the right to vote; however, only twelve MPs voted in 
favour. The law did not fare any better in the 1975, 1981, 1985, 1992 and 1996 National 
Assemblies, but on 16 May 1999, the government announced that the Emir wished to grant 
women the right to vote and to stand for elections. A royal decree was issued that deleted 
the word ‘male’ from the first Article of the Election Law but the approval of the National 
Assembly was still required before it could pass into law. The 1999 National Assembly 
narrowly rejected the Emir’s decree, which failed to pass by only two votes.  
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Six years later, on 16 May 2005, the parliament passed a government proposal that granted 
women the right to vote and contest elections. The government had coordinated efforts 
with secularists, independents and Shiites within and outside the parliament to ensure that 
the draft law would pass.  It also persuaded Islamists and tribal representatives to vote for 
the law by agreeing that the text of the law could have an “Islamic” addition, to the effect 
that, 
Article (1) Any Kuwaiti over the age of 21 shall have the right 
to vote. This excludes nationalised citizens who were 
nationalised less than twenty years prior to the elections being 
held according to Article (60) of the Emiri Decree Number (15) 
for the year 1959. Women may vote and stand in elections as 
long as they respect the teachings of Islamic shariʿa.414 
Thus, the Islamists succeeded in making the legislation more ‘Islamic’ through an 
understanding with the government. 
5.8 Political Opposition within the Movement 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, similar to any other movement, witnessed differences 
of opinion among its leaders especially in the absence of any clear vision or political goals. 
The Movement’s leaders in Kuwait al-Ali and al-‘Adsani differed over how to deal with 
the ruling family. Shaikh Abdullah al-Jaber al-Sabah wished to become an honorary 
member in al-Irashd. Al-Mutawwa’ who enjoyed great relations with the ruling family 
welcomed the idea but al-‘Adsani was completely opposed to it.415 Al-Mutawwa‘ and al-
‘Adsani also disagreed over how to respond to Nasser’s campaign against the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt. The former adopted a neutral stand while the latter declared his 
support of the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite there being previous disagreements between 
the two over a number of issues, it was political issues that deepened the division between 
the two men. 
The 1968 organisation faced similar challenges. Following the government’s decision to 
reinstate the parliament in 1981 after it was suspended in 1976, members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood engaged in heated debates about whether to field candidates or not, an 
unprecedented step in the history of the movement. Most of those Muslim Brotherhood 
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members who had contested the elections ran as independents. The debate centred on 
whether parliamentary elections conformed with Shari‘a especially in view of the 
controversy surrounding article 2 of the constitution.
416
 Some members were sceptical that 
any real change could be effected through the parliament. The movement held several 
meetings and consulted with Muslim Brotherhood in other countries such as Iraq, Egypt 
and Jordan after which it was decided they would field candidates and make article 2 of 
the constitution the focus of their campaign in addition to other legislations. It was not an 
easy decision especially since many members of the organisation were opposed to 
participating in the elections. Those members including Musa‘id al-ʿAbduljadir, were of 
the opinion that the Muslim Brotherhood was a social and education movement and should 
not involve itself in politics.
417
 
From the mid to the end of the 1980s, especially during the Monday diwanyyias, a general 
sense of dissatisfaction with the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in political life 
through the parliament and the Kuwait University Student Union, the conduit through 
which the movement fought its political battles against the government. This could be 
attributed to the fact that the president of al-Islah Abdullah Al-Mutawwa‘ enjoyed very 
close and warm relations with the ruling thanks to his brother ʿAbdulʿaziz. He was 
particularly close to the Crown Prince and Prime minister shaikh Sa’ad. The struggle 
between the movement and their members in parliament intensified following the 
movement’s decision to expel Abdullah al-Nafisi because he did not heed the movement’s 
orders. He ended up published a series of articles in al-Qabas Newspaper, later collected in 
book entitled “al-Harakah al-Islamiyya: Thagharat fi al-Tariq” [The Islamic Movement: 
Gaps along the Way], in which he criticised the movement and the way it was being run.
418
 
Al-Nafisi criticised what he perceived as the political, strategic and social shortcomings of 
the movement. On the political level, he condemned the movement for failing to develop a 
clear political vision and carve a place for itself on the political stage. Socially, he 
expressed his disapproval of the fact that the movement did not open up to the public and 
work remained limited to a select few. He remarked this meant that members of the public 
were put off by the movement’s air of mystery and lack of clear goals.419 Al-Nafisi also 
accused the movement of being stagnant and of refusing to indulge in any form of self-
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criticism or dialogue with the other.
420
 He reserved his harshest criticism for the leadership 
which he described as “tiresome, patriarchal, old, dictatorial and stuck in time.”421 
The disagreements with the movement’s leadership result in the expelling of some 
members such as al-Nafisi and the retirement of others.
422
 This was considered the most 
serious division in the history of the movement in Kuwait but did not lead to the collapse 
of the organisation which was mainly social and educational and therefore insulated from 
the political bloc. In general, political issues were debated within the movement and 
decisions were issued by the Shura council. Members were expected to abide by these 
decisions. 
5.9 Conclusion 
After the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait in the 1950s, the movement 
focused on social reform and the Islamisation of society. It sought to achieve these 
objectives through supporting Islamist MPs and other MPs sympathetic to its causes after 
Kuwait had won back its independence and a National Assembly had been established. 
Muslim Brotherhood members failed to win any parliamentary seats as independents, but 
as a movement, they succeeded in fielding several successful representatives in 1981; this 
was almost 14 years after the establishment of the new movement whose young members 
were now in their thirties. During the 1980s and the 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood 
entrenched itself as an important political player in Kuwait, especially following the 1990 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait when it became the central player in the post-liberation period. 
Their position was cemented by their establishment of the Islamic Constitutional 
Movement (ICM).  
Following the invasion, the Muslim Brotherhood and other political movements imposed a 
new reality, and from the early 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood began to make political 
demands, such as its calls for the legalisation of political parties, increasing political 
freedoms, and so on. Their social and religious demands naturally remained more pressing 
and more urgent in their discourse than their political demands. 
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Kuwait’s Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, are unique among their 
counterparts in other countries in that they have enjoyed very good relations with the 
government and the ruling family. Kuwait had retained the old ruling system from the days 
of the Umayyads; this was predicated on dividing the Islamic state into a political power 
(concerned with running the country, its finances, army, international relations and other 
political affairs under the direct control of the ruling family, the army chief and other 
politicians and sometimes the merchants as was the case with Kuwait), and a social power 
(concerned with the judiciary, issuing fatwas, education, and charity work). Although 
social services were shared by both the political and the religious powers, the latter had 
greater influence on providing services through its direct links with the Waqf and its 
allocations (e.g., in building schools and hospitals, and helping the poor). The boundaries 
were clear between these two sorts of power, and that status quo was maintained for a very 
long time. This should not be understood to mean that there were no clashes between 
political and religious powers.  
Thus the political system in Kuwait remained quite stable, unlike in several Arab countries 
where nationalist secularist movements overthrew old systems and replaced them with 
secularist ones, causing traditional ruling families and religious institutions to lose power. 
The biggest shock occurred when, after centuries of control, leadership of the social 
domain by religious institutions was appropriated.  In Egypt, for example, al-Azhar’s lands 
and Waqfs were nationalised in the 1950s to weaken it economically and bring it under the 
control of the new secularist government.  A number of western-style universities were 
established to pull the educational rug from under al-Azhar’s feet, and Nasser cracked 
down on the Muslim Brotherhood for fear they might mobilise the masses against him. He 
enlisted the help of secularists, socialists and nationalists in his war against the Muslim 
Brotherhood, who became engaged in an existential battle against an authority that was 
intent on wiping them out. The Muslim Brotherhood viewed this as a war against Islam 
and insisted on the need to replace the new regime with one that was more Islamic. The 
struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime persisted throughout the tenure 
of both Sadat and Mubarak.  
The situation was quite similar in other Arab countries like Iraq, Syria and Tunisia, and 
secularist movements in Kuwait attempted to do the same thing by imposing their own 
political agenda on the ruling family to pressure them to make changes to the ruling 
system. The secularist agenda was keen to imitate the changes in Egypt, which resulted in 
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the leading ruling family and the Islamists taking steps to resist these political and social 
threats to their existence. It was therefore quite natural that the interests of the government 
and the Islamists should converge to enable them to deflect the secularist threat and ensure 
the survival of the old system. 
In spite of its good treatment and tolerance of Islamists, the Kuwaiti government was 
nevertheless quite wary of them. The Islamists had been drawn upon as a balancing power 
in the conflict with the secularists, but the government remained constantly aware of the 
status of the Muslim Brotherhood as a regional power. These fears were further aggravated 
by the rise in their popularity during the invasion by Iraq and afterwards, as the Muslim 
Brotherhood forged ahead with building their social institutions in addition to the dynamic 
nature of the ICM in various social and political issues. All of this prompted the 
government to reject any amendments to Article 2 and to several other proposals by the 
Islamists. The authorities also sought to keep a more watchful eye on the activities of the 
general secretariat of the Waqf by introducing non-Brotherhood members and deposing 
Muslim Brotherhood ones.  
Other policies were used to contain the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood during the 
1990s, and when the Muslim Brotherhood joined efforts with the opposition in the 1980s 
and the 1990s, the government opted for a ‘divide and rule’ tactic by pitting the opposition 
groups against each other, especially as the opposition incorporated elements from 
secularist as well as Islamist movements (both Sunni and Shiʿi). In addition to this 
successful tactic, the government encouraged the emergence of ‘service MPs’ (MPs 
renowned for their skill and prowess in dealing with government red tape). Such privileges 
were extended to pro-government MPs only, thereby prompting voters to elect service 
MPs who would be able to help them process their paperwork much more rapidly.  
Thus the relationship between the Islamists and the government remained in a state of ebb 
and flow without any real confrontations occurring. Indeed, following the attacks on New 
York on the ‘events of 9/11,’ the Islamists were fiercely defended by the Kuwaiti 
government in the face of accusations levelled against them by the US, especially 
criticisms against their charity organisations. 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood movement in Kuwait undoubtedly had a great influence on 
Kuwaiti society, especially in the social domain which the Muslim Brotherhood sought to 
dominate. The Muslim Brotherhood’s interest in the social domain stems from their 
conviction that Islam is the society’s cultural compass and the repository of values and 
identity. For centuries, Islam has been the major component of the society, through the 
efforts of the religious establishment actors such as scholars who worked in schools, the 
judiciary, etc. The Muslim Brotherhood’s impact on the political domain was quite 
minimal due to the lack of any clear political project and the defensive position it adopted 
to protect its dominance over the social domain. From its establishment until 2005, the 
movement limited its political engagement to occasional collaboration with other political 
forces to demand certain political reforms. Although the difference between their role in 
the political and social domains emerges quite clearly when the two are compared over the 
first four decades of the movement’s activities in Kuwait, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
become increasingly influential in the political domain over the last two decades following 
the establishment of the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) as their political wing in 
1991. It is expected that the Muslim Brotherhood’s political role will witness even more 
dramatic changes as their activities intensify.  
There are the main conclusions reached during the course of thesis: first, The Muslim 
Brotherhood organisation in Kuwait is originally a social movement that sought to 
dominate the social domain which had historically been under the control of religious 
institutions. Inspired by the thinking of Islamist renaissance scholars such as Jamal al-Din 
al-Afghani, Muhammad ʿAbduh and Muhammad Rashīd Rida, the Muslim Brotherhood 
grew in influence as a reformist movement in some parts of the Arab world by regarding 
itself as a continuation of, or even a replacement, for religious establishment especially 
since its members hailed from all walks of life (preachers, scholars, teachers, etc.) who had 
previously been part of such establishment. The organisation attracted members from new 
segments, such as academics and businessmen, making it the most comprehensive 
movement in terms of covering both the social and political domains. In Kuwait the efforts 
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of all its members were directed towards serving the social goals of the movement 
(cultural education, moulding social and individual identity) especially after the secularist 
trend succeeded in controlling those aspects from the 1950s to the 1980s. The educational 
sector, originally under the control of the religious establishment, was gradually 
secularised, and secularists also exercised a great degree of influence over the media which 
replaced mosques. As far as Islamists were concerned, the biggest danger posed by 
Secularists was the introduction of several secularist articles into the Kuwaiti Constitution 
which ceased to consider Shariʿa “the main source” of legislation and instead regarded it 
as “a source of legislation”.  
Second, the original Muslim Brotherhood movement in Kuwait was inspired by the mother 
organisation in Egypt but after being greatly weakened, the movement sank into oblivion 
at the end of the 1950s. In 1968, ʿAbdulwahid Aman, a Kuwaiti who had been raised in the 
traditions of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood re-established the organisation. A number of 
Muslim Brotherhood members, such as Abdullah al-ʿAqil, relocated from Zubair in the 
south of Iraq to Kuwait where they spread the movement’s philosophy and ideas. 
Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid who was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Baghdad, 
was the chief theorist of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. Thus, it can be argued that 
the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood had the biggest influence on its sister movement in Kuwait 
starting from 1968. It is worth noting that the Muslim Brotherhood of Iraq was a highly 
secretive and vigilant movement which took great care in selecting its new members. 
Noted for its highly organised structure, it was renowned for the moral and religious 
training its members had to undertake, in addition to being schooled in the art of leadership 
and management to help shoulder the movement’s grand task of educating society. The 
Iraqi model was so effective that Muslim Brotherhood movements everywhere strove to 
emulate the standards of their Iraqi counterpart. The Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood members 
transposed their experiences onto the Kuwait branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, thus 
establishing a solid, well-structured organisation whose members were carefully selected 
and trained.  The 1968 Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood organization, too, opted not to carry 
out its activities in the open to the extent it eventually became overly secretive and 
complicated in a society known for its open and simple way of life. Despite the success of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in establishing this well-organised movement, it became 
gradually more accommodating of Kuwaiti realities by publicly announcing its activities 
and the identity of its members, and even exposing its political wing, the ICM. 
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Third, the Muslim Brotherhood had originally participated in political life indirectly 
through their links with conservatives or Islamic politicians as evident from the legislation 
banning alcohol and attempts to amend Article 2 of the Constitution. The Muslim 
Brotherhood then engaged with union activities, usually a precursor to full political 
participation. They succeeded in dominating a number of professional associations and 
organization such as the National Union of Kuwaiti Students. In the 1980s, the Muslim 
Brotherhood won two parliamentary seats, thus consolidating their influence over the 
social and political domains. They established the ICM, their political wing, but this foray 
into the political was intended only to serve their aim of dominating the social domain, 
since they were convinced they needed political gains in order to protect their influence in 
the social domain. All the issues the Muslim Brotherhood fought for politically were of a 
social nature such as banning alcohol, amending Article 2 of the Constitution, banning 
mixed gender education and outlawing usury. However, none of this prevented the Muslim 
Brotherhood from joining other political forces in mobilising for political issues. A special 
understanding between the Muslim Brotherhood and the ruling establishment was born out 
of the realisation that the secularists were a mutual enemy that they had to combat, 
especially as the secularists were attempting to control both the social and political 
domains. The Muslim Brotherhood refrained from opposing the government except in very 
rare cases and on a limited scale. The real enemy was presented in the shape of the 
secularists who posed a danger to both the Muslim Brotherhood and the government in the 
political domain, especially since secularists had the backing of their counterparts in other 
Arab countries. Even so, the ruling establishment did not give free rein to the Islamists, as 
it did not wish to replace its secularist enemy with an Islamist one. 
 
Fourth, the Muslim Brotherhood employed several methods to control the social domain 
by establishing a number of successful social organisations, the most prominent and 
successful being al-Irshad, followed by al-Islah. The activities of these two organisations 
included charity work, training and educating the youth, daʿwah and media activities (al-
Irshad and al-Mujtamaʿ journals), in addition to some indirect political activities. The 
Muslim Brotherhood focused on effecting change at the grassroots level; hence their 
objective of putting together a base of members from all specialisations. Social activities 
such as education and religious scholarship were the main avenues through which the 
Muslim Brotherhood pursed their interests in the social domain, and explains why schools 
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and mosques were their main field of operations. They gradually succeeded in reshaping 
social identity by pulling society more towards the conservative right, especially during the 
1980s and 1990s. The hijab is a very clear example; during the 1970s there were very few 
girls donning the Muslim head cover but in the 1990s, the number of women wearing the 
hijab far exceeded those who did not. 
 
Fifth, the Muslim Brotherhood’s brand of activism is best represented by Munson’s theory 
of integrating thought with structure, and Asef Bayat’s theory of social movements. 
Bayat’s theory of ‘imagined solidarity’ explains the spread of Islamic thinking throughout 
society, but he did not elaborate on the mechanisms for spreading those ideas. Munson, 
however, covers this aspect in his examination of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
argues that the movement integrated its intellectual sources into the structure of the 
organisations. Munson further comments that daʿwah is the best example of synthesising 
Islamic teachings with organised work. This explains why the Muslim Brotherhood has 
been so successful in spreading their ideas, despite the security and political challenges 
they have encountered from Arab governments everywhere. When applying these two 
theories in the Kuwaiti context, that of ‘imagined solidarity’ explains the spread of the 
general acceptance of Islamic ideas in the society, especially after the 1967 War when 
Islamists used the defeat to put the blame on the Secularists. Islamists also used ‘imagined 
solidarity’ to prohibit alcohol consumption when they waged a strong campaign against it. 
Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, also used daʿwah to spread their message in 
the society starting from the young generation in schools and at Kuwait University. Both 
theories were used by the Muslim Brotherhood to control the social domain and spread 
Islamic ideology in the society.  
 
As a dynamic movement capable of adapting to new realities, the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Kuwait will engage with the political domain in a new manner that reflects its ability to 
change and shift according to the needs of the time.  This is a natural progression for a 
movement which has always aimed to enforce certain social values. Now, with the 
introduction into the Muslim Brotherhood’s discourse of values such as freedom, social 
justice and democracy, these notions have acquired an Islamic identity. The relationship 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and the ruling establishment is also bound to change as 
fresh realities create the need for new alliances. 
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As the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Kuwait advanced in age along with its solid 
base on which the movement was founded and as the number of its members increased and 
it became quite active in the political domain during the 1990-91 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
it was inevitable for the movement to progress into a new and more complex phase. On the 
one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood’s relationship with the ruling family and society at 
large became more multi-faceted and complex since 1991. The horizontal spread of 
Muslim Brotherhood ideas helped them reach both urban and tribal areas. At the same 
time, the Muslim Brotherhood itself was also influenced by the environment into which it 
was born. In tribal areas, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood was influenced by tribal 
structures as evident from the fact that several Muslim Brotherhood members contested 
parliamentary seats on tribal platforms during the 1990s, a move which in principle 
contradicts with the tenets of their membership. This gave rise to several dilemmas; should 
the member heed the Movement’s or the tribe’s political opinions? Social and tribal 
pressure intensified on tribal members who were also Muslim Brotherhood members in 
addition to some Muslim Brotherhood affiliates complaining of the strict need for secrecy, 
especially among the much older members who refused to obey orders unless there was an 
acceptable rationale behind them. 
The biggest hurdle to overcome was the generational conflict which also plagued other 
branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the Sudan, for example, young members rebelled 
in 1999 against Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the movement. As the original base of the 
movement continues to be controlled by the older generation, young members find 
themselves unable sometimes to impose their own fresh vision on the movement. Since 
2005, the height of the confrontation occurs in the field of politics where the younger 
generation in Kuwait grapples with issues such as freedoms, pluralism and political 
participation, issues that the older generation did not allude to. Thus the pressing question 
is: how can young Muslim Brotherhood members compete with the ruling family over its 
long-held control of the political domain which the Muslim Brotherhood had for decades 
conceded to the ruling family in return for full control over the social domain. 
Undoubtedly, the examination of the Muslim Brotherhood experience in Kuwait is 
important for understanding the dynamics of Islamic movements in the Gulf, especially for 
scholars who are interested in studying the political and social history of Islamic 
movements. In addition, such a study helps examine how western theories of social 
movements could be modified to apply to non-western contexts. 
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Appendix A 
Petition Addressed to ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Ali al-Mutawwaʿ 
by the Members of al-Irshad 
 
Dear honourable Brother ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Ali al-Mutawwaʿ 
General Observer of Jamiʿiyyat al-Irshadal-Islami in Kuwait 
 
Assalamu alaikum wa rahmatu Allah wa barakatuh.. 
We have been sad since we read your letter in Al-Biʿtha Journal about your will of 
resigning from the burden of leading al-Irshad. How could our older brother resign and the 
beginning of the road of spreading God’s word among people? How can he resign after 
giving him our trust and leadership as a brother, a friend, and a leader who promised his 
solders to be with them in good times and bad times and in return they promised him to 
obey him in what they like or hate until God fulfil his promise to believers.  We all know 
about your responsibilities and business, however, our belief in your sincerity, 
responsibility, your preference for the hereafter rather than this ephemeral life as God says 
“And who is better in speech than one who invites to Allah and does righteousness and 
says, “Indeed, I am of the Muslims.”” (44:33), and your fulfilling of leadership 
qualifications as Islam explains makes you the best person who can take this responsibility 
which is still in around your neck. 
Therefore, in the name of our brotherhood and this holy mission, we ask you to write back 
Al-Biʿtha Journal that you are still with us on the road as a leader of this organization. 
Also, we would like to mention to you that your request for withdrawing your nomination 
for the election of choosing the General Observer of al-Irshad is not accepted because 
people choose who they want to represent them, who they trust and love, and whenever a 
person is chosen by people he cannot reject them. Thus, consolidate your determination to 
walk with us on this road that God chose for us. May Allah bless you and guide you to 
righteousness.  
Assalamu alaikum wa rahmatu Allah.  
[Signatures of 45 members of al-Irshad]
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 A copy of the letter is in possession of Ahmad ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Mutawwaʿ. 
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Appendix B 
Report of the Fact-Finding Committee on the Events 
Surrounding the Symposium on Mixed-Gender Education at 
the University of Kuwait 
 
The Committee held four meetings on 22, 23, 27 and 30 November 1971 at the conference 
room of the University Council. The meetings were presided over by the Minister of 
Education, the President of the University and the following members: 
Mr Anwar al-Nuri  University Secretary General 
Mr Jasim al-Saqir  University Council Member 
Mr Hasan al-Ibrahīm  Lecturer at the Department of Political Science 
Mr Yusif al-Sumaiṭ  Teaching assistant at the Geography Department 
The committee examined the case thoroughly and conducted a number of interviews to 
gain deeper insight into the events that occurred at the symposium. Members listened to 
statements from students, organisers of the symposium, students opposed to holding the 
symposium and some members of the audience from outside the university; some opposed 
to and some who support the idea of mixed-gender education. The witnesses were: 
1. Students: 
A. Naji ʿAbdulʿaziz al-Ibrahim al-Muʾawwad Economics (third year) 
B. Ghassan Nisif al-Yusif al-Nisif Business (fourth year) 
C. Badir ʿAbduwahab Sayyid al-Rifaʿi Science (Second year) 
D. Bashir Saleh Thnian Science (First year) 
E. Muhammad Mahmud al-Raḥmani Law (fourth year) 
F. Hamad Falih Humud al-Rushaid History (fourth year) 
G. Hamīd Mansur Qasim (ʿAbdulamid al-Sarraf) Law (third year) 
H. Wadha al-Khali Economics (second year) 
 
2. Others: 
A. Mr Muhammad Musaʿid al-Saleh Lawyer 
B. Mr Sulaiman al-Mutawwaʿ Employee at the KOC 
C. Mr Ali Maʿrafi Assistant Librarian Kuwait University  
D. Mr Yusif Qattan Employee, Min. of Electricity & Water 
E. Mr Humud al-Mudian Director of an Orphanage 
F. Mr ʿAbdulwahid Aman Employee at the Municipality  
The committee listened to a tape recording of the symposium, examined many 
photographs taken during the incident and reviewed all the discussions at the Parliament 
and on the pages of newspapers.  
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The committee discussed the following points: 
 The right of the National Union of Kuwaiti Students (The University of Kuwait 
branch) to hold the symposium as part of its cultural and social activities. 
 Students opposed to the symposium and their right to voice their opinions, the 
manner to do so and how opinions were actually expressed during the symposium.  
 The type of audience who attend the symposium and their role in what occurred. 
 The causes behind the ensuing state of tension and disorder. 
 The accusations that arose in the Parliament that the symposium had included 
offensive statements about the Qurʾan. 
The Committee concluded the following: 
The National Union of Kuwaiti Students (Kuwait University branch) was established three 
years ago and is supervised by an annually-elected administrative body. The Union 
organises many social and cultural activities. It has held a number of social and 
entertainment gatherings and several cultural symposiums, the latest being the symposium 
on mixed-gender education to which the following were invited to speak: 
MP Khalid al-Masud, Dr. Saʿad ʿAbdulrahman, Mrs Fatimah Husain, Dr ʿAbdulʿaziz 
Sulṭan. 
As is the case with any society, big or small, or a group of people, and even members of 
the same family, several points of view are bound to emerge. Some might support a certain 
opinion while others oppose it. In a democratic system like the one we have in Kuwait, the 
opposition represents the views of the minority and if with time it succeeds in convincing 
the masses of the validity of its opinions, it becomes the majority and the other side 
becomes the opposing minority. This is what elections are for. 
The student community at the University of Kuwait includes some students who are 
opposed to the administrative body of The National Union of Kuwaiti students-University 
of Kuwait branch. As such and because they oppose the principle of mixed-gender 
education seeing that they are very conservative and religious, they seized the opportunity 
to express their views at the symposium and to stand up to the National Union of Kuwaiti 
Students (Kuwait University branch) especially in view of the fact that none of the 
participants was opposed to the notion of mixed-gender education. 
None of the opposition contacted the organisers of the symposium or any university 
official to request they be extended the opportunity to speak and express their opinions. 
Nor did they follow procedure by waiting for the floor to open in order to express their 
opinions and debate their views as part of the discussion that follows the end of speeches.  
Nor did they resort to any other democratic means such as holding their own symposium 
or conference to present the opposition’s point of view backed up by evidence. Indeed, the 
opposition did not resort to any of these democratic methods but four of them: Bashir 
Saleh Thnian, Muhammad Mahmud al-Rahmani, Hamad Faleh Hamad al-Rushaid, and 
Hamīd Mansur Qasim chose to voice their opposition as soon as the symposium started 
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and before any of the other participants had the chance to utter a single word. They took 
advantage of the tension in the hall and the type of audience in attendance who supported 
their shouting and screams and before anyone knew what was happening, some members 
of the audience had pushed forth two other members (Muhammad Mahmud al-Rahmani 
and Hamad Faleh) and demanded they be allowed to participate. 
The organisers of the symposium did not wish the situation to spiral further out of control 
and so decided to break with tradition and give in to the shouts and demands of the 
audience to add Muhammad Mahmud al-Rahmani and Hamad Faleh to the panel of 
speakers.  They had no intention of allowing them actually to speak and so when it was 
their turn to take the floor, electricity was cut off to their microphones because the 
organisers were not happy with the way these two speakers were foisted upon them by an 
unruly audience. 
In the meantime, a member of the audience (Mr Yusif al-Qattan who works at the Ministry 
of Electricity and Water) leapt onto the podium with a copy of the Qur’an in his hand and 
waved it in the air as evidence against mixed-gender education. He placed it in front of the 
participants and left it there before getting off the platform and allowed Muhammad 
Mahmud al-Rahmani to take his place. This behaviour only served to aggravate the tension 
in the hall. 
In light of these unfortunate events and the disorder and chaos that ensued during which 
expletives were exchanged between the two sides, especially since the moderator Badir al-
Rifaʿi was in a very bad state of agitation after being interrupted, one of the participants 
(Mr Khalid al-Masud) decided to quit the session, while another participant (Mrs Fatimah 
Husain) refused to speak. Only Dr Saʿad ʿAbdulrahman and Dr ʿAbdulʿaziz Sultan agreed 
to address the audience. Despite the participation of the opposition, the chaos continued 
until the noise drowned the speakers’ voices. This left the impression that the opposition 
was there simply to wreak havoc and voice their objections regardless of the opinions 
being debated.  
The events that transpired have required the committee to examine a number of factors: the 
subject and timing of the symposium, who was invited and how, and the finally the 
circumstances that aggravated the existing tensions between the various groups. 
With regard to the subject of the symposium, some of those interviewed contended that the 
subject encouraged mixed-gender education which is morally corrupt and contravenes the 
teaching of Islam. They also objected to the symposium being held in the last days of the 
holy month of Ramadan which are considered very sacred to Muslims.  
Others pointed out that the neither the topic nor the timing of the symposium were 
offensive and that all topics should be debated within the realm of science and religion. 
They also remarked that the topic had already been debated on national television with the 
participation of two members of parliament and a lawyer. Similarly, the Alumni Club had 
held another symposium two years before with the participation of the Society for Social 
Reform. Thus, the symposium was not guaranteed to approve of mixed-gender education. 
  223 
Yet the symposium became the subject of heated debates on radio shows during the holy 
month of Ramadan, in Friday sermons and during religious tutorials in which Imams and 
religious scholars condemned the central premise of the symposium. They encouraged 
their followers and students to attend and many impressionable young people responded to 
these calls (see photographs 1 and 2 of the audience). They showed up in groups quite 
early in the day to occupy their seats in the hall. It was very evident they were neither 
university students nor regular members of the audience who usually attend cultural events 
at the university’s auditorium.  Nor did they attend out of interest in religious matters; just 
one week before on the 19 of Ramadan, a symposium entitled “A Journey with the 
Qurʾan” with the participation of Professor of Sharʿia, Dr Muhammad Salam Madkur, was 
held and only the front rows were occupied. Young people were further agitated by the 
attack launched by al-Mujtamaʿ Journal against the university, its administration, Council, 
students and Students’ Union, prompting the Union to issue a formal response. 
Some witnesses said that Mr ʿAbdulahid Aman who was among those present would 
signal to the audience to shout or desist and they would obey his cues. Aman denied the 
accusations. 
It is worth mentioning that the invitation to the symposium, similar to any other cultural 
symposium held in Kuwait was not by special invitation. Several newspapers (al-Siyasah, 
13 November 1971, al-Taliʿah 13 November 1971) had printed the invitation on its pages. 
The symposium received a mention on television in addition to the symposium being 
advertised by word of mouth. 
It was against the backdrop of these tensions that the symposium was held and the 
audience attended. When the opposing students began to shout and challenge the speakers 
in the manner outlined above, the two sides got caught up in a shouting and cursing match 
(see photograph 3). As the situation got gradually out of control, members of the audience 
were shouting from all directions, especially members of the opposition. The symposium 
organisers felt compelled to call the police and request troops to keep order for fear the 
situation might worsen. The interruptions and the shouting continued even after two of the 
opposition were allowed to take a seat on the podium. Only two of the original participants 
were able to speak (Dr Saʿad ʿAbdulrahman and Dr ʿAbdulʿaziz Sultan). The chaos 
persisted, a clear indication that the opposition was quite intent on thwarting the 
symposium rather than taking part in it. The organisers advised the Union’s students to 
suspend the symposium to avoid any further deterioration of the situation. The president of 
the National Union called upon the Union’s members and female students to leave the hall. 
The opposition tried to object to their departure so the organisers turned off the 
microphones and switched off the lights. People rushed to the doors and the staircase in a 
great state of agitation. Some members of the audience got into a fist fight which resulted 
in two minor injuries. 
Based on all the evidence and the statements made by witnesses from both sides, the 
committee hereby confirms that the Holy Qur’an was not desecrated in any way. It is 
Allah’s book that everyone takes great care in protecting. 
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The committee is honoured to present the results of its investigations to the esteemed 
Cabinet. 
 
Minister of Education and President of the University 
Jasim Khalid al-Marzuq
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Appendix C 
Proposal for Amending Article 2 of the Constitution of Kuwait 
 
After reviewing the Constitution, especially Articles 2, 174 and 175 thereof, the National 
Assembly hereby ratifies the following Constitutional Law. 
Article (1)  
Article (2) of the Constitution of the State of Kuwait shall be amended as follows: “Islam 
is the religion of the state. Islamic Shariʿa is the source of legislations.” 
Article (2) 
The prime minister and ministers concerned shall implement this amendment which shall 
become valid on the day of its publication in the Official Gazette.  
 
A Memorandum explaining the text of the law was published to ensure that the law was 
interpreted as intended. The memorandum read as follows: 
Almighty Allah has commanded in many verses of the Qur’ran that Shariʿa should be the 
source of legislation; “And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is 
those who are the disbelievers” (5:45), “But no, by your Lord, they will not [truly] believe 
until they make you, [O Muhammad], judge concerning that over which they dispute 
among themselves and then find within themselves no discomfort from what you have 
judged and submit in [full, willing] submission” (5:65),“Legislation is not but for Allah” 
(12:40). These verses and many others demonstrate that it is forbidden to drawn upon any 
other source of legislation or consider it equal to Shariʿa. It is well-known that Allah 
almighty knows what is best for people and has enacted legislations that ensure their 
stability, security and peace of mind in all aspects of their lives. Secular laws that violate 
Allah’s laws are incapable of tackling all the problems people face in their daily lives and 
often lead to intractable problems. 
In addition to this, Allah’s laws are as perfect as Allah’s abilities and knowledge and 
suitable for times and places. It is comprehensible covering all aspects of political, 
economic, and social life. Allah says “This day I have perfected for you your religion and 
completed My favour upon you and have approved for you Islam as religion.” (5:4). 
The Constitution promulgated in 1962 postulated that “Shariʿa is a main source of 
legislations”, not that “Shariʿa is the source of legislations”. All efforts exerted by the 
Foundational Council and later National Assemblies to adopt the more binding version of 
the law failed miserably. 
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As such, the degree to which Shariʿa should be the source of legislation was left to the 
discretion of lawmakers as shown by the Explanatory Memorandum which stated that “the 
text of the law in the Constitution calls upon lawmakers to draw upon Shariʿa as much as 
they can.” Yet despite this explicit prompting, after 19 years no serious efforts had been 
undertaken to adopt the dictates of Islamic Shariʿa.   
The passage of time demonstrated that the promptings of the explanatory memorandum to 
rely on Islamic Shariʿa as a source of legislation was not sufficient to make Shariʿa the 
sole source. It would thus seem imperative that a more constitutionally binding article of 
law would need to be incorporated to prohibit any source but Shariʿa from being adopted. 
This amendment would put an end to the dispute among jurists by placing Islamic Shariʿa 
at the forefront of legislation. In other words, Shariʿa would be considered the only main 
source from which all legislations derived their provisions while other sources would 
become secondary, to be used only when there were no relevant provisions in Shariʿa law. 
The current text of the Constitution which stipulates Shariʿa as a source of legislation is 
not binding and leave matters to the discretion of lawmakers. What is required is a law that 
codifies that injunction. This would protect the country from legislative chaos and would 
not leave the door open for appealing the applications of Shariʿa. Making the necessary 
amendments to Article 2 would embody the spirit of Islam which encourages gradual 
change. 
The term Islamic Shariʿa refers to the Qur’an, the Hadith, Consensus, and Ijtihad. 
Ijtihad or “independent reasoning” is the method by which Shariʿa is made suitable for all 
times and places.  
The new text of the Constitution does not prohibit regular lawmakers from adopting 
secular laws or other legislations, as long as they do not violate the principles of Shariʿa 
and serve the interests of the country, Muslims, and justice. Nor would the new text 
propose changes to the current system of rule since Islamic Shariʿa does not specify how a 
ruler is chosen; rather it commands Muslims to follow the principles of shura in selecting 
their rulers.
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